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Resume
Au cours d'une transaction portant sur une acceptation bancaire (ci-apres «BA»
tel que d,enommee dans Ie jargon juridique) differents types de relations peuvent s'etablir
entre les parties impliquees, certaines plus directes que d'autres. Dans une transaction
donnee, a part Ie client et la banque, on peut trouver une ou plusieurs banques
participantes et un ou plusieurs investisseurs, qui deviennent detenteurs de BA. La
situation peut devenir complexe et les relations legales risquent de devenir assez
compliquees. Cependant, il est important d'identifier si la relation s'est etablie atravers
l'instrument de BA, si elle existe par Ie biais d'une relation contractuelle ordinaire ou
encore, si elle existe par Ie fait de la loi. Dne bonne analyse des circonstances entourant la
transaction, des facteurs connexes ala transaction et des droits et obligations qui existent
entre les parties, sera necessaire pour determiner laquelle de la loi provinciale ou federale
s'appliquera, et dans quelle mesure.
Dne fois accordee, la BA est gouvernee par la Loi sur les lettres de change.
Toutes solutions apportees it un probleme qui implique des BA, doivent, en principe,
respecter la nature inherente de la BA en tant qu'effet de commerce, gouverne par la loi
federale. En matiere de BA, c'est, soit la Loi sur les lettres de change soit la Loi sur les
lettres et billets de depot (Depository Bills and Note Act) qui s'appliqueront a l'acte.
Comme il existe des lois federales applicables a la BA, l'objet de notre etude est de
determiner si, et dans quelle circonstance la loi de la province, tel que Ie Code civil du
Quebec, trouvera application et eclaircira dans certains cas la disposition contenue dans
la Loi sur les lettres de change, notamment lorsque les dispositions de ladite loi sont
silencieuses ou ambigues.
La solution la plus simple serait d'appliquer la loi provinciale aux matieres qui ne
sont pas traitees dans la loi, etant donne que les lois provinciales apportent souvent un
complement ala legislation federale. Cependant, la Loi sur les lettres de change contient
des dispositions speciales, tel que l'article 9 qui stipule :
9. Les regles de la common law d'Angleterre, y compris en droit commercial, s 'appliquent aux lettres,
billets et cheques dans la mesure de leur compatibilite avec les dispositions expresses de la presente
loi.
Cette disposition a cree une certaine confusion relativement a l'application du
droit civil du Quebec en matiere de Lettres de change. En effet, il existe un doute quant a
savoir si l'application de l'article 9 est une incorporation par reference qui exclue
totalement l'application du droit civil. Cette question continue de se poser
inexorablement dans la doctrine et la jurisprudence. Elle a en effet donne lieu aune serie
de theories quand au degre d'application de la common lawen matiere de lettres de
change. Une revue de la jurisprudence dominante nous permet de conclure que les
tribunaux ont accepte l'application du droit provinciale dans certaines questions
impliquant les lettres de change.
La question essentielle traitee lors de notre analyse est la suivante: lorsqu'un litige
prend naissance dans une transaction de BA, quelle est la regIe qui devra s' appliquer?
Quel sera Ie droit qui gouvernera les problemes emergeant dans une BA, celui du Code
Civil du Quebec ou celui de la common law d'Angleterre?
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Etant donne Ie nombre de cas qui sont portes devant les cours de justice en
rapport avec des transactions de BA, comprendre quelle sera la loi applicable est d'une
importance fondamentale. Pour repondre a cette question, nous commencerons par un
examen de l'historique, du developpement et de l'evolution de la BA. Afin de mieux
comprendre la BA, nous debuterons par un bref survol des origines de cet instrument
juridique. Dans Ie deuxieme chapitre, nous analyserons la nature et Ie caractere legal de la
BA. Cela constituera Ie cadre aux travers duquel nous pourrons identifier les regles et les
principes qui s'appliquent aux differents aspects de la transaction de BA. Le chapitre trois
fera l'objet d'un examen detaille des mecanismes de l'operation de BA tout en etudiant
de pres les exigences imposees par la legislation applicable.
Apres avoir examine l'aspect legal de la BA, nous procederons au chapitre quatre,
a l'etude de l'applicabilite de la loi provinciale relativement a certains aspects de la
transaction de BA. A cet effet, nous examinerons les differentes approches de
comprehension de la Loi sur les lettres de change et plus particulierement la
problematique rencontree a l'article 9. Nous etudierons aussi l'application et
l'interpretation de cette loi par les tribunaux du Quebec au cours du siecle demier. Les
juges et les juristes se sont penches sur les sens qu'a voulu donner Ie legislateur lorsqu'il
a stipule dans l'article 9 «Le regles de la common law d'Angleterre, y compris en droit
commercial, s 'appliquent aux lettres, billets et cheques dans la mesure de leur
compatibilite avec les dispositions expresses de la presente loi ». Cette section doit-elle
etre appliquee a la lettre, nous obligeant a appliquer la common law d'Angleterre a
chaque probleme qui peut se poser en relation avec les lettres et les billets? Le Parlement
a-t-ill'intention que cette disposition s'applique egalement au Quebec, dont Ie droit prive
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est base sur Ie systeme du Code Civil? Notre etude pOltera sur les differentes approches
d'interpretation qui offrent une diversite de solutions au probh~me pose par l'article 9.
Finalement, compte tenu des nouveaux developpements legislatifs, au chapitre
cinq, nous proposons' une methode en vue de determiner la loi applicable aux differents
aspects de la transaction de BA. Notre analyse nous a conduit a adopter la solution
proposee par la majorite des juristes, ala difference que notre approche de l'article 9 est
basee sur des raisons de politique. Nous avons donc adopte la stricte dichotomie (en tant
qu'effet negociable d'une palt, et d'une sorte de contrat et de propriete de l'autre) en
prenant en compte les difficultes inherentes a detenniner quand l'un finit et l'autre
commence.
En conclusion, selon notre opinion, il existe deux solutions. Premierement, il y a
la possibilite que l'article 9 puisse etre ecalte. Dans ce cas, toutes les matieres qui ne sont
pas expressement evoquees dans la loi tomberont dans la competence de la loi
provinciale, comme c'est Ie cas dans d'autres types de legislations fed6rales. Dans ces
situations, Ie droit civil du Quebec joue un role suppIetif dans les applications d'une loi
federale au Quebec.
Deuxiemement, modifier l'article 9 plutOt que d'en ecarter son application offre
une autre possibilite. Incorporer la large stricte dichotomie dans l'article 9 nous semble
etre une solution preferable. La disposition pourrait se lire comme suit: <<Les regles de la
common law d'Angleterre incluant Ie droit commercial dans fa mesure ou elles ne sont
pas incompatibles avec les dispositions expresses de la Loi, s 'appliquent aux lettres,
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billets, et cheques au sens stricte. Pour plus de certitude, les lettres et les billets au sens
strict, incluent la forme, la delivrance et I 'emission des lettres, billets, et cheques.»
Ce type de changement se revelera etre un pas important dans Ie but de clarifier Ia
loi et determiner l'equilibre atrouver entre l'application des lois federales et provinciales
en matiere de BA.
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Resume
When dealing with a BA transaction several types of relationships may develop,
some more direct than others. In any given transaction, aside from the customer and
bank, there may be one or more participating banks, investment dealers, or multiple
investors, who become holders of the BA. The situation may be complex and the legal
relationships may become quite intricate. However, it is important to identify whether the
relationship is established through the BA instrument, or whether it exists by ordinary
contractual relationship or by operation of law. Proper analysis of the surrounding
circumstances, the connecting factors, and the obligations and the rights which exist
between the parties, will be necessary in determining whether or not the contractual rules
of the provinces, or federal law rules apply, and to what extent.
Granted, the BA instrument is clearly govemed by the Bills of Exchange Act.
Any solution introduced to a problem involving a BA must, in principle, respect the
inherent nature of the BA as a negotiable instrument, govemed by federal law. In the case
of BAs, either the Bills of Exchange Act or the Depository Bills and Notes Act will apply
to the instrument. Since there are applicable federal rules to BAs, the purpose of our
study is to determine if, and under what circumstances, provincial law, such as the Civil
Code of Quebec, would find application with respect to BAs and complement the
provisions of the Bills of Exchange Act where the statute is silent or ambiguous.
The simple solution would be to apply provincial law to those matters not
addressed in the Act, as provincial law typically compliments federal legislation.
However, the Bills of Exchange Act contains a peculiar provision, namely section 9,
which provides:
9. The rules of the common law of England, including the law merchant, save in so far as they are
inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act, apply to bills, notes and cheques.
This provision has created confusion as to the appropriate application of Quebec
civil law to matters of bills of exchange. Indeed, there is doubt as to whether section 9 is
in fact an incorporation by reference that effectively precludes the application of civil
law. The problem continues to be a contentious issue in the doctrine and jurisprudence.
The "inexorable character" of the problem created by the interpretation of this provision
has given rise to a number of diverse theories regarding the extent of the applicability of
common law to matters of bills of exchange.
As we can clearly conclude from a review of the jurisprudence, the courts, for the most
part, have been conciliatory to the application of provincial law in issues involving bills
of exchange. The majority of judges express a hesitance to jeopardize the integrity of the
provincial law as complimentary law in order to accommodate the idea that Parliament's
desire was to enact an extensive and far-reaching law of bills and notes. The position of
most doctrinal writers is very much the same.
The essential question of our analysis is which rules will govern the issues, which
emerge within BAs - the Civil Code of Quebec or the common law of England? From a
Canadian perspective, understanding which law is applicable to BAs is of paramount
importance, since courts are dealing with an increasing amount of banker's acceptance
transactions.
To answer this question, we will begin with an examination of the origin and
evolution of the banker's acceptance. In Chapter Two, we will also analyze the nature
and legal character of the BA. This will establish the framework through which we can
identify the rules and principles that apply to the various aspects of the BA transaction. In
Chapter Three, we examine the mechanics of the BA operation step-by-step, paying close
attention to the requirements imposed by legislation. We look at the laws applicable to
the BA and describe the various agreements pertaining to the BA. Having examined the
legal nature of the BA as being a negotiable instrument governed by federal law and a
contract and moveable pursuant to the Civil Code of Quebec, we will proceed in Chapter
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Four to consider the applicability of provincial law to aspects of the BA transaction. To
this end, we examine different approaches to understanding the Bills of Exchange Act,
particularly the problematic section 9, as well as the applicable law as understood in
Quebec jurisplUdence during the past century. Judges and jurists alike have attempted to
understand what was meant when the legislator stated in section 9, "[t]he rules of the
common law of England, including the law merchant, save in so far as they are
inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act, apply to bills, notes and cheques."l Is
this section to be interpreted literally, requiring us to apply English common law to evelY
issue that might arise in connection with bills and notes? Does Parliament intend this
provision to apply equally to Quebec, whose private law is based on the civil law system?
Our study will look to interpretive approaches offering a variety of different solutions to
the problem of section 9.
Finally, given new legislative developments, in Chapter Five, we offer a proposed
method to detelmine the law applicable to various aspects of the BA transaction. Our
analysis has lead us to adopt the result advocated by the majority of jurists, but with the
recognition that our approach to section 9 is based on reasons of policy. We have adopted
the strict/wide dichotomy, (as a negotiable instlUment on the one hand, and as a specie of
contract and property on the other hand) realizing the difficulties inherent in determining
where one ends and the other begins.
Therefore, in our opinion there exist two solutions. Firstly, there is the possibility
that section 9 could be repealed. In this case, all matters not expressly dealt with in the
Act would fall to be governed by provincial law, as. is the case with other federal
legislation. In these situations, Quebec civil law takes on a suppletive role in applying a
federal law in Quebec. Secondly, there is the possibility of modifying rather than
repealing section 9. Incorporating the strict/wide dichotomy into section 9 itself seems to
us to be a more preferable solution. The provision could read, "The rules of the common
law of England, including the law merchant, save in so far as they are inconsistent with
I R.S. 1985, c. C-5, s. 9.
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the express provisions of this Act, apply to bills, notes and cheques in a strict sense. For
greater certainty, bills and notes in a strict sense include the form, issue, negotiation and
discharge of bills, notes and cheques." Alternatively, a Law Reform Commission could
draft an Act that defines section 9 according to the strict /wide dichotomy.
These types of changes would prove to be an important step to clarifying the law,
and strike the appropriate balance between the application of federal and provincial law
to bankers' acceptances.
Keywords
Acceptance
Agreements
Assignment
BA
BA Agreement
BADrafts
Banker's Acceptance
Bank Act
Bank ofCanada Act
Banks
Bank Transaction
Bills
Bills ofExchange
Bills ofExchange Act
Civil Code ofQuebec
Contract ofsale
Correspondent Bank
Credit Agreement
Delegation
DepositOTY Bills
Deposit01Y Bills & Notes Act
Discount
Exportation
Guarantee
Federal Law - Civil Law
Harmomization Act, No 1
Importation
InteTpretation Act
Issuing Bank
Letters ofcredit
Loan
Mandate
Maturity
Notes
Novation
Participation Agreement
Participation Banks
Paying Bank
RolyPoly
Stipulation for another
Transactions
9
Introduction
In the international business community, letters of credit are the common method
of paying suppliers overseas. The problem, however, is that payment is often made on
terms that require it immediately, before the delivery of merchandise. To help in these
structures, banks introduced the bankers' acceptance (BA), a bill that expedites payment.
BAs2 have progressively become a more attractive means of financing for corporate
borrowers. BAs are bills of exchange, but what sets BAs apart from other bills of
exchange is that they are drawn on a bank. A BA is a bill of exchange drawn on and
accepted by a bank, whereby the drawer orders the bank to pay a named person or the
payee, a specified sum of money on a specified date.3 The bank thus acts as drawee and
acceptor of the draft.4 "The principal use of the bankers' acceptance is to permit the
drawer to use the credit of the bank as a means of obtaining money."s Because the bank's
liability is engaged, money can be raised at a more favorable rate. 6
2 "Bankers' acceptances", "acceptances", "bills" and "BA" will be used interchangeably throughout the
text.
3 See Margaret H. OGILVIE, Canadian Banking Law, 2nd ed., Scarborough, Carswell, 1998, p. 426;
Edmund M.A. KWAW, "Debt Financing", (1998) 17 Nat 'I Banking L. Rev. p. 17,21
4 A BA, and bill of exchange generally, is referred to as a draft prior to acceptance, and a bill after
acceptance. See Operation of a Bankers' Acceptance Transaction, infra.
5 E.M.A. KWAW, loco cit., note 3, p. 22. See also, Reade H. RYAN, Jr., "Bankers' Acceptances" in Reade
H. RYAN, Jr. (ed.), Letters o.fCredit and Bankers' Acceptances, New York, Practicing Law Institute, 1988,
p. 221.
See Jacob ZIEGEL, Benjamin GEVA and Ronald C.c. CUMING, Commercial and Consumer
Transactions: Cases, Text and Materials, 3rd ed., vol. 2, Toronto, Emond Montgomery, 1995, p. 24.
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PROCEDURE 1'0 A BA AGREEMENT
(credit agreement)
Drawee
Bank <Ii
/
BA
AGREEMENT
~
Beneficiary
(Seller)
Customer
(Buyer)
Sales agreement
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Negotiable instruments have been a means of circulation since the earliest of
times. The first transaction ever recorded is found in the Bible, where in Genesis (Chapter
23) it says that Abraham purchased land from Ephron with a negotiable instrument
having a value of four hundred shekels. One of the earliest usages of bankers'
acceptances was in Babylon, approximately 1600 B.C.? There; traders would defer
payment by making a promise to pay at a later date. The Babylonian Talmud makes
references to bills of exchange at the time of the Sura school (circa 247 c.E.).
Instruments that more closely resemble the modem BA were in use in the Middle Ages in
Italy and Spain, but bankers' acceptances in their modern form first appeared some three
hundred years ago, in the financial circles of London, England. Merchants sought to add
the name of other reputable merchants to their trade bills. Some of these merchants
evolved into full-fledged merchant banks, while others become investment banks.8
Having gained increased acceptance through the 1960s, BAs are relatively new to
Canada. They serve a different purpose here than their American counterparts. Originally,
bankers' acceptances in the United States and England were used to finance international
trade either as an independent source of financing or in conjunction with letters of credit
transactions. On the other hand, BAs introduced in Canada during the early 1960s were
being traded as commercial paper in an attempt to develop an active domestic money
market. 9 Since the early 1980s, BAs have taken on a very important role in Canada's
7 Philip G. BEVANS, "Canadian Bankers' Acceptances" in Richard MINER (ed.), Current Issues in
Canadian Business Law, Toronto, Carswell, 1986, p. 507 at page 534, citing S. SARPKAYA, op. cit., note
17, p. 60. See also, Desire GIROUARD, Essai sur les lettres de change et les billets promissoires,
Montreal, John Lovell, 1860, p. 7ft., for a discussion of the various opinions on the origins ofbiIls of
exchange.
8 Brian J. TERRY, "Banker's Acceptances" r in Brian J. TERRY, (ed.), The International Handbook of
Corporate Finance, 3d ed., New York, AMACOM, 2000, p. 70 I at page 704.
9See Daryl MERRETT, "The Evolution of Bankers' Acceptances in Canada", (1981) Bank ofCanada
Review, 3, 3
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money market. 10 Indeed, "[t]he market for BAs in Canada has grown dramatically over
the last 30 years and continues to account for the bulk of the growth in the Canadian
short-term paper market.,,11 Where BAs are used to finance business activity, they are
more popular as a method of generating short-term finance than as a means of financing a
particular commodity transaction.
Numerous scenarios exist. The following is an example in which BA financing
will apply:
Montreal-based "BASE International" recently exported a large shipment of sweaters to France.
Usually, the company is paid cash on delivery (C.O.D.). Exceptionally, the company has agreed to
grant the French customer 90 days to make payment. This three-month period is confirmed by a
letter of credit issued by the French buyer's bank located in New York City. The bank guarantee
provides assurance that the payment will be effected, though payment is only expected in three
months time.
Four weeks prior to the maturity of the term, a long-time, valued customer in Spain orders a larger
quantity of the same sweaters for delivery in 45 days. BASE International does not have sufficient
resources in stock to complete the order, nor does it have sufficient funds to purchase those
resources because its cash flow is tied-up in the French deal. If BASE International cannot fill the
order, its Spanish customer will go elsewhere, and the company risks losing a valued customer.
The bank has rejected a request for a line of credit and the BASE International's fabric supplier
will not consent to terms for payment. Moreover, the workers are demanding double time for the
overtime they will have to work to complete the order in time for shipment.
10 See Ely RAZIN, «Two Are Better Than One: Bankers' Acceptance Participation Financing in Canada»,
(1992) 7 B.F.L.R. p. 217,218.
11 Lisa BOULTON, "Bankers' Acceptances Smooth Canadian - US Cross-Border Credit", (1996) IS
fF.L.R p. 32, 34.
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BA financing appears to be an attractive option, for this case. Why would a bank
agree to BA financing if they've already refused a line of credit? In truth, the BA is a
very different type of instrument. The key aspect to note is that the BA is not actually a
loan. The customer obtains the bank's commitment ("acceptance") to pay the holder of
the bill at a future date. This commitment, i.e., the bankers' acceptance, is then sold in the
market, at a discount, and the funds obtained are used to finance business activities. This
arrangement plays a particularly important role in international trade,12 and indeed, the
largest proportion of BAs is created for international trade transactions.
Transactions financed by BAs will be expected to generate funds sufficient to
enable the customer to reimburse the bank, who is the party obligated to pay the holder of
the BA at maturity. For this reason, this transaction is said to be "self-liquidating.,,13 The
advantage for banks is that they can help provide funds for their customer, and earn fees
- at the outset, rather than over the loan period - without incurring borrowing costs. As
one writer pointed out, "[t]he total borrowing cost involved in using BAs is generally
lower than borrowing at prime plus a margin. Even though banks can maintain the same
spread on a BA borrowing as with a prime-based loan, their cost of funds when using
BAs is generally lower.,,14 Moreover, in contrast with regular loans, banks are less
concerned with the liabilities generated by its engagement on the bankers' acceptance,
because such liability need not have a matching deposit liability. Consequently, even
12 See Peter NEWMAN, Murray MILGATE and John EATWELL (eds.) The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Money and Finance, Vol. 1, New York, MacMillan Press, 1992, p. 207.
13 E.M.A. KWAW, lac. cit., note 3, p. 21.
14 L. BOULTON, lac. cit., note 11, p. 34.
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when the bank purchases the acceptance itself, banks will enter the transaction at a lower
yield rate. 15
BA financing doesn't only benefit the bank; it can be an attractive option for both
the customer and investor as well. I6 For the customer, BAs are an alternative to
commercial paper and bank loans, because the discount rate is usually lower than (prime)
interest rates; therefore, bankers' acceptances are less costly than borrowing directly from
a bank. 17 Bankers' acceptances can help the customer realize significant savings over
prime bank loans as an alternative source of short-term financing. 18
A favourable discount rate will exist because the primary obligation to pay the
BA at maturity rests with the bank. Therefore, it is the bank's - not the borrower's -
creditworthiness that is factored into the discount rate. 19 A further advantage to the
customer is that, "the use of BAs gives a borrower greater control in management of its
debt because BAs allow the borrower to fix its cost of funds over the term chosen.,,2o
BAs are considered to be more secure investments with fewer risks and thus an
attractive place for investors to place sholi-term smplus funds. 21 They are considered
safer because of the creditworthiness of the bank. Since acceptances are "two-name"
15 M.H. OGILVIE, op. cit., note 3, p. 428. "One former advantage which the BA option provided to banks
was that they were not required to include the full amount of BAs accepted by them in determining their
liabilities for capital adequacy purposes. That has now been changed, and in calculating capital adequacy
standards, Canadian banks must treat BAs which they have accepted as a direct loan." See L. BOULTON,
loco cit., note I I, p. 34
16 See B.J. TERRY, op. cit., note 8, p. 720
17 R. H. RYAN, Jr., op. cit., note, p. 221; M.H. OGILVIE, op. cit., note 3, p. 428.
18 Suleyman SARPKAYA, The Money Market in Canada: How it Works - the Arrangements, Practices and
Instruments, 4th ed., Don Mills, Ont., CCH Canadian, 1989, p. 63.
19 L. BOULTON, loco cit., note 11, p. 34.
20/d.
"Acceptance financing is most cost effective if the borrower can specify the duration ofhis funding needs,
and thus the life of the acceptance. If the collateral underlying an acceptance transaction were sold early,
the borrower would be required to prepay the acceptance which would raise the effective borrowing cost."
B.J. TERRY, op. cit., note 8, p. 720.
21 S. SARPKAYA, op. cit., note 18, p. 63.
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paper, both the bank and customer are liable to pay the holder of the BA at maturity.
Moreover, each subsequent endorser is also liable on the bill, thus adding additional
protection and security to the holder. As a result, "investors are willing to accept a
slightly lower return on acceptances than they are on 'one-name' paper such as
commercial paper and certificates of deposit."n
Some risk is nevertheless involved in creating and using bankers' acceptances for
trade finance. Bankers concerned about earnings and capital identify several categories of
risk associated with bankers' acceptances.23 One form of risk is "liquidity risk" which
relates to a bank's ability to meet its obligations as they become due without having to
incur sizeable costs to make funds available in order to do so. Many factors will affect
this risk, including the size of the accepting bank and its rating, although most bankers'
acceptances carry a short-term to maturity, which helps alleviate some of the risk in this
respect.
The credit risk may be lower in the BA "two-name" paper, but there is still
concern about transaction and compliance risk involved with BA financing. Transaction
risk is the risk that arises from "fraud, error and the inability to deliver products or
services.,,24 Banks seek to ensure that its clients understand the requirements of formal
and transactional validity of BAs to facilitate the timely processing of the instrument.
Compliance risk concerns compliance with statutory rules and regulations, and internal
policies and procedures.25 Standard forms and practice mitigate some of the risk in this
22 Robert K. LAROCHE, "Bankers' Acceptances", (1993) 79 Federal Reserve Bank ofRichmond
Economic Quarterly p. 75, 84.
23 See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Comptroller of the Currency Administrator of National Banks,
Bankers' Acceptances: Comptroller's Handbook, September 1999, online:
<http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbooklbaccept.pdf>
24 Id., p. 14
25 Id., p. 15
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regard; the concern is greater in the U.S., however, where there is the possibility that
banks will create ineligible bankers' acceptances but treat them as though they are
eligible for discount by the Federal Reserve. 26
Reputation risk, the risk of a negative impact on establishing future relationships
due to pessimistic public opinion, is also at the forefront in bankers' acceptances
transactions since all that the bank provides with a BA is its good name. The
creditworthiness and trustworthiness of a bank will be called into question if it extends its
good name to customers that are unable to fulfill their obligations.27 Therefore, banks will
only undertake to accept BA drafts from creditworthy and responsible customers.
Because of reductions in stamping fees and aggressive discounting, BAs have become
more competitive with commercial paper. As a result, BAs are likely to increase in
popularity as more borrowers avail themselves of this means of financing. 28 It is also
likely that an increase in cross-border loan activity will compel banks arrange their credit
agreements so as to ensure that their customers can obtain Canadian currency through
26 The Federal Reserve Act (forming part ofTitle 12 ofthe United States Code) limits the Federal
Reserve's open market operations. It distinguishes between 'eligible' and 'ineligible' acceptances.
Eligibility refers to eligibility for discount by banks subject to Federal Reserve requirements. Eligible
acceptances are those that are drawn to finance certain types of transactions. The original Federal Reserve
Act limited eligibility for discount to acceptances based on the importation or exportation of goods.
Eligible paper was to depend, therefore, upon the nature of the underlying transaction and not upon the
form of the paper. Congress amended the Act in 1916 to include acceptances arising from the storage of
readily marketable staples, from domestic shipments, and from the furnishing of dollar exchange. Until
April 1974, when the current rules on eligibility for purchase went into effect, all acceptances that were
eligible for discount, along with some others, were eligible for purchase. The types of private-sector credit
instruments that may be purchased or sold are still significantly restricted by the views of sound banking
and of the needs ofcommerce that were used in writing the Federal Reserve Act in 1913. The restriction
today is on the form of the security - the credit instrument must be a bankers' acceptance or a bill of
exchange (with some further "real bills" restrictions). See generally, David Small & James Clouse, "The
Limits the Federal Reserve Act Places on the Monetary Policy Actions of the Federal Reserve" (2000) 19
Ann. Rev. Banking L. p. 553.
27 See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Comptroller of the Currency Administrator of National Banks,
Bankers' Acceptances: Comptroller's Handbook, September 1999, online:
<http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/baccept.pdt>, p. 17
28 L. BOULTON, loco cIt., note II, p. 34.
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BAs.29 BA financing offers clear advantages to the pmties involved, but what might a
bankers' acceptance transaction entail? Let us consider the previous scenario as an
illustration of the BA operation and its implications for the parties involved.3D
BASE International will enter into an agreement with Bank ABC, by which the latter agrees to extend
acceptance financing. A credit agreement between the parties will be signed. BASE International will
then draw a draft on Bank ABC, which wiJl accept the draft, completing the BA, pursuant to the
agreement. The bank will then deliver the BA to BASE International, which will then discount
(negotiate) the BA, either with Bank ABC, or another bank or dealer. BASE International will then use
the funds obtained from the negotiation of the acceptance to purchase those resources it needs to
complete the order for its Spanish customer. Alternatively, it may negotiate the BA to its supplier, in
return for the goods it needs to fill the order (which may be more willing to accept a BA, as it contains
the primary obligation of Bank ABC, rather than BASE International, which is fairly secure guarantee
that it will be paid).
Upon receiving payment for the order from Spain (or in fact, from its English customer) it will then be
able to provide funds to Bank X, pursuant to the agreement, which will allow the bank to pay the holder
of the BA at maturity. 31
When dealing with a situation like that of BASE International, a BA transaction
may develop other relationships between other parties, with some of these relationships
being more direct than others. We will return to this example later on and examine the
various legal issues it presents. In any given transaction, aside from the customer and
bank, there may be one or more participating banks, investment dealers, or multiple
29 Id.
30 The ABC International example will be used throughout the paper to highlight various aspects of the BA
transaction and to illustrate some of the difficulties that arise from its operation.
31 The operation is described in detail, infra, p. 36.
18
investors, who become holders of the BA. The situation may be complex and the legal
relationships may become intricate. Therefore, it is important to identify whether the
relationship is established through the BA instrument, or whether it exists by ordinary
contractual relationship, or by operation of law. Proper analysis of the surrounding
circumstances, the connecting factors, and the obligations and the rights which exist
between the parties, will be necessary in determining whether the contractual rules of the
provinces, or federal law rules apply, and to what extent.
Clearly, the BA instrument is governed by the Bills of Exchange Act. Any
solution introduced to a problem involving a BA must, in principle, respect the inherent
nature of the BA as a negotiable instrument, governed by federal law. In the case of BAs,
either the Bills ofExchange Act or the Depository Bills and Notes Act will apply to the
instrument. Since there exists federal legislation for BAs, an important element of our
study is to determine if, and under what circumstances, provincial law such as the Civil
Code of Quebec (C.C.Q.), would find application with respect to BAs and complement
the provisions of the Bills ofExchange Act where the statute is silent or ambiguous. We
wish to propose a technique that will aid us in resolving uncertainty about the law
applicable to BAs. In the Canadian context, resolving such uncertainty is becoming
increasingly important because the courts are facing a growing number of cases involving
bankers' acceptances.
The purpose of this study is to find the law applicable to BA's, particularly when and
what aspects of the BA's are to be governed by provincial law such as the CCQ. In
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resolving this question , we have analyzed the doctrinal opinions and relevant
jurisprudence, as well as proposing a technique to resolve the various problems that may
occur when determining the law applicable to BA's.
The simple solution would be to apply provincial law to those matters not
addressed in the Act, as provincial law typically complements federal legislation.
However, the Bills of Exchange Act contains a peculiar provision, namely section 9,
which provides:
9. The rules of the common law of England, including the law merchant, save in so far as they are
inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act, apply to bills, notes and cheques.
The appropriate application of Quebec civil law to matters of bills of exchange
has been confused because of this provision. There is doubt as to whether section 9 is in
fact an incorporation by reference that effectively precludes the application of civil law.
The problem continues to be a contentious issue in the doctrine and jurisprudence. The
"inexorable character" of the problem created by the interpretation of this provision has
given rise to a number of diverse theories, regarding the extent of the applicability of
common law to matters of bills of exchange.32 As we can clearly conclude from a review
of the jurisprudence, the courts, for the most part, have been conciliatory to the
application of provincial law in issues involving bills of exchange. The majority ofjudges
express a hesitance to jeopardize the integrity of the provincial law as complimentary law
32 See Jean LECLAIR, "L'interaction entre Ie droit prive federal et Ie droit civil quebecois en matiere
d'effets de commerce: perspective constitutionnelle", (1995) 40 McGill L.J. p. 691, 695.
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in order to accommodate the idea that Parliament's desire was to enact an extensive and
far-reaching law of bills and notes. The position of most doctrinal writers is very much
the same.
Thus, the essential question we must consider throughout the study is: which rules
must be applied to disputes that arise in a BA transaction? Is it the Civil Code of Quebec
or the common law of England? In other words, do we apply federal or provincial private
law to matters pertaining to BAs not expressly mentioned in the Bills ofExchange Act?
From a Canadian perspective, understanding which law is applicable to BAs is a matter
of increasing importance, due to its growing appearance in courts. This question is
addressed in Chapter 4 of this study which focuses on reconciling federal and provincial
law pertaining to bankers' acceptances. To this end, we begin in Chapter one with an
examination of the history, development and evolution of the bankers' acceptance. To
better understand the BA, we offer a brief overview on the origins of the instrument. In
Chapter 2, we also analyze the nature and legal character of the BA. This will establish
the framework through which we can identify the rules and principles that apply to the
various aspects of the BA transaction. In Chapter 3, we examine the mechanics of the BA
operation step-by-step, paying close attention to the requirements imposed by legislation
as well as the various parties involved in a BA transaction and the relationships between
them. Having examined the legal nature of the BA, we proceed to Chapter 4, the most
essential part of this study , where we consider the applicability of provincial law to
aspects of the BA transaction. To this end, we examine different approaches to
understanding the Bills ofExchange Act, particularly the problematic section 9, as well as
the applicable law as understood in Quebec jurisprudence during the past century.
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Finally, given new legislative developments, such as the Harmonization Act, in Chapter 5
we propose a method to determine the law applicable to various aspects of the BA
transaction. Although our method proposed is but one approach on the subject, we
believe it to be a suitable one that upholds the force and value of both federal and
provincial laws, when resolving the laws applicable to the BA. Still, it is hard to envision
challenging a decision in which a judge offered a careful and considered judgment based
on a different interpretive approach to section 9, and that in fact would derive different
conclusions.
Our analysis has led us to adopt the result advocated by the majority of jurists, but with
the recognition that our approach to section 9 is based on reasons of policy. The policy
choice of most authors and judges seems to be that, for matters dealing with bills and
notes in a strict sense, common law will apply. Civil law will apply where the matter is
"contractual" or "proprietary," that is, bills and notes in a wide or broad sense.
We think therefore that incorporating the strict! wide dichotomy into section 9 itself or in
the Act that defines section 9 is preferable in striking the appropriate balance between the
application of federal and provincial law to bankers acceptances.
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CHAPTER 1. The Origin of the Bill of Exchange and the
Bankers' Acceptance
In this chapter, we discuss the origin of the bill of exchange and how it gave rise
to the modern BA. Subsequently we will examine the evolution of the BA in Canada. 33 It
was during the thirteenth century that writings obligatory writings obligatory (a type of
debenture or term note) were being developed.34 Justice Cockburn stated that:
Bills of Exchange are known to be of comparatively modern origin, having been'first brought into
use, so far as is presently known, by the Florentines in the twelfth, and by the Venetians about the
thirteenth century. The use of them gradually found its way into France, and into England.35
Since the middle of the fifteenth century, English merchants have been using bills
of exchange in order to conduct their business. The seventeenth century brought
recognition to the negotiable nature of a bill... "Before the seventeenth century, bills of
33 See generally, Raymond Adrien De ROOVER, L 'Evolution de la lettre de change, XIVe - XVIIIe_sieeles,
Paris, Librairie Armand Collin, 1953; Edward JENKS, "On the Early History of Negotiable Instruments"
(1893) 9 L. Q. Rev. 70; James Milnes HOLDEN, The History ofNegotiable Instruments in_English Law,
London, Athlone Press, 1955; James Steven ROGERS, The Early History ofthe Law ofBills_and Notes: A
Study ofthe Origins ofAnglo-American Commercia(Law, London, Cambridge University Press, 1985;
William Searle HOLDSWORTH, "The Origins and Early History of Negotiable Instruments, Part I",
(1915) 31 L. Q. Rev. 12 and W.S. HOLDSWORTH, "The Origins and Early History of Negotiable
Instruments Part II", (1915) 31 L. Q. Rev. 173; Frederick READ, "The Origin, Early History and Later
Development of Bills of Exchange and Certain Other Negotiable Instruments, Part I", (1926) 4 Can. Bar
wF. READ, "The Origin, Early History and Later Development of Bills of Exchange and Certain Other
Negotiable Instruments, Part II", (1926) 4 Can. Bar. Rev. 665.
34 Bradley CRAWFORD, Crawford and Falconbridge Banking and Bills ofExchange, 8th ed., vol. 2,
Toronto, Canada Law Books, 1986, p. 1171-1172.
35 Goodwin v. Robarts, (1875), L.R. IO Exch. 337, affd 1 App. Cas. 476 (H.L.)
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exchange were fairly arcane, complex devices for the transfer of capital and were little
used by the general populace or even many merchants.,,36
Merchants who did use bills of exchange used them to finance long-distance
trade. Bills of exchange were developed to solve a basic problem, namely, how to
transport capital from one place to another, or fi'om country to country, without having to
undertake the dangerous task of hauling bullion or other valuables, thereby risking theft??
This early type of transaction has been described in the following manner:
Suppose A, an Amsterdam merchant, owes money to D, a Hamburg merchant, for goods sold from
D to A. Suppose Band C, as exchangers, are in what we would call today the banking business. B
is in Amsterdam and C is in Hamburg. Rather than transferring the funds from Amsterdam to
Hamburg in specie, A (the Amsterdam merchant) either gives cash to B (the Amsterdam
exchanger) or has his account with him debited, and obtains from him a bill of exchange, namely a
letter addressed by B to C asking C to pay D, in the sum of his debt to D. A then sends the letter to
D (the Hamburg merchant) who presents the letter to C (the Hamburg exchanger) and obtains
payment in discharge of A's debt to him. C then debits B's account with him.38
As merchants began extending their trade into foreign countries, a more complex
system of settling accounts became necessary. Bills of exchange were used to facilitate
trade by enabling merchants to avoid carrying money in specie. Instead, they could trade
36 Kurt EGGERT, "Held Up in Due Course: Codification and the Victory of Form Over Intent", 35
Creighton L. Rev. p. 363, 377.
37 [d., 377. This is the basic function ofa payment mechanism. See Benjamin GEVA, "The Concept of
Payment Mechanism", (1986) 24 D.H.L.J. p. I.
38 1. ZIEGEL, B. GEVA and R.C.C. CUMING, op. cit., note 8, p. 4.
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in their money for letters of exchange, which could be transfelTed to buyers or sellers,
which in tum could be redeemed for money at major fairs held throughout Europe. 39
Bankers are the ones that made it work by playing an essential role in this process.
Holdsworth describes the situation as follows:
At the great fairs, the merchants' bankers, armed with letters of exchange for the receipt of money
and with money to payoff the creditors of their clients, would attend the fairs, meet together and
pay each other as needed, working with the exchangers who, because their business was giving
currency of on'e country in exchange for another, could accurately calculate the exchange rate for
the debts and credits incurred in a multitude offoreign countries.4o
Often, bankers did not have to keep large amounts of currency on hand because
while they were paying bills of exchange they would also receive money on bills owed to
merchants.41
Using bills was one of the many customs and practices of merchants that was
codified. The regulation of cheques, however, had been incorporated into the lex
mercatoria as early as the sixteenth century, when English merchants were placing
valuable consideration as security with the king of England in order to manage the use of
notes as payment devices. Following the Civil War of 1638, King Charles I had,
unilaterally and without permission, benefited from the consideration entrusted to him.
English merchants therefore lost confidence in the King and began dealing directly with
39 See K. EGGERT, loco cit., note 36, p. 378 citing W.S. HOLDSWORTH, «The Origins and Early History
of Negotiable Instruments, Part I», loco cit, note 32. The earliest fairs where such exchange occurred were
held at Champagne, and when these fairs declined during the fourteenth century, fairs at Lyons, Anvers,
and Genoa took over this function
40 /1.
41 /1., p. 28
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indepe~dent goldsmiths. Goldsmiths would also require a deposit of valuable
consideration in exchange for a bill that could lawfully be used in commercial
transactions.42
Bills of exchange played an important role in a medieval economy that did not
have sufficient money currency in circulation to sustain all the on-going commerce (prior
to the issuance of bank notes by the Bank of England).43 Bills of exchange were also
valued because they were easily transferred and since the holder could recover their value
from a number of parties. Each endorsement created a new liability on the bill.
Eventually, the customs and practices with respect to bills and notes, including the lex
mercatoria, were codified.
The first such codification was the English Bills ofExchange Act in 1882, drafted
by Sir Mackenzie Chalmers. Long before that, in 1462, bills of exchange were referred to
in a royal ordinance issued by Louis Xl, consecrating existing commercial practice.44 In
1572, the negotiation of bills of exchange was confined to specially appointed agents in
Paris.45 The first law on bills of exchange was the Order of 1673, which was a synthesis
of the usages of merchants. It has been said that this early codification crystallized French
commercial law, inhibiting its absorption into the general legal system ofFrance.46 In the
eighteenth and nineteenth century, characteristic differences were evident between
English common law, and French mercantile law. One feature that distinguished them
42 [d., p. 386
43 Id., p. 382
44 See A.M. KElLEY, "Bills of Exchange", (1900) 6 Virginia Law Register 73, 75.
45Id.
46 Leonie M. MITCHELL, "The British Conception ofNegotiab!e Instruments v. The French", (1928) 10 J.
ofComp. Legis & Int'!L. (3d series), 237, 240.
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was that, until 1922, French bills were void if they did not bear a statement of
consideration.47
The Canadian legislation by the same name, largely derived from the English
legislation, followed soon after. The countries of continental Europe have relatively
similar laws regarding bills of exchange as a result of the Geneva Convention, which
emerged in the 1930s. In the United States, legislation respecting bills of exchange can be
traced back to the Negotiable Instruments Law, drafted. by lJ. Crawford in 1896 on
behalf of the National Conference of Commissioners on UnifOlID State Laws. This draft
was eventually adopted by all American states.48
In Canada, the law of bills and notes falls within the exclusive legislative power
of the federal government by viliue of section 91 (18) of the Constitution Act of 1867.49
However, it was only in 1890 that the federal government exercised its power to create
the first Canadian Bills of Exchange Act.5o This Act basically reproduces the Bills of
Exchange Act of 1882 in its entirety.51 Officials believed the Act would bring uniformity
to the law of bills and notes in Canada. Indeed, the Minister of Justice at that time, Sir
John Thompson, said the following when introducing the Bill in session in 1889: "The
object of this Bill is to render unifOlID in almost every respect the laws throughout the
Dominion with respect to these contracts. The law under this Bill will be uniform in
47 Jd., p. 240.
48 See B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1180.
49 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3. (U.K.), formerly, the British North America Act, 1867.
50 S.C. 1890, c. 33 (Royal Assent granted May 16, 1890).
51 See Jean LECLAIR, "La Constitution par I'histoire: portee et etendue de la competence federale
exclusive en matiere de lettres de change et billets 11 ordre", (1992) 33 C. de D. p. 535, 612-613. The
Canadian Bills of Exchange Act did make some substantial changes to the British Act, notably, the
preservation of the common law (now found at s. 9), which will be discussed at length, infra, p. 76.
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every particular except as regards statutory holidays, in respect of which special
provision is to be made as regards the Province of Quebec. ,,52
In 1849, the Legislature of Canada passed a statuteS3 described as, "the most
comprehensive enactment relating to bills and notes passed in any part of Canada before
the promulgation of the Civil Code of Lower Canada."s4 Aside from introducing many
rules of English law into Lower Canada, the statute provided that the laws of Lower
Canada should govern bills and notes, and if there were no laws with respect to a
particular issue, then recourse would be had in the laws of England in force on May 30,
1849. In general, the statute did little to redress the doubt surrounding what law should be
exercised in matters involving bills of exchange.
The first codification of Quebec law, the Civil Code ofLower Canada (C.C.L.C.),
enacted in 1866, and included parts of the 1849 statute. 55 Pursuant to article 23~0 of the
C.C.L.C., where matters relating to bills of exchange were not regulated by the Civil
Code, "... recourse must be had to the laws of England in force on the thirtieth day of
May, one thousand, eight hundred and forty-nine ...." The Canadian provinces (other than
Quebec) were, however, fully governed by English law. Eventually, the Bills ofExchange
Act of 1890 rendered inoperative all the articles of the Civil Code save for those relating
to evidence affecting bills of exchange, cheques and promissory notes. Later versions of
the Code did not include article 2340 or a corresponding provision.
52 Cited in Desire GIROUARD and Desire H. GIROUARD, The Bills qfexchange act, 1890 .. An act to codifY .
the laws relating to bills ofexchange, cheques and promissOly notes, passed by the Parliament ofCanada, 53
vic., ch. 33 with notes and comments. Also a reference to-the English, American and French decisions and to all
the Canadian reported cases, and appendix containing the French text ofthe act debates ofParliament, civil
code ofLower Canada etc., and an analytical index, Montreal: J.M. Valois, 1891, Introduction, p. VIII.
53 12 Viet., e.22.
54 B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1179.
55 Id, p. 1180. ,
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In the following section we will analyze the evolution and growth of the BA in Canada's
money markets. This part will briefly describe the bankers' acceptance from its formative years
up to the present, and see how it has evolved, from a means of financing trade to the trade of
futures contracts on the BA.
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1.2 Evolution of the lBA in Canada
"[G]enerally speaking, bills and cheques are a means of transferring funds. Notes
embody credit obligations. Nevertheless, functional distinctions are occasionally blurred:
bills and cheques may be used as credit instruments.,,56 A bill of exchange is a document
like no other that has drastically evolved from is early origins. As one author stated,
"Aujourd'hui, les effets de commerce servent ades fonctions differentes de celles qui ont
assure leur developpement au Moyen Age. Ils ne se lirnitent plus aremplacer Ie transport
de numeraire d'un endroit aun autre. La lettre de change sert principalement comme
instrument de credit entre commen;ants eloignes.,,57 That is not to say that the use of bills
and notes as a mechanism of credit financing is new; the use of bills of exchange in
England as a means of credit was recognized by the l560s.58
However, "[d]evant la proliferation de nouveaux instruments de paiement plus
perfectionnes simplifiant d'avantage l'extinction des obligations pecuniaires, l'utilisation
de l'effet de commerce a graduellement ete restreinte surtout aux operations de credit.,,59
Indeed, although bankers' acceptances have been used to facilitate international trade for
hundreds of years, it was not until the 1962 that BAs appeared in Canada. From the
outset, BAs have served a different purpose in Canada. Whereas in the United States
bankers' acceptances had been used to finance international transactions, Canadian
56 .J. ZIEGEL, B. GEVA and R.C.C. CUMING, op. cit., note 6, {'. 3.
57 Nicole L'HEUREUX, Edith FORTIN and Marc LACOURSIERE, Droit bancaire, 4th ed., Cowansville,
Yvon Blais, 2004, p. 411-412. For a discussion ofhow the bill evolved into an instrument of credit, see
Janice D. McGINNIS, "Statute Law and the Owl of Minerva: The Bills of Exchange Act, 1882", (1986) 24
Alta. L.R. 275, 285 if.
58 Daniel R. COQUILLETTE, "Legal Ideology and Incorporation IV: The Nature of Civilian Influence on
Modem Anglo-American Commercial Law", (1987) 67 B. U.L. Rev. p. 887, 888.
59 Octavian CAPATINA, "L 'Evolution des fonctions de la lettre de change dans les rapports de commerce
exterieur", (1978) 22 Revue Roumaine des Sciences Sociales p. 309, 311.
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authorities were enthusiastically encouraging the use of BAs as an instrument for
financing corporate debt. 60 The Canadian govemment's decision to allow foreign banks
to engage in certain banking activities in Canada was a factor which most certainly
influenced this trend. The result was an increase in the number of players in Canada's
money market who could accept BAs. Bankers' acceptances are reported to be the largest
single short-term paper negotiated in Canada's money market. 61 While their development
was gradual and deliberate, BAs have become a significant component of the Canadian
financial market.
To aid in the promotion of a more dynamic money market, on June 11, 1962,
bankers' acceptances were introduced in Canada. Investment dealers, the Bank of
Canada, and chartered banks were all actively involved in outlining the initial shape of
the Canadian acceptance market. Several essential requirements were put into place that
had to be respected by chartered banks before they could grant a customer's request for
acceptance financing. Firstly, only Canadian customers of Canadian banks could draw
bankers' acceptances, and they could be drawn only in Canadian funds. Furthermore,
maturity had to be between 30 and 90 days from acceptance. The minimum face value
was predetermined at two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000).62 Acceptances were only
to be issued to finance the production or marketing of goods, wares and merchandise as
defmed in the Bank of Canada Act. This included "products of agriculture, products of
the forest, products of the quarry and mine, and products of the seas, lakes and rivers" as
60 D. MERRETT, loco cit., note 9, p.3. See also, L. BOULTON, lac. cit., note 11,32.
61 The amount of outstanding Canadian dollar BAs was 150 million dollars in 1965,395 million in 1970,
1,047 million in 1975,5,365 million in 1980, and jumped to 42.5 billion by October 1988, including 2.8
billion in foreign currencies. See S. SARPKAYA, op. cit., note 18, p. 63.
62 D. MERRETT, loco cit., note 9, p. 5.
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stated in section 18 (l)(f) or 18 (l )(g) of the Act. 63 All these limitations placed on the
Bank of Canada impacted on the scope of acceptance activity engaged in by charted
banks. These constraints were" ...designed to satisfy the legal restrictions on the Bank of
Canada as to the type of assets it could acquire, and it also reflected the desire of the
chartered banks to limit the creation ofacceptances to 'self liquidating transactions. ",64 It
was not until the extensive amendments of 1980 that we saw a significant change in the
acceptance practices of banks in Canada.65
In the later part of 1962, the acceptance market noticeably increased its activities.
The outstanding amount remained relatively stable, due to the apprehension of the
chartered banks in issuing acceptances to less-than-acceptable credit risks, and the fact
that smaller films were necessarily excluded by the substantial minimum face value of
$200,000.66 By December 1962, the aggregate of current acceptances issued stood at nine
million dollars. This was so despite the fact that not many BAs had l;>een drawn after. the
first few months of that year. During the following two and a half years, acceptances
reached a peak of 15.6 million dollars, never falling below 6.4 million dollars. 67 It should
be noted that these extremes occurred just several weeks apart, indicating the relative
smallness of the size of the market at that time. The issuance and maturity of acceptances
had a considerable impact on the market.
63 Bank ojCanada Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-2.
64 D. MERRETT, loco cit., note 8, p. 5-6.
65 See Lazar SARNA, "Bankers' Acceptances" in Lazar SARNA (ed.), Corporate Structure, Finance and
Operations: Essays on the Law and Business Practice, Vol. 8, Scarborough, Carswell, 1995, p. 39 at page
64.
66 Id., p. 7.
67Id.
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A decrease in the stamping fee in 1965 allowed for rapid growth of the acceptance
market. In fact, the increase in growth was tenfold, going from 11.6 million on every
Wednesday in June to 149.4 million on the same day of the week in December. It may be
assumed that fluctuations were due to the reduction in the charges for stamping fees, but
the cOlTesponding reduction of commercial paper reflected in an increased number of
acceptances cannot be attributed to the change in stamping fees alone. MelTett attributes
this growth in BAs to the failure of a major finance company in that year, which shook
consumer confidence in financial companies and commercial paper.68 For three years,
from 1966 through 1969 the acceptance market was stagnant, with no expansion
whatsoever.
At first, banker's acceptances were deemed to be a valid form of collateral for
day-to-day loans of chartered banks and for purchase and resale agreements (PRA) with
the Bank of Canada, as long as the loan was not sought from the same bank that had
stamped the acceptance. 69 The Bank of Canada often purchased bankers' acceptances
issued to finance suitable activities and to help promote the emerging market. However, it
would be the investment dealers that would play a key role in this expansion of the
bankers' acceptance market, by activdy engaging in the purchase and sale of acceptances
on a regular basis.
Nevertheless, throughout most of the 1960s, acceptances were looked upon as
private placements (with investors) and experienced limited trading because they were
assumed to be intended for investment purposes. As a result, secondary trading of
68 Id. Unlike BAs, commercial paper does not have the obligation of a second party to pay the debt. The
primary and secondary obligations on the BA are discussed, infra, p. (cite page which begins section 3.2.3.
Acceptance)
69 Id., p. 6.
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acceptances was not widespread. In fact, dealers sought to avoid competition by not
revealing the names of those for whom they held acceptances. The rationale behind this
was that fierce competition by chartered banks for secondary reserves caused loans to
become relatively inexpensive. These loans were used to finance other acceptances,
making them very lucrative to investment dealers who preferred holding them. 70
Two key changes had occurred by 1968. The first involved limiting the issuance
of .BAs and the second enlarging the power of chartered banks to accept BAs. The Bank
of Canada restricted the total designated dealers' use as collateral for PRAs and day-loan
credit. Secondly, consent was granted to chaliered banks to consider acceptances carrying
their own stamp as eligible loan collateral. Until this time, only acceptances of other
banks could be used in such a manner. As a result, banks began to use acceptances (both
their own and those issued by other banks) as a means of collateral against other ioans
provided to dealers. 71
Acceptances were being retained by banks for their own acc~>unts, as they were by
numerous other investors, from the dealers' now waning reserves. The money markets
flourished with the use of acceptances as a liquid asset that offered, as a practical
alternative, the ability to expedite the management of short-term cash transactions.
Although these changes were essential in creating a considerable increase to the sum total
of bankers , acceptances outstanding, there were several other elements, presumably more
significant, in effecting this increase. Bankers encouraged an increasing number of their
clientele to use BAs because the cost to the customer compared to loans was lower than it
had been in the past. Fmihermore, it was an appealing option in light of the fact that strict
70 Id., p. 7.
71 Id., p. 8-9.
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credit requirements were limiting business growth in the 1970s. Thus, acceptance usage
became more widespread in Canada. The chartered banks wanted the acceptances they
held to be included as part of their secondary reserve, although this never happened even
with revisions to the Bank Act in 1967 and 1980.
Early in the 1970s, BAs enjoyed a noticeable economic advantage over loans as a
financial instrument, but this was not reflected in the BA market, as the aggregate of acceptances
remained relatively unchanged. In 1974 however, BAs had a sudden growth in the market, which
ended in 1975. In order to increase the potential market for bankers' acceptances, several banks
considered expanding the list of authorized activities that could be financed with acceptances, as
well as stretching the maturity date beyond the 90-day limit. Chartered banks were reluctant to
incorporate thes'e changes, however, since this type of modification meant creating a situation in
which certain acceptances would meet the eligibility requirements for purchase by the Bank of
Canada, while others would not. 72
In 1978, one bank publicized its willingness to stamp acceptances for periods of 10 to
180 days, without regard to the activity for which the acceptance was being drawn to
finance.?3 This bank also opened unique lines of credit against which acceptances or
loans could be drawn at any time, as well as devising several pricing options that were to
make acceptances more competitive with commercial paper, and hence a more lucrative
alternative to other methods of financing. Even as these changes were implemented, the
market saw little growth until several other banks followed suit and increased
72 Id., p. 10-11. The situation of eligible and ineligible acceptances arose in the United States in 1913 with
the introduction of the Federal Reserve Act. Acceptances meeting reserve requirements were deemed
eligible for discount. Conversely those that did not were ineligible and subject to having to match the
amount with funds secured in reserve, whereas eligible acceptances could be leveraged. See generally, R.
K. LAROCHE, loco cit., note 22.
73 D. MERRETT, loco cit., note 9, p. II.
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competition. With this competition came a renewed expansion in the previously dormant
acceptance market, marking an unprecedented growth that started late in 1978.
During the 1980s, the BA had become the preferred instrument of corporate
debt.74 During that decade, there were several major changes to the BA market. One such
change was the advent of U.S.-denominated acceptances issued in Canada. Another
change was due in large part to the total outstanding value of bankers' acceptances
(which by the end of the 1980s well above the 7 billion dollar mark). With this came the
realization that measures once needed to sustain the market were no longer necessary. On
December I, 1980, the Bank of Canada reversed its earlier legislation regarding the
eligibility of acceptances as collateral for day-loans or PRA credit. Practically, this meant
that only Government of Canada securities could be used as collateral, as was the case
prior to 1962.75
Additionally, section I8(g) of the Bank of Canada Act stated that the bank could
"buy and sell bills of exchange or promissOly notes endorsed, accepted, or issued by a
chartered bank and having a maturity not exceeding 180 days, excluding days of grace,
from the d~te of acquisition by the Bank." 76 It is not likely, however, that this alteration
of the Bank of Canada Act significantly impacted the bankers' acceptance market. The
availability of other assets, such as government treasury bills, limited the effect of this
legislative change. Significant variations in the amount of bankers' acceptances
outstanding occurred in 1980 and 1981. In May and June of 1980, as well as from
December 1980 through January 1981, there were decreases in acceptance activity in
rising markets.
74 E. RAZIN, loco cit., note 10, p. 219.
75 D. MERRETT, loco cit., note 9, p. 11.
76 Supra, note 52.
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The Canadian trend during this period is noteworthy in that there was a marked
decline in what had been an upward movement of the market. Borrowers now returned to
loans in order to finance their business ventures as their acceptances reached maturity. Up
to that point, acceptances had been the prefened method of financing for over four years.
But borrowers became more sophisticated, shifting to ordinary bank loans when relative
costs favoured them over BAs. There is no indication that this type of shifting is likely to
stop. In fact, it is probable that there will be a perpetual shift between the two,
highlighting the new discriminatory nature of the borrower towards interest rates.
Undoubtedly this will be facilitated by the various other financing options offered by
chartered banks. 77
The creation of more chartered banks may in fact mean that the Bank of Canada
Act will aid in fostering greater competition. Already familiar with the fixed-term, fixed
rate fmancial mechanisms and bankers' acceptances internationally, many of these banks
have substantial expertise in Canadian commercial banking. Since December 1980, U.S.
denominated acceptances have been issued in Canada. These are appealing to those
requiring U.S. currency, as well as Canadian and American investors who previously had
held U.S. dollar accounts in Canadian banks, as interest rates were lowered slightly.78
To bring the BA to the public market, in 1988, the Montreal Exchange introduced
the futures contract on3-month Canadian bankers' acceptances (BAX). Bankers'
acceptance futures contracts are an innovation designed to hedge or reduce short-term
interest rate risk.79 After a relatively modest start, trading in this contract has grown
77 D. MERRETT, loco cit., note 9, p. 12.
78 Id.
79 See Lome N. SWITZER and Samar OBAID, "The Performance and Efficiency of the Canadian Bankers'
Acceptance Futures Market" in Lazar SARNA, (ed.), Corporate Structure, Finance and Operations:
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rapidly. In practice, the yield on the BA represents the difference between the discounted
price and the face value of the BA. However, in the futures market, the yield will depend
on the value for which the BA is being traded on the stock market. As one author
explains it, "[t]he contract is traded on an index basis. Thus, its price is calculated by
subtracting the annualized implied yield on the bankers' acceptance from 100. For
instance, if September contracts are offered at 95.20 on the floor of the Exchange, this
would imply a 4.80 per cent (or 100.00 - 95.20) annual yield for BAs issued in
September. ,,80
Bankers' acceptances have become relatively less favoured as a money market
instrument in recent years, although the market for futures in bankers' acceptances has
grown exponentially. In 1990, bankers' acceptances accounted for 21.1 % of money
market instruments. This percentage fell to 18.3% by 1998. By contrast, bankers'
Essays on the Law and Business Practice, vol. 9, Scarborough, Carswell, 1996, p. 375 at page 375. The
authors suggest that although there is evidence of the inefficiency of the BAX market, there are signs it is
becoming more efficient over time.
80 Nancy HARVEY, "The Market for Futures Contracts on Canadian Bankers' Acceptances", (1996) Bank
ofCanada Review 19, 20. The author describes the technical aspects of the BAX in the following way:
"The BAX contract is traded on the floor of the Montreal Exchange between 8 a.m. and 3 p.m. (Eastern
Time) and is based on an investment of $1 ,000,000 in 3-month bankers' acceptances. Contracts mature two
business days prior to the third Wednesday of the month in March, June, September and December over a
two-year period. These delivery dates correspond to the delivery dates of Eurodollar futures contracts
traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, which helps create arbitrage opportunities between the BAX
and the Eurodollar futures markets ....The integrity of the BAX market is based on the role of the clearing
house, in this case the Canadian Derivatives Clearing Corporation or CDCC, which guarantees the financial
performance ofparticipants' transactions on the Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver exchanges. Subsequent
to the conclusion of a transaction by two parties, the clearing house takes an offsetting position to each leg
of the transaction. A margin deposit of $1,000 or $1,900 per BAX contract traded is required depending on
the status of the participant. The deposit requirement is typically met by depositing financial assets in a
special account prior to the transaction. This deposit, or margin, serves as collateral and is a sign of the
participants' willingness to meet their obligations. lt also enables the clearing house to cover its losses
should one of the parties default. It should be noted that margin requirements vary since they are frequently
reviewed by the CDCC. BAX contracts are marked-to-market daily, which brings about periodic
adjustments. Resulting profits or losses are credited or charged to the margin account. If these daily
adjustments result in the margin account falling below a pre-specified level, the investor must make an
incremental deposit to bring it back to the desired level, or the futures position will be liquidated. When the
contract expires, outstanding positions are liquidated. Although most investors are not interested in
acquiring the underlying instrument of the contract, they must abide by certain rules. For instance, when
they wish to liquidate their position prior to the delivery date of the futures contract, they must buy an
offsetting position on the floor of the exchange."
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acceptance futures rose threefold in value in the 1995-98 periodY Noting the variance in
the purpose ofBAs, Nancy Harvey explains:
Classified according to purpose, BAX transactions fall into three broad categories: hedging,
speculation and arbitrage or yield investment. Data published by the Montreal Exchange suggests
that BAX transactions undertaken for hedging purposes are the most significant, accounting for
more than 50 percent of total transactions. Speculation represents about 25 per cent of all the
transactions, while less than 25 per cent are attributable to arbitrage and yield-investment
strategies. This distribution seems relatively stable but can vary according to market volatility.
When markets are volatile, the volume of transactions increases along with the share that reflects
hedging activity, while speculative trading is more prevalent in periods of low market volatility. 82
Since 1994, the BAX market has grown considerably due in large part to the
effort to use BAX contracts as hedging instruments by banks and the encouragement of
non-residents to participate in the Canadian market. 83 As well, the prices of BAX
contracts are more responsive than traditional instruments. These multi-purpose
instruments facilitate the smooth operation of the money market by complementing other
instruments such as treasury bills. According to one analyst, more than 9,000 BAX
contracts were traded daily in 1995 and amounted to around $90 billion dollars in May
1996.84
81 See SERGE BOISVERT and Nancy HARVEY, "The Declining Supply of Treasury Bills and the
Canadian Money Market", (1998) Bank ofCanada Review 53.
82 N. HARVEY, lac. cit., note 80, p. 25-26. For more on how Canadian financial firms manage short-term
interest rate risk through the use of BAX futures contracts, see David G. WATT, "Canadian Short-Term
Interest Rates and the BAX Futures Market: An Analysis of the Impact of Volatility on Hedging Activity
and the Correlation of Returns between Markets", (1997) Bank ofCanada Working Paper 97-18.
83 N. HARVEY, lac. cit., note 80, p. 20.
84 Id., p. 31.
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CHAPTER 2. Th.e Nature and Legal Character of the Bankers'
Acceptance
Chapter 1 examined the evolution of bankers' acceptances in Canada. BAs have
greatly evolved since they were first introduced and so it will not come as a surprise if
there is more innovation in the market in the years to come. Despite the emergence of a
futures market, bankers' acceptances continue to be used to finance trade. To better
understand the legal issues surrounding the BA transaction, in this section the juridical
nature of bankers' acceptances will be examined. There has been very little attention
given to the theoretical nature of negotiable instruments in general and bankers'
acceptances in particular.85 In order to truly comprehend the BA and resolve issues that
may arise concerning its operation, it is important to begin by uncovering the nature of
the BA and its unique qualities as a negotiable instrument. We will analyze the bankers'
acceptances' contractual and proprietary features, in an effort to compare and contrast it
with the various types and modalities of obligations, such as loans, suretyship, mandate,
sale, novation, delegation, assignment of claim and stipulation for another. Through this
analysis we will establish that a BA, as a fonn of bill of exchange, is a unique instrument
that resembles various obligations but still remains independent of them.
85 Barak laments the depth of analysis of negotiable instruments in Aharon BARAK, "The Nature of the
Negotiable Instrument", (1983) 18 Isr. L. R. p. 49, 50. Sarna notes that BAs are "little studied in the legal
community." See L. SARNA, op. cit., note 65, p. 82.
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2.1 The Contractual and Proprietary Aspects of BAs
BA AGREEMENT
us $ 20 000
Montreal, April 20, 2005
(Canadian Bank)
----------------------------- J>A]{ 1[() ----------------
(ABC Exports Canada)
1llIE ()!tl)E!t ()!' -----------------------~-----------------------------------------
llwenty thousand US $------------
1llIE SUrvi ()!' --------------------------------------------------------------------
Walley Green
1[() ------------------------------------------
123 J>lamondon
rviontreal, Quebec
ABC Exports Canada
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A BA is an offspring of the bills of exchange family. The qualities of a BA are
engraved within the very context of a bill. In the words of Justice Brossard, " ... there are
no provisions of the Act [Bills ofExchange Act] which state an instrument having all the
characteristics of a bill of exchange ceases to be such because it is drawn on a bank;
indeed article 165 which speaks of a bill of exchange drawn on a bank confirms that a bill
of exchange may be drawn on a bank; it is only when such a bill of exchange is payable
on demand that it is to be considered a cheque.,,86 This notion is widely supported by
doctrinal wri ters. 87
From this explanation from the Honourable Justice Brossard, we can see clearly
that the Bills of Exchange Act applies to bankers' acceptances, mutatis mutandis, and
consequently, BAs must conform to the conditions of form set out in the Act. "However,
because their use in Canada is as recent as 1962, there is no body of case law on banker's
acceptances which discusses it as a negotiable instrument; when legal problems arise,
resort should be had to the standard negotiable instruments texts.,,88 Still, BAs are slightly
different from other negotiable instruments, such as promissory notes and cheques,
because in order to engage the liability of the banks on the BA there must be an
"acceptance." This is not to say that without the bank's acceptance the bill will not be a
negotiable instrument. In other words, the bank's acceptance does not "complete" the
bill; it simply engages the liability of the bank, in addition to the drawer. The draft
remains a negotiable instrument with or without the acceptance, of the bank and the
drawer remains liable with respect to it.
86 Lavoie v. Abbott, [1963) C.S. pp. 600, 602.
87 Bradley CRAWFORD, Crawford and Fa!conbridge Banking and Bills ofExchange, 8th ed., vol. I,
Toronto, Canada Law Books, 1986, p. 878; see also, N. L'HEUREUX, E. FORTIN and M.
LACOURSIERE op. cit., note 57, p. 319.
88 M.H. OGILVIE, op. cit., note 3, p. 429.
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Keep in mind that the BA document as a negotiable instrument entails an
obligation that is distinct from the interaction of the parties involved. For example, the
BA may be created to effect payment between two parties involved in a commercial
transaction such as a sale. The obligation engaged on the BA is distinct from the
obligation to make payment for the sale. In the words of one author: "L'obligation
cambiaire est egalement dite abstraite ou autonome en ce sens que la circulation du titre
fait naitre, en faveur du detenteur, des droits independarnment du sort de l'obligation
principale.,,89 This notion of an "abstract" obligation, being autonomous from the
underlying transaction, is known in continental countries where it corresponds more or
less to the concept of "negotiability. ,,90
The t3A as a negotiable instrument is distinguishable from any ordinary property
and obligations. To comprehend these unique traits of the BA, we will compare the BA
instrument to forms of property and contracts (obligations) and determine its juridical
character. In our view, the BA does not fit perfectly into any of those categories. It can
only be defined as a negotiable instrument, governed by the Bills of Exchange Act.
However, the implications of this exercise' will take on a new relevance when we
examine which law ought to apply to the BA when the Bills ofExchange Act is silent or
ambiguous.
89 N. L'HEUREUX, E. FORTIN and M. LACOURSIERE op. cit., note 57, p. 419; Infra, p. 46.
90 Uwe JAHN, Bills ofExchange: A Guide to Legislation in European Countries, Asia & Oceania, 3d ed.,
Paris, ICC Publishing, 1999, p.3.
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2.2 The BA as Property
Like any moveable product that may be sold or purchased, a negotiable
instrument is a tangible object susceptible to ownership and the rules of property.
Chalmers stated this quite clearly when he explained that a bill is a chattel that can be
transferred as such.91 Baxter explains that when a bill of exchange is issued, property is
put into circulation.92 Likewise, according to Britton, the negotiable instrument is not
only written evidence of the contract obligation of the parties, but is also a form of
property.93 Civil law authors are essentially silent on the issue of bills of exchange when
seen as propelty. "This reserve may be an indication that a negotiable instrument has its
roots in the classical French doctrine that focuses on the contractual aspects of the
instrument.
Thus like every other material thing in this world, a negotiable instrument can be
sold, gifted, transferred, destroyed, or altered as the owner sees fit. It is also property for
the pUlposes of criminallaw94 and conflicts of law.95 The proprietary aspect of negotiable
91David A.L. SMOUT, (ed.), Chalmers on bills ofexchange: A Digest ofthe Law ofBills ofExchange, 13th
ed., London, Stevens, 1964, xli.
92 Ian F.G. BAXTER, The Law ofBanking, 4'h ed., Scarborough, Carswell, 1992, p.l3.
93 William Everett BRITTON, Handbook ofthe law ofbills and notes, 2nd ed., St. Paul, West Publishing,
1961, p. 119, cited in A. BARAK, lac. cit., note 85, p. 54.
94 Negotiable instruments could certainly fall within the broad language of the s. 2 definition of property in
the Criminal Code, R.S.C. (1985), c. C-46, modified by R.S.C. (1985), c. 2 (I sl supp.). Under section 2
"property" includes
(a) real and personal property of every description and deeds and instruments relating to or evidencing the
title or right to property, or giving a right to recover or receive money or goods,
(b) property originally in the possession or under the control of any person, and any property into or for
which it has been converted or exchanged and anything acquired at any time by the conversion or
exchange, and
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instruments, specifi,cally bills and notes, can be found in the Bills ofExchange Act itself.
Take for example section 48( I), which provides:
Subject to this Act, where a signature on a bill is forged, or placed thereon without the authority of
the person whose signature it purports to be, the forged or unauthorized signature is wholly
inoperative, and no right to retain the bill or to give a discharge therefore or to enforce payment
thereof against any party thereto can be acquired through or under that signature, unless the party
against whom it is sought to retain or enforce payment of the bill is precluded from setting up the
forg~ry or want of authority.
The distinction between the right to "retain the bill" and the right to "give a
discharge" indicates that there is a proprietary element to bills of exchange. The right to
retain relates to this aspect of the bill, while the right to give discharge relates to the
obligational aspect of the bill.96
This proprietary nature of bills and notes was the underlying thought of Justice
Rinfret, of the Supreme Court of Canada, in the case of Pesant v. Pesant. 97 He found that
the promissory note in question was "moveable property." This moveable property,
which may become the subject of a manual gift, comprises, of course, of corporeal
moveables, but also titl'es de creance, the delivery of which is capable of effectually
operating the trarisfer of ownership therein.98 In such a case, the negotiable document and
(c) any postal card, postage stamp or other stamp issued or prepared for issue under the authority of
Parliament or the legislature of a province for the payment to the Crown or a corporate body of any fee, rate
or duty, whether or not it is in the possession of the Crown or of any person;
95 That is, i~sofar as we can determine the status of a bill or note for the purposes of private international
law.
96 This point is made by A, BARAK, loe. cit., note 85, p. 53, in relation to section 23(a) ofIsrael's Bills of
Exchange Ordinance, as it stood, which is the functional equivalent to s. 48 in the current Canadian Bills of
Exchange Act.
97 [1934] R.C.S. 249, 264-265.
98 See O'Meara v. Bennett, [1932] I A.C. 80, which was discussed and applied.
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the creance which it represents are identified with one another to such an extent that the
creance itself is transfened by the sole delivery of the document from hand to hand,
which is the characteristic of the manual gift ("don manuel").
This case establishes that a negotiable instrument is property. The reification of
the obligation embodied in the instrument so as to make it transferable by physical
delivery (without any necessary endorsement) makes it possible to view the BA as
property. Interestingly, it is easier to conceive of the negotiable instrument as property,
when it is overdue, because in that case although it is negotiated to subsequent holders,
they can only take as good a title as the transferor. The perfection of title that is an effect
of negotiability ceases to operate, but there is still a transfer to the subsequent party. The
idea that negotiability is something different than title (i.e., property) is thus put into stark
relief. 99
On the other hand, it is clear that negotiable instruments, such as BAs, are not like
other forms of property. Although there is a proprietary aspect of a negotiable instrument,
its importance is limited for the most part to its evidentiary function (that is, possession of
the physical document can act as proof that the obligation therein has been discharged).
Generally speaking, it has little if any intrinsic value. Its primary usefulness lies in the
obligation it represents. IOO Nevertheless, it is no less "property" because an individual
will likely use it to collect an obligation than retain the instrument for use.
99 See Ashurst v. Official Manager afthe Rayal Bank afAustralia, (1856) 27 L.T. 168.
100 See Wookey v. Pole, (1820) 106 E.R. 845.
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2.3 The BA as an Obligation
Previously we stated that negotiable instruments must be distinguished from any
underlying credit arrangement or contract between a customer (drawer) and seller (payee)
or between a customer and its bank (drawee). They are not the same. As we know, " .. .la
jurisprudence admet Ie caractere autonome de l'obligation cambiaire.,,101 In other words,
we must be careful not to confuse the negotiable instrument as a contract with the
underlying exchange or agreement (i.e., contract) for which the negotiable instrument
was issued. The latter is a bilateral contract, the former is unilateral. Barak explains it this
way:
Frequently, a negotiable instrument is made within the framework of a bilateral contract. For
example, A undertakes to sell goods to B and in consideration B gives A a bill. That is a bilateral
contract; but the bill has an existence of its own. Once it has been made, an additional contract
arises - that on the bill itself. If B fails to pay the bill, A will generally have two contractual
remedies - one based on the bilateral contract, the other on the bill. There is, of course, a close
connection between the two contracts: payment of the bill discharges the bilateral contract; failure
on the part of A to perform his undertaking under the bilateral contract may provide B with a
defence to an action brought on the bill. 102
101 N. L'HEUREUX, E. FORTIN and M. LACOURSIERE op. cit., note 57, p. 420
102 A. BARAK, lac. cit., note 85, p. 61-62.
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The court in Barbour v. Paradis 103 treated a promissory note as being a contract.
Likewise, Justice O'Leary of Ontario's High Court of Justice found that " ... the word
'contract' in s. 4 of the Interest Act includes a promissory note. Not only is such
conclusion alTived at by giving the words used in the section their ordinary meaning, but
also by paying heed to the opinions ofjudges and other jurists."104
Negotiable instruments as contractual obligations are not terminated because the
contract proving its existence is destroyed or lost. On this level, it is subject to the same
defences as are other contracts; namely, fraud, duress, and non est factum. They may also
be assigned like ordinary contracts. 105 Moreover, the Bills of Exchange Act (which
govems.BAs) provides that the capacity to contract and the issue of consideration are the
same as for ordinary contracts. 106The question then becomes, if negotiable instruments
are understood to be contractual obligations, what type of contractual obligation is the
BA? We will begin with loan.
103 (1929), 68 Que. S.C. 31 (S.C.).
104 Elcano Acceptance Ltd. v. Richmond, Richmond, Stambler & Mills, (1989) 68 O.R. (2d) 165, 174. Conf.
(1991) 79 D.L.R. (4th) 154 (Ont. C.A.).
105A non-negotiable bill (payable to order of A only) cannot be negotiated by endorsement, but it may be
assigned according to the rules of assignment of a chose in action (See Dealers Finance Corp. v. Sedgwick
[1932] 1 D.L.R. 71 (Sask. C.A.). See also, I. F.G. BAXTER, op. cit., note 92, p. 13-14. Baxter notes
however that the assignment is not negotiation, and that it will give transferee the title of an assignee and
not the title ofa transferee by negotiation. The difference will be discussed infra, p. 22
106 46. (I) Capacity to incur liability as a party to a bill is coextensive with capacity to contract.
52. (I) Valuable consideration for a bill may be constituted by
(a) any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract; or
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2.3.1 Loan
Can a BA be understood as a loan? Prima facie, it appears the answer is yes. The
Civil Code of Quebec defines a simple loan as follows:
2314. A simple loan is a contract by which the lender hands over a certain quantity of money or
other property that is consumed by the use made of it, to the borrower, who binds himself to return
a like quantity of the same kind and quality to the lender after a certain time. 107
The relationship between the accepting bank and its customer is somewhat similar
to that of a lender and borrower. Consider the following: the bank will agree to pay a
certain sum of money to the payee, which, in many cases will be the customer as the
practice with BAs is for the customer to name him or herself payee. This sum is to be
reimbursed by the customer at a future date, along with .the payment of additional fees
(similar to premiums) and interests. Thus, this arrangement appears seems to be a loan.
But, this is not the case. Although a BA involves a credit transaction, it is not a loan. The
acceptor never lends money to the customer, although he may facilitate the transfer of
funds to the customer by discounting the accepted bill or draft. 108
107 S.Q., 1991, c. 64, art. 2314.
108 Lazar SARNA, Letters ofCredit: The Law and Current Practice, 3'd ed., (Publisher's Note 2002 - ReI.
2), Toronto, Carswell, 1989, p. 10-37. See B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 87, p. 879; See also the decision
of Gould, J. in Air Canada v. Minister ofFinance ofBritish Columbia, [1979] 4 W.W.R. 643, 648
(B.C.S.C.) (reversed on other grounds).
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The court in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Rowntree & CO. 109 had to
determine whether capital arising from an acceptance was considered "borrowed money"
for taxation purposes. In discussing the issue, Justice Tucker stated the following:
As to that, if the word "lender" is to be given its strict legal meaning, I am unable to see how the
discount houses lent any money to anybody. They did not. They purchased these biIls, and I think
it is a faIlacy to regard a transaction of this kind as one of borrower and lender. "But," said the
Solicitor-General, "even if Eriangers are not strictly lenders in law, none the less, if you look at
this transaction as a whole, if you regard it as a tripartite arrangement, its object was to raise
money in the money market, the money was in fact raised, it was made available for the use of the
company by the discount house, and therefore, the discount house is to be regarded as the lender in
a commercial sense, and for the purposes of this taxing Act there is a borrowing of money
wherever A makes available for B money for B's use on the terms that B will pay an equivalent
sum to A at some future date." I think the speeches in the Port of London case in the House of
Lords indicate that the proper approach to this case is to construe the words "borrowed money" as
words which require the existence of a borrower and lender, and that there must be a real
borrowing in the legal sense of the word. I find it difficult, if not impossible, to appreciate how
there can be borrowed money unless the legal relationship of lender and borrower exists between
A and B. After alI, the words "borrow" and "lend" are not words of narrow legal meaning. They
represent a transaction welI known to business people. I 10
From an analytical perspective, we must be careful to distinguish the underlying
agreement (the credit arrangement, in this case) from the BA itself (a negotiable
109 [1948] I All E.R. 482 (C.A.).
110 [d., With respect to taxation, Professor Ogilvie has remarked, "Until 1984, it was uncertain as to whether
acceptance stamping and other fees were deductible for tax purposes as were fees and costs associated with
bank loans. However, changes in the Income Tax Act clarified the position so that although bankers'
acceptances are not, legaIly speaking, loans, certain costs associated with them are deductible for tax
purposes." M.H. OGILVIE, op. cit., note 3, p. 428.
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instrument), as mentioned earlier. To repeat, a loan is a bilateral contract, whereas the BA
is a unilateral, independent obligation for the banle. Though the customer is secondarily
liable to the holder in due course, should the bank default, the customer does not entertain
a direct obligation to reimburse the bank (apart from that arising from the credit
arrangement, which is a separate contract).
There are a number of theories put forward by German, Italian, French,
British and American authors, coneerning the unilateral nature of this obligation.
Analyzing these theories would be beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, for
clarification purposes, the following is a briefoverview.
German scholars first posited that negotiable instruments operate on the basis of
the unilateral engagement of the drawer. llI The German conception is based on a
formalism whereby drawing the bill invests the legal rights in the instrument,
independent orthe underlying transaction. I12
The leading Italian theories were tairly similar to the main German ones.
However, as Jeantin and Le Cannu point out, German theory was not easily reconcilable
with French law, which has not pushed the notion of the abstract nature of the bill of
exchange to its Iimits. 113 Indeed, classic French doctrine was never receptive to unilateral
b 1 j . . I . bl . 114engagements ut las come to accept t Ie notIOn \Vlt 1 respect to negotIa e mstmments.
This has lead .Jeantin and Le Cannu to propose that bills of exchange are only partially
III The intellectual origins of the unilateral engagement theory have been attributed to Johannes Kuntze.
See Johannes Emil KUNTZE, Die Lehre von den Inhaberpapieren, odeI', Obligationen au porteur,
rechtsgeschichtlich, dogmatisch und mit Beriicksichtigung del' deutschen Partikularrechte, Leipzig, J.G.
Hinrichs, 1857, referred to in Frederic NIZARD, Les tUres negociables, Paris, Revue banque edition:
Economica, 2003, p. 80.
ll2 L. M. MITCHELL, loco cit., note 46, 240.
113 Michel JEANTIN and Paul LE CANNU, Droit commercial: Instruments de paiement et de credit;
Entreprise en difficulte, 6th ed., Paris, Dalloz, 2003, p. 172.
114 Frederic NIZARD, Les tUres negociables, Paris, Revue banque edition: Economica, 2003, p. 76, note I.
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abstract in nature, operating out of the interaction of the will of the pmties and the
legislative requirements; the legislative formalism reinforcing the unilateral engagement
of the drawer. 115
On the other hand, according to American and British doctrine, the source of the
obligation lies not in unilateral engagements, but rather in unilateral agreements. It is the
acceptance that binds; "[b]efo1'e acceptance ... no legal obligation exists.,,116
Notwithstanding the nuanced doctrinal debate, the unanimous view IS that
negotiable instruments are by nature unilateral in their obligations. Therefore, the SA
cannot be a loan. What the bank has done in practice is that it has shifted its
creditwOlihiness to the customer, so that the latter can finance a particular transaction.
Unlike a loan between the bank and its customer, in the SA notlling is transferred and no
deposits m"e kept as reserves; Reserves are however maintained by the Bank of Canada
.c I d' . .. 117Joren mg actlvltles.
115 Michel JEANTIN andPaul LE CANNU, Droit commercial: 11lstnl1llents de paiement et de credit;
Entreprise ell difficulte, 6th ed., Paris, Dalloz, 2003, p. 172. This is similar to the view expressed by Roblot,
who rejected other French and German theories on the source of the obligation. See Rene ROBLOT, Les
effets de commerce: lettre de change. billets d ordre et au porteur, warrants. facture protestable, Paris,
Sirey, 1975.
116 Geoffrey Chevalier CHESHIRE, Cheshire. Fifoot alld Funllstoll 's Law ofContract, 12th ed., London,
Butterworths, 1991, p. 57. See Frederic NIZARD, Les titres negociables, Paris, Revue banque edition:
Economica, 2003, p. 76, note I.
117 See M.H. OGILVIE, op. cit., note 3, p. 429.
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2.3.2 Guarantee
Should a BA be viewed as a contract of guarantee (suretyship)? As with a
guarantee, the bank in a BA transaction is responsible for the liability of the customer,
since it effectively guarantees payment to the holder in due course. The Act provides the
means of a guarantee type of arrangement. An accommodation bill is one accepted or
endorsed without value so that a party to the bill is accommodated. The BA is an
instrument where the acceptor plays the role of a surety for a principal debtor who mayor
may not be a patiy to the bill. l18 The Quebec Civil Code states:
2333. Suretyship is a contract by which a person, the surety, binds himself towards the creditor,
gratuitously or for remuneration, to perform the obligation of the debtor if he fails to fulfil it. 119
Recall that "[b]ecause the obligations on a negotiable instrument are contractual
the guarantor prevents nothing known to the general law of contract. Ordinary rules
applicable to the relations between guarantor and the person he provides a guarantee
apply in matters of negotiable instruments.,,120 However, this is not to say that the bank is
a guarantor in a BA transaction, but simply that another party may choose to act as a
guarantor for either the bank or customer, and add their liability to that of the bank and
the customer. This would be a separate agreement however, independent of the BA.
Insofar as the BA is concerned, it cannot be classified as a contract of suretyship
or guarantee, because the accepting bank is primarily liable to the creditor (e.g., holder in
1181. P.G. BAXTER, op. cit., note 92, p. 40.
119 S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 2333 (hereinafter C.C.Q.)
120 A. BARAK, lac. cit., note 85, p. 63.
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due course), not secondarily liable as guarantors typically are. The obligation of the bank
is independent of any obligation its customer may have towards any other party (such as
the bank or a holder in due course). Moreover, while a surety can raise defences of the
principal debtor, such as set-off and incomplete performance, these defences are not
available for the accepting bank in a BA transaction, which must pay the holder in due
course without invoking "any of the customer's actions or failures.
Nevertheless, it does not help us any more if we invert their roles and consider the
bank as the debtor, and the customer as the surety, because the BA transaction could not
then be characterized as a suretyship. Thus, the customer's liability to the beneficiary/
holder of the BA, in the event that the bank refuses or is unable to fulfil its obligations, is
a separate obligation. The customer, in paying the holder at maturity, does not "perform
the obligation of the debtor" as set out in the Civil Code, but rather performs his own
obligation, which stems from his signature on the BA. Furthermore, a contract of
suretyship requires the surety (in this case, the customer) to "bind" himself to the creditor
(e.g., a holder in due course). However, in a BA transaction, the surety would be binding
himself to the debtor (bank), not the creditor. The contractual relationship formed exists
only between the bank and customer and not third pcuiies. The benefit to third parties
derives from the nature of the contract, not from the contractual relationship itself. The
BA is thus a guarantee type of arrangement, but is not a guarantee as understood under
basic private law principles.
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2.3.3 Mandate
Does the BA relationship between the bank and its customer resemble a mandate?
Article 2130 Civil Code of Quebec states:
2130. Mandate is a contract by which a person, the mandator, empowers another person, the
mandatary, to represent him in the performance of a juridical act with a third person, and the
mandatary, by his acceptance, binds himself to exercise the power. The power and, where
applicable, the writing eVidencing it are called the power of attorney. 121
This law can be said to describe the bankers' acceptance (negotiable instrument)
contract. The customer is said to be the mandator (principal) while the accepting bank
can act as its customer's mandatary (agent). The perfonnance of the juridical act with
regard to a third person would be the obligation to pay the holder in due course (or
beneficiary) a sum certain ofmoney at a specified date.
However, the mandate would not work to characterize a BA, since unlike ordinary
mandates, the mandatary in this case (the bank) never intends to act on behalf of, or
represent, the mandatory. Instead, from the outset, the bank acts in its own name. As we
have pointed out, the commercial desirability of a BA is the fact that the bank (usually an
eminently creditworthy institution) is primarily liable on the instrument, independent of
the customer. We must be careful to distinguish between the bank acting at the request of
121 C.C.Q., art. 2130.
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its customer and the bank representing its customer. In a BA transaction, the bank acts on
the "unconditional order" of its customer; but it accepts the bill or note in its own name.
It does not purport to exercise any "power" granted by the mandator. Moreover, although
the bank binds itself to pay the holder in due course at maturity, it does not commit to
represent the customer and act in its stead as mandatary/ agent. Whether the bank acts as
the customer's mandatary will depend on some other anangement. 122
122 See Harold LUNTZ, "Cheques as Mandates and as Bills", (1996-97) 12 B.F.L.R. 189, 190-191 for a
discussion of a cheque (a negotiable instrument) as a bill or mandate. A cheque differs from a bankers'
acceptance in that the former is payable on demand, while the latter is payable fixed or determinable future
time.
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2.3.4 Contract of Sale
Is the BA seen as a contract of sale? Indeed, in international transactions
involving foreign parties, the contract of sale can stipulate that a BA will be used as the
method of payment either in c:onjunction with a letter of credit or in lieu of one. When a
BA is used in conjunction with an existing letter of credit, it will be used to hasten
payment so that a beneficiary will not have to wait until the term of payment to cash in on
his profits. If however, the BA is used as an alternative to the letter of credit, then
although it will continue to have the characteristics of a bill; it will now have an added
international character.
57
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Article 1708 CCQ defines sale:
Sale is a contract by which a person, the seller, transfers ownership of property to another person,
the buyer, for a price in money which the latter obligates himself to pay. A dismemberment of the
right of ownership, or any other right held by the person, may also be transferred by sale. 123
The BA may be sold, subject to the rules of the sale of movables. Notwithstanding
this fact, the BA itself cannot be said to be a contract of sale, since a BA transaction
involves no buyer or seller. Nor does the BA involve a transfer of ownership of property
(although it may create "property"). As mentioned above, negotiable instruments are
unilateral contracts, not bilateral contracts. Thus they could never be deemed a contract
of sale, since they are not synallagmatic by definition,124 and they do not involve the
transfer of property.
As well, the BA cannot be classified as a specific nominate contract. The only
alternative is to view the BA as a type of sui generis contract. The problem is if the BA
instrument is a sui generis contract that creates a negotiable instrument, how then do we
characterize the transaction that occurs between the customer and bank, whereby the
order is made, and then accepted by the bank? Assuming that the bankers' acceptance is
an obligation, the BA transaction resembles certain methods of transferring or modifying
the obligation under the Civil Code.
123 C.C.Q., art. 1708
124 !d., art. 1380,
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2.3.5 Novation
Can the BA be said to involve novation? We might think that like cash, the
negotiable instrument is an instrument in circulation that destroys the title of the former
owner and creates a title (de novo' in the person receiving it. 125 The Quebec Civil Code
provides:
1660. Novation is affected where the debtor contracts towards his creditor a new debt which is
substituted for the existing debt, which is extinguished, or where a new debtor is substituted for
the former debtor, who.is discharged by the creditor; in such a case, novation may be affected
without the consent of the former debtor.
Novation is also affected where, by the effect of a new contract, a new creditor is substituted for
the former creditor, towards whom the debtor is discharged.
Still, novation does not adequately capture what occurs in a BA transaction
between the bank and its customer. The bankers' acceptance, as a negotiable instrument,
constitutes a new and independent obligation; it does not arise in place of the existing
debt, as mentioned previously. The bank's liability is not substituted for the customer's; it
is simply added to it. The fact that the customer remains liable to the holder in due course
125 James Crossely VAINES, Personal Property, 5th ed., London, Butterworths, 1973, p. 161.
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on the bankers' acceptance, along with the accepting bank means, practically speaking,
that what occurs in a BA transaction is not novation. J26
126 See N. L'HEUREUX, E. FORTIN and M. LACOURSIERE op. cit., note 57, p. 420.
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2.3.6 Delegation
Is it possible to envision the BA relationship as a form of delegation? Article
1667 of the CCQ. defines delegation:
1667. Designation by a debtor of a person who is to pay in his place constitutes a delegation of
payment only when the delegate obligates himself personally to the delegatee to make the
payment; otherwise, it m'erely constitutes an indication of payment.
The customer in a regular BA transaction is the debtor and the beneficiar>: or
holder is its creditor. The customer would be the delegant, the accepting bank would be
the delegue, who receives instruction from its customer to make a payment, to the
beneficiary (delegataire).
Delegation may be perfect or imperfect. Perfect delegation means that the creditor
(delegataire) accepts the delegue as the new debtor (which in a sense entails novation).
This would mean that the third party would have to accept the bank as a debtor. Imperfect
delegation means the debtor does not consent to discharge the original debtor, and thus a
new obligation is created. Thus, delegation can, to a certain extent, define the operation
of a bill of exchange, and therefore the BA. 127 Still, the BA cannot truly be classified as a
127 See Jean-Louis BAUDOUIN and Pierre-Gabriel JOBIN, Les Obligations, 5th ed., Cowansville, Yvon
Blais, 1998, p. 760.
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delegation, because it cannot account for the liability the acceptor undertakes to all
successive beneficiaries' holders in due course. 128
128 See N. L'HEUREUX, E. FORTIN and M. LACOURSIERE, op. cit., note 57, p. 420.
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2.3.7 Assignment
Is the BA an assignment? Article 1637 CCQ states:
A creditor may assign to a third person all or part of a claim or a right of action which he has
against his debtor. He may not, however, make an assignment that is injurious to the rights of the
debtor or that renders his obligation more onerous.
In a BA, a difference must be made in that although it can be assigned, it is not
. itself an assignment. 129 Section 126 of the Bills ofExchange Act provides:
A bill, of itself, does not operate as an assignment of funds in the hands of the drawee available for
the payment thereof, and the drawee of a bill who does not accept as required by this Act is not
liable on the instrument.
Aside from the statutory pronouncement, the BA could not be an assignment of
claim, because assignment presupposes a claim or right of action that can be transferred,
while the contractual obligation forming the BA creates the claim in the ftrst place. "The
assignment does not create liability, it merely redirects it.,,130 The customer cannot assign
something it never had in his or her possession in the first place. Although the customer
may well be a creditor of the bank (if, for example, the customer has an account in that
particular bank), we must remember not to confuse pre-existing or underlying agreements
129 For a complete discussion, see Ian F.G. BAXTER, "The Bill of Exchange as an Assignment of Funds: A
Comparative Study", (1953) 31 Can. Bar. Rev. 1131.
130 B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1611.
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with the BA. The customer is not pm-porting to transfer the debt owed to him by the bank
to the third party, but rather is creating a new, independent obligation with a BA.
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2.3.8 Stipulation for Another
Does a BA involve a stipulation for another (stipulation pour autrui)? 131 Article
1444 of the Civil Code of Quebec provides:
A person may make a stipulation in a contract for the benefit of a third person. The stipulation
gives the third person beneficiary the right to exact performance of the promised obligation
directly from the promisor.
Stipulation for another resembles in some way indication of payment, delegation,
and assignment of claim. It appears that a BA is, in fact, a stipulation for a third party.
Indeed, it meets the requirements of the Code. The customer would be the person making
the stipulation, the bank would be the promisor, and the third person beneficiary would
be the specified person or bearer. However, in a BA transaction, the third party retains his
or her right against both the bank and customer. That is, there are two separate liabilities,
unlike a stipulation for another, which maintains a single obligation. Moreover, the Code
states that:
131 Thejus quaesitum terito has a long tradition in civillaw..The "stipulation pour autrui" is part of the civil
law of both France and Quebec. In this book on letters of credit, Sarna concludes that "if the categorization
of the letter of credit as a 'stipulation pour autrui' retains the possibility that the issuing bank may in certain
limited circumstances refuse to honour the credit extended, this may very well reflect the current stage of
development of the commercial use of letters of credit and accordingly provide harmony between the legal
mechanism and the commercial practice." He seems to have in mind as "limited circumstances," special
statutory and regulatory restrictions which can affect the lending practices of banks. I. F.G. BAXTER, op.
cit., note 92, p. 17. -
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1450. A promisor may set up against the third person beneficiary such defences as he could have
set up against the stipulator.
Article 1450 provides an option that cannot be invoked in a BA transaction, or
any negotiable instrument, where the stipulated party is the holder in due course because
section 73(b) of the Bills ofExchange Act provides:
The rights and powers of the holder of a bill are as follows .. .(b) where he is a holder in due
course, he holds the bill free from any defect of title of prior parties, as well as from mere personal
defences available to prior parties among themselves, and may enforce payment against all parties
liable on the bill.
Because the holder holds the bill free from any defect in title as well as mere
personal defences,132 the BA cannot be a stipulation for another, because the bank
(promisor) does not have the same defences against the third person beneficiary (the
holder in due course) as he would have against the customer (as stipulator). The holder in
due course doctrine is an exception to the nemo dat quod non habet rule, which is
captured by Article 1450 of the Quebec Civil Code. There is thus an important difference
between "immediate" and "remote" parties that is not captured in the stipulation for
another. 133
132 "Defect of title" and "mere personal defenses" are discussed in Benjamin GEVA, "Equities as to
Liability on Bills and Notes: Rights of a Holder Not in Due Course", (1980-81) 5 C.BLJ. 53,61-72.
lJJ For a discussion of some the holder in due course issues see Benjamin GEVA, "Reflections on the Need
to Revise the Bills of Exchange Act", (1981-82) 6 eBLJ. p. 269, 271-302.
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2.3.9 Letters of Credit
Can a BA function like a letter of credit? By the "look" of a BA, and given how
often it is used instead of a letter of credit in international transactions, it would not be
misplaced to question whether they are the same type of instrument.
A letter of credit is defined as a letter from of a party (the issuer, a bank)
addressed to a party (the beneficiary) at the request of another party (the applicant, the
bank's customer). The letter indicates an undertaking to pay the beneficiary upon demand
by the latter. In most cases, this demand must be accompanied by other documents. 134
Generally speaking, letters of credit transactions involve a number of separate
relationships: the issuer-beneficiary relationship, the beneficiary-applicant-relationship
d th 1· . l' h' 135an e app lCant-Issuer re ahons Ip.
134 John F. DOLAN, The Law ofLetters ofCredit: Commercial and Standby Credit, (rev. ed.), Arlington,
VA, A.S. Pratt, 1999, §2.02[1].
135 Id., §2.01. See United City Merchants. v. Royal Bank ofCanada, [1983] A.C. 168; (1982) All E.R. 720
(H.L.).
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LETTER OF CREDIT
Name of bank:
Address:
Type of credit document
Beneficiary:
Beneficiary's name
Beneficiary's address
Advising Bank:
Advising bank's name
Advising bank's address
Credit available by:
(specify mode of credit)
Purpose of Issuing Credit
ICredit number
Applicant:
Applicant name
Applicant address
Amount:
(specify currency)
Date & site of expiration
List of accompanying documents
Shipment form
Details:
Restrictions:
Partial shipments
re: shipment from x to y
Transhipment
Additional instructions:
Applicable law: designate law to apply
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In practice, the biggest WOlTY of a seller is the risk of non-payment by a buyer in
a foreign country. While the seller is anxious not to spend money wastefully in
manufacturing, packaging and shipping goods without knowing for certain that the buyer
will be solvent, the buyer will favour not paying until the goods have left the seller's
possession on their way to him. This fact is usually attested to by documents produced by
the seller. Consequently, at the demand of the seller, the buyer will call upon a bank to
guarantee the execution of the obligation of payment by opening a letter of credit to the
benefit of the seller. 136
Authors have recognized that there has been some uncertainty about the precise
legal nature of the letter of credit precisely because they resemble a number of other
instruments. 137 However, authors have also noted that letters of credit are neither bills of
exchange nor promissory notes. 138 This is true because most letters of credit are payable
upon the production of certain documents, which is "fatal" to any argument they are bills
of exchange, because they fail the requirement that the order be unconditional. 139 Even if
letters of credit could be said to be negotiable instruments, they would be promissory
notes l40 as the document contains a promise to pay, rather than an order. Although the
136 Audi GOZLAN, International Letters ofCredit: Resolving Conflicts ofLaw Disputes, 2nd ed., London,
Kluwer Law International Ltd., 1999, p.l.
137 John F. DOLAN, The Law ofLetters ofCredit: Commercial and Standby Credit, (rev. ed.), Arlington,
VA, A.S. Pratt, 1999, §2.01. See also Lazar SARNA, Letters ofCredit: The Law and Current Practice, 3rd
ed., (Publisher's Note 2002 - ReI. 2), Toronto, Carswell, 1989, p. 2-1.
138 David A.L. SMOUT, (ed.), Chalmers on bills ofexchange: A Digest ofthe Law ofBills ofExchange,
13 th ed., London, Stevens, 1964, p. 179; Antonio PERRAULT, Traite de droit commercial, t. I, Montreal,
Albert Levesque, 1940, p. 1211, as cited in Lazar SARNA, Letters o.fCredit: The Law and Current
Practice, 3rd ed., (Publisher's Note 2002 - ReI. 2), Toronto, Carswell, 1989, p. 2-20.
139 SEA, s. 16.
140 There are some letters of credit that are payable simply after the passage of time and do not require the
presentation of documents. Notwithstanding, the difficulties associated with characterizing them as
negotiable instruments, they may well be promissory notes. Nevertheless, "it serves little analytic purpose
to characterize one limited species of letter of credit as a promissory note and to exclude the much greater
realm of conditional letters of credit from that characterization. To say that some letters of credit are in law
promissory notes is in effect simply to say that they are not letters of credit." Lazar SARNA, Letters of
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BA functions in similar ways to a letter of credit, it remams markedly different,
especially in its operation. The difference between a promise and an order is that in the
former (letter of credit), although you have undertaken to do something, there is the
option to fulfill the promise or not, if some other contingency has not been met. But, with
an order (such as the BA), you are required by law to act in a certain way (i.e., to pay) in
default of which you would be in breach of contract with all the consequences that
entails. In the letter of credit, the payer may choose not to pay at a certain time by
invoking the fact that the merchandise was defective, or that the seller defaulted in some
way. But in a BA transaction, the payee bank must make payment at the agreed upon date
of the document, irrespective of the seller's fulfillment of his obligations. This, for the
seller and buyer, is the greatest advantage of the BA over the letter of credit.
Final consideration on this point should be given to anticipated acceptance theory,
which states that in undertaking to open a credit on behalf of the applicant, the bank gives
an anticipated acceptance, which obligates the bank to pay the beneficiary the face
amount of the letter of credit. 141 Sarna attributes the source of this theory to jurisprudence
that equated the promise in the letter of credit to an anticipatory acceptance of drafts, but
he points out, however, that Canadian, French and British legislation require that the
acceptance must be made on the bill itself for it to be valid. 142 And so the difference
between a letter of credit and a BA in this respect is that while in the first an acceptance
is a part of the document but not essential to its existence, in the BA, the acceptance is
what makes the BA valid
Credit: The Law and Current Practice, 3rd ed., (Publisher's Note 2002 - ReI. 2), Toronto, Carswell, 1989,
p.2-21.
141 Lazar SARNA, Letters ofCredit: The Law and Current Practice, 3rd ed., (Publisher's Note 2002 - ReI.
2), Toronto, Carswell, 1989, p. 2-22. In France, this is known as "une acceptation cambiaire."
142 Id., p. 2-22. In Canada, the relevant legislation is section 35 of the Bills of Exchange Act.
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To summarize, the BA is an agreement that shares some similarities with certain
forms and modalities of obligations, yet it remains distinct in that it is a negotiable
instrument governed by the Bills ofExchange Act. The BA creates a new obligation for
each of the signatories, which originates from the consent to be bound and statutory
requirements. The obligation is both voluntary and legal. 143 Thus, we must concur with
Justice Barclay who stated, "While negotiable instruments are contracts, they are
contracts of a special nature, regulated by a special statute, and by that statute they are
made part of the currency of the country. ,,144 This special statute is the Bills ofExchange
Act, which governs the creation and operation, and unique characteristics of negotiable
instruments.
143 See N. L'HEUREUX, E. FORTIN and M. LACOURSIERE op. cit., note 57, p. 420
144 Bank ofMontreal v. Amireault, (1938) 65 B.R. I, 19
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2.4 The Complex Character of the Bankers' Acceptance
Rare is a legal document at once so simple and yet so complex. The BA is an
obligation (contract) drafted and is considered property. Yet, it is also classified as a
"negotiable instrument," which allows it to be transferred to any new holder in due
course within its maturity date, while creating unique obligations upon the parties
involved. 145 The identification of the right to possess a bill or note and the right to sue
thereon corresponds to the double nature of a negotiable instrument as in a "chose in
action" and a "chattel," otherwise known as an "intangible obligation" and "movable
property" in civilian terminology. This earned the BA (and bills of exchange generally)
the description of having a "duplex" nature. Concerning the "duplex nature" of the
negotiable instrument, one author pointed out:
It is a chattel, a tangible scrap of paper, sometimes valuable for its own sake if sufficiently ancient
or bearing the autograph of some historic debtor.... Secondly, a bill or note is a bundle of
contracts. Its ownership involves not only the right to possess a thing but the right to sue several
persons - maker, drawer and acceptor endorsers. The right to hold the paper and the right to
enforce the obligation are in the same person. 146
However, others have asked us to consider the triple nature of the negotiable
instrument, and rightfully so. BAs have more than a dual nature. As explained:
145 See A. BARAK, loco cit., note 85, p. 67
146 Zechariah CHAFEE, "Remarks on Restrictive Endorsements", (1945) 58 Harv. L.R. 1182, 1190.
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[The answer to the previous question should be evident] ... recalling the triple nature of the
negotiable instrument. An instrument is a chattel governed by general property law, as well as an
obligation governed by general contract law. It is also a negotiable paper governed by the special
law merchant or the law of negotiable instruments in the strict sense, as codified by the BEA in
relation to bills and notes. 147
This double, or rather triple nature of a negotiable instrument has long been
recognized. This unique instrument is produced by the "reification" of the debt claim
under the instrument or its "merger" into the paper embodying it. 148 That is, the physical
bill itself, the very piece of paper, constituted, and did not merely evidence, the claim or
debt that had created it. 149
Professor Gilmore explains it this way:
That was the idea, that the piece of paper in which the bill was written or printed should be treated
as if it - the piece of paper - was itself the claim or debt which it evidenced. This idea came to be
known as the doctrine of merger - the debt was merged in the instrument. Under merger theory the
only way of transferring the debt represented by the bill was by physical delivery of the bill itself
to the transferee. 150
Is it truly important to exert so much intellectual effort in order to characterize the
negotiable instrument? It would appear so. Barak reminds us that, "[t]heory is very often
a matter of great practical importance," especially in a field which develops at such a
1471. ZIEGEL, B. GEVA and R.C.C. CUMING, op. cit., note 6, p. 58.
14K !d, p. 57.
149 K. EGGERT, loe. cit., note 36, p. 383.
150 Grant GILMORE, "Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments", (1979) 13 Creighton L. Rev. p.
441,449.
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rapid pace. A return to underlying theory is necessary to deal with "new and
unforeseeable" situations. 151 Indeed, it may be quite relevant in many instances, in
particular where there are questions as to which law applies to the instrument. Barak
further states:
From the point of view of general theory it is important to emphasize that the negotiable
instrument's existence does not depend solely on the special legislation on the subject; it also
exists outside that framework. It would be a grave error to attempt to find the answers to all the
questions on negotiable instruments in that special legislation alone. The nature of the negotiable
instrument cannot be properly understood if it is not examined in the light of the legal system as a
whole. Thus, for example, the legislation on negotiable instruments lays down rules as to
negotiation. But negotiation is not the only way in which liability on a bill is transferred. As we
have already seen, at least insofar as English law is concerned, the transfer can be in accordance
with the rules governing the assignment of debts. In addition, the rights on a bill may also pass by
way of succession or on bankruptcy. The latter are not regulated by a special legislation on
negotiable instruments, but by general law, without which it is impossible to understand the
theoretical nature or practical operation of the negotiable instrument. 152
Therefore, as a bill or note "is both a chattel and a chose in action" and a
"negotiable instrument," it is subject to two main sets of laws: one is the general law
dealing with property and obligations; the other is the special law, derived from the law
merchant dealing with the specific characteristics of a bill or note as a negotiable
instrument. The former set of laws, relating to the property and obligatory elements of the
instrument, is "the law of bills and notes in the wide sense." The latter set oflaws, which
lSI A. BARAK, loco cit., note 85, p. 50.
152 Id, p. 72.
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includes the fOlID, issue, negotiation, and discharge of bills and notes, is "the law of bills
and notes in the strict sense,,153 The question arises with section 9 of the Bills of
Exchange Act, which provides:
9. The rules of the common law of England, including the law merchant, save in so far as they are
inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act, apply to bills, notes and cheques.
This part of our work has been the source of much doctrinal controversy. Some
authors maintain that this section imports English comrilOn law to all matters coming
within bills and notes. 154 Others, who represent the majority opinion, maintain that the
scope of section 9 is limited to those matters coming within bills and notes in a "strict
sense" only, not matters concerning bills and notes in a wide sense. 155 It should be noted
that the distinction between the law of negotiable instruments in the strict sense and the
law of negotiable instruments in the broad sense is not expressly referred to in section 9.
Nevertheless, this interpretation of the section is premised on "the double nature of the
bill or note as a 'negotiable instrument' governed by special law (whose historical roots
are in the old law merchant), and as a chattel and obligation governed by the general law
of property and contract. ,,156 According to some of the jurists who hold that English
common law applies, reading the stricti wide distinction into section 10 [now section 9] is
IS3 Benjamin GEVA, Financing Consumer Sales and Product Defences in Canada and the United States,
Toronto, Carswell, 1984, p. 256.
154 See e.g., Benjamin RUSSELL, A Commentary on the Bills ofExchange Act, 2nd ed., Montreal,
Burroughs & Co., 1921, p. 22.
155Infra, p. (interpretive approach)ff See Antonio PERRAULT, Traite de droit commercial, t. 3, Montreal,
Albert Levesque, 1940, p.171.!f. and Maximilien CARON, Precis de droit des effets de commerce, i h ed.,
A. BOHEMIER and Michel DESCHAMPS, (eds.), Montreal, Beauchemin, 1986.
156 Benjamin GEVA, "Negotiable Instruments and Banking: Review of Some Recent Canadian Case Law",
(1994) 9 B.FL.R. p. 197, 198. Although the leading Quebec authors agree with the strict/wide dichotomy, they do not
discuss the notion of the "double nature" ofbills, cheques and notes.
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incompatible with the language of that section. 15? On the other hand, some jurists believe
that this view reflects the true spirit of the law. 158 In any case, " ... the distinction has
proved a political and legal means of limiting the incident of sec. 10 [now section 9] and
restricting its application to an absolute minimum.,,159
The issue of section 9 is important in Quebec, since private law in this province is
based on the French civilian tradition, rather than the English common law. The matter is
one related to the separation of powers between the federal and provincial governments
in the constitution and federalism in general. Consequently, the difficulty with section 9
is not only a concern for Quebec, but in fact for all provinces. 160
157 See A. BARAK, loco cit" note 85, p. 73.
158 See M. CARON, op. cit., note ISS, p. 11-12. See also, Louis-Joseph de la DURANTAYE, Traite des
effets negociables, Marc BRIERE, Louis-Philippe TASCHEREAU, and Guy LORD, (eds.), Montreal,
Wilson & Lafleur, 1964, p. 42, who adopts Falconbridge's position.
159 A. BARAK, loco cit., note 85, p. 73~
160 Id., p. 72 -73.
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CHAPTER 3. The Law and Operation of Bankers'
Acceptances
In Chapter 2, we described the nature and juridical character of the BA. We have
determined that the proper characterization of the BA will thus have a profound effect on
the law that is applied. As mentioned, BAs are often part of wider transactions of
business and financing operations, and so they will touch on both federal and provincial
legislation. The scope of each field of legislation and the governing law is debatable. In
the following sections, we will examine the various relationships formed in a BA
transaction, and determine which law applies to them. To do this properly, we will begin
by briefly exploring the legislation pertaining to the BA transaction and then tum to an
examination of the actual operation. Understanding the law first is important because the
BA transaction is a multifaceted operation with numerous obligations incurred by a
variety of different parties, which may bring into play various federal and provincial
laws, specifically the civil law in Quebec.
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3.1 Canadian Legislation Affecting Bankers' Acceptances
Bills of exchange and negotiable instruments in Canada have been controlled by
three primary pieces of legislation: The Bills ofExchange Act,161 the Bank Act, 162and the
Bank of Canada Act. 163 Bills and notes may now be subject to a fourth enactment - the
Depository Bills and Notes Act. 164 While the Bills ofExchange Act (and to some extent
the DepositOlY Bills and Notes Act) govern the creation of a BA and its conversion into a
negotiable instrument, the Bank Act and the Bank of Canada Act relate to a BA on a
broader level. We will examine each of these enactments in turn.
161 R.S.C. (1985), c. B-4.
162 1991, c. 46.
163 Supra, note 52.
164 1998, c.l3.
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3.1.1 The Bills of Exchange Act
The most important law applying to BAs is the Bills of Exchange Act, since it
regulates the formal and transactional validity of negotiable instruments. The first
Canadian Bills ofExchange Act165 received Royal Assent on May 16, 1890 and came into
force September 1, 1890.166
The Act states that any bill, draft, or promissory note will be treated as a
negotiable instrument if it is expressed as a document in which one party obligates the
other to pay a particular sum of money at a pre-determined or determinable date. BAs are
governed by the Bills ofExchange Act because they are instruments drawn on a bank and
payable at a future time. A bank, for the purposes of the Bills ofExchange Act, is defined
as a bank or an authorized foreign bank within the meaning of section 2 of the Bank
Act.167 The details of the various requirements of the Act in respect to a BA will be
analyzed in section 3.2 where its transactions will be discussed.
165 S.C. 1890, c. 33.
166 See B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1178.
167 S.C. 1991, c. 46.
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3.1.2 The Depository Bills and Notes Act
With the stated intention of the banking industry to evolve with technological
developments, and to move towards electronic settlement and clearing, an understanding
of the DepositOlY Bills and Notes Act (DBNA), its effect on money market instruments,
and its relationship with the Bills ofExchange Act, becomes crucial. 168
The DepositOlY Bills and Notes Act came into force June 11, 1998. This new
legislation responds to recommendations by the banking and financial services
industry. It is technical in nature and aims at improving the efficiency of Canada's money
markets by creating " ... a new class of investment securities designed to be traded and
delivered by means of screen-based systems, replicating the protections of traditional
negotiable instruments law by other means.,,169 However, it was not intended to replace
existing legislation such as the Bills ofExchange Act, but rather work with it and provide
dd ' . 1 f dr' . bl . 170an a Ihona means 0 awmg negoha e mstruments.
Nevertheless, the existing federal legislation in this area, the Bills of Exchange
Act, discusses being in physical possession of negotiable instruments when describing the
rights of parties involved in transactions. Today, it is increasingly common for banks and
other stakeholders to hold instruments such as bills, treasury bonds, bankers' acceptances
and other negotiable instruments through depositories. When such instruments are
assigned, the transfer is facilitated by an entry in the records of the depository, not by
168 See Alison R. MANZER, "Depository Bills and Notes," (1998) 17 Nat'l Banking L. Rev. 69,69-70.
169 Bradley eRAWFORD, "The Depository Bills and Notes Act: Negotiable Instruments for the Electronic
A~e," (1998-1999) 14 B.FLR., p. 205, 206.
17 See A. R. MANZER, loco cit., note 168, p. 70.
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way of the physical delivery of the instrument. Prior to the DBNA, the legislation
governing financial institutions in this regard did not reflect the modem practice of
financial institutions. The Bills of Exchange Act refers to the effect of possession of a
negotiable instrument when detennining the rights of parties to a transaction. When a
negotiable instrument is in the hands of a depository and the transfer is effected through a
record entry, the rights mentioned in the Bills ofExchange Act are impossible to interpret
since the instrument itself remains with the depository. The DBNA corrects this problem
by creating two new categories of financial instruments: the depository bill and the
depository note. Now, a purchaser of a depository bill or note has the same legal rights as
a purchaser of a bill or note under the Bills of Exchange Act without the instrument
actually being delivered. In order to distinguish them from other similar securities,
depository bills and notes will carry a notation on the reverse side indicating that they are
depository bills and notes subject to the DBNA. 171
The DBNA requires that the order be in writing, which according to some
indicates that Canada is not yet entirely ready for e-commerce. l72 This is further evident
from the concept of deemed physical delivery that will probably become fully obsolete
within a few years. On the other hand, the law is unlikely to be of significant long-term
influence or practical significance - not simply because of these deficiencies - but
because it was deliberately designed from the outset as an interim measure. 173
The tenns "depository bill" and "depository note" in the DBNA are almost
identical in substance to those of "bill" and "note" in the BEA. This was designed in
171 See B. CRAWFORD, loco cit., note 169, p. 219 and 220.
172 A. R. MANZER, loco cit., note 168, p. 70.
173 B. CRAWFORD, loco cit., note 169, p. 206. An additional reason offered for the writing requirement is
it was thought to be necessary in order to locate the instruments in a particular jurisdiction for conflicts of
law purposes.
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order to ensure that it would be clearly recognizable whether it was subject to the BEA or
DBNA. 174 For example, the DBNA requires that each instrument be marked with the
words "This is a depository bill subject to the Deposit01Y Bills and Notes Act" or "Lettre
de depot assujettie ala Loi sur les lettT'es et billets de depot.,,175
Note that the legal relations of parties to a depository bill or note are appreciably
different despite the fact that their practical effect and commercial value are substantially
the same as inshuments governed by the BEA. 176 For example, the Bills of Exchange Act
distinguishes between primary, secondary and even tertiary liability of the parties
involved. Moreover, the effect of section 16 is such that there is no defence of partial, or
even total, failure of consideration under the Act, because a party is liable even if the bill
does not constitute a binding contractual obligation. 177 Defences are limited to forged or
unauthorized signatures and where the bill or note is counterfeit or materially altered with
consent of the party liable to pay.178 The requirements that the legend be prominently
incorporated on the face of the depositOly bill, and somewhere within its text, are
designed to ensure that persons signing the new form of bill understand that they are
subjecting their liability on the instrument to the new legal regime. The requirements also
serve to ensure that parties to instruments that were originally issued subject to the BEA
are not at risk of having their liabilities materially altered by the addition of a legend at
some later time. 179
174 B. CRAWFORD, lac. cit., note 169, p. 215.
175 Depository Bills and Notes Act, 1998, c.13, s. 4(c) (hereinafter, D.B.N.A.).
176 B. CRAWFORD, lac. cit., note 169, p. 220.
177 D.B.N.A., s. 16.
178 Id., c.l3, s. 20(1).
179 B. CRAWFORD, lac. cit., note 169, p. 220.
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The simplicity of the statute belies the fact that it is intended to be used by
everybody. It contains few protections for paliies contained in the Bills ofExchange Act
(there is no section comparable to section V of the BEA), which are intended to insulate
them against risk. 180 This legislation was designed for sophisticated and experienced
issuers ofmoney market instruments.
It is important to keep in mind that the "DBNA is a temporary measure narrowly
focussed on avoiding, rather than solving, a number of difficult legal problems raised by
the extension of electronic clearing and settlement systems to negotiable debt securities in
the form of bankers' acceptances and commercial paper to which the market is
accustomed." 181 Nevertheless, there may be resistance to abandoning the newly created
legal regime under the DBNA, especially if actors in the money market have an
encouraging experience with its liability regime. If this regime continues for any length
of time, bankers will need to determine if BAs and other money market instruments will
be settled through the Canadian Depository for Securities (CDS) system or not. If it is the
case, they will need to ensure that the depository bill or note meets the requirements of
the Deposit01Y Bills and Notes Act. 182
180 Id., p. 226.
181 Id., p. 242-243.
182 A. R. MANZER, loco cit., note 168, p. 72.
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3.1.3 The Bank Act
The Bank Aet l83 confers the powers described in sections 409 and 410 184 to the
banks falling within the Act's purview. These powers include, without limitation, certain
183 Supra, note 137.
184 The Business and Powers of banks was found in so 173(1) of the Bank Act prior to 1991:
409. (I) Subject to this Act, a bank shall not engage in or carry on any business other than the
business of banking and such business generally as appertains thereto.
(2) For greater certainty, the business of banking includes
(a) providing any financial service;
(b) acting as a financial agent;
(c) providing investment counseling services and portfolio management services; and
(d) issuing payment, credit or charge cards and, in cooperation with others including other
financial institutions, operating a payment, credit or charge card plan.
410. (I) In addition to the powers that a bank may exercise pursuant to section 409, a bank may
(a) hold, manage and otherwise deal with real property;
(b) outside Canada, engage in the activities in which an information services corporation, within
the meaning of subsection 464( I), may engage;
(c) in Canada, engage in such of the activities referred to in paragraph (b) that the bank was
permitted to engage in by regulations made under the Bank Act, being chapter B-1 of the Revised
Statutes of Canada, 1985;
(col) in Canada, engage in the activities in which an information services corporation, within the
meaning of subsection 464(1), may engage, if before engaging in those activities the bank obtains
the Minister's written approval for it to engage in those activities;
(Co2) engage in the activities in which a specialized financing corporation, as defined in subsection
464( I), may engage, if before engaging in those activities the bank obtains the Minister's written
approval for it to engage in those activities;
(d) promote merchandise and services to the holders of any payment, credit or charge card issued
by the bank;
(e) engage in the sale of
(i) tickets, including lottery tickets, on a non-profit public service basis in connection with special,
temporary and infrequent non-commercial celebrations or projects that are of local, municipal,
provincial or national interest,
(ii) urban transit tickets, and
(iii) tickets in respect of a lottery sponsored by the federal government or a provincial or municipal
government or an agency of any such government or governments;
(f) ac t as a custodian of property; and
(g) act as receiver, liquidator or sequestrator.
(2) Except as authorized by or under this Act, a bank shall not deal in goods, wares or merchandise
or engage in any trade or other business.
(3) The Governor in Council may make regulations
(a) respecting what a bank mayor may not do with respect to the carrying on of the activities
referred to in paragraphs (I)(b) to (Co2); and
(b) imposing terms and conditions in respect of
(i) the provision of financial services referred to in paragraph 409(2)(a) that are financial planning
services,
(ii) the provision of services referred to in paragraph 409(2)(c), and
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enabling provisions relating to specific aspects of banking and the permitted activities of
banks, except as other provisions of the Act limit them. Subsection 409(1) provides that,
subject to the provisions of the Act, a bank will not engage in or carry on any business
other than the business of banking and such business that generally pertains thereto. For
greater precision, section 409(2) identifies four areas which are included in the business
of banking, namely (a) providing any financial service, (b) acting as a financial agent, (c)
providing investment counselling services and portfolio management services, and (d)
issuing payment, credit or charge cards in cooperation with others including other
financial institutions; operating a payment, credit or charge card plan. 18S Additional
powers and restrictions are listed in section 410 of the Act.
It should be noted that bankers' acceptances have been judicially recognized as
part of the business of banking since at least the nineteenth century. 186 With respect to the
power of a bank to deal in acceptances, Crawford has stated, "[t]o deal in bills of
exchange is to traffic or trade in them; that is, to buy and sell them, or to lend on the
security of them. This power has recently achieved renewed significance with the
development of a domestic market in bankers' acceptances ... and the renewed interest in
international trade in forfeiting.,,187
Although the current Bank Act does not expressly empower the bank to deal in
negotiable instruments as it once did,188 this power can be inferred from the general
(iii) the carrying on of the activities referred to in paragraphs (I)(b) to (c.2).
185 Supra, note 137, s. 409(2).
186 Berton v. Central Bank (1863), 10 N.B.R. 493 (C.A.).
187 B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 87, p. 341.
188 R.S.C., (1985), c. B-1, s. 173(c)(g). Those provisions allowed the bank to:
(c) acquire, deal in, discount, and lend money and make advances on the security of, and take as security
for any loan or advance made by the bank or any debt or liability to the bank, bills of exchange, promissory
notes and other negotiable instruments, coin, gold and silver bullion and securities;
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power to engage in the "business of banking"; that is, to be involved in such
commercial transactions, such as making payments and providing credit. In order for
these instruments to be effective, banks must have considerable freedom in engaging in
these types of activities. The term, "business of banking" has been interpreted liberally as
the banking power must reflect changing conditions.
In 1894 Lord Watson said, "Banking [is] an expression which is wide enough to
embrace every transaction coming within the legitimate business of a banker."J89 The
Ii beral interpretation of the phrase persists, despite the fact that the list of specil1c powers
that followed may have resulted in a restrictive judicial construction.190
In Canadian Pioneer Management Ltd. v. Labour Relations Board of
Saskatchewan, 19.1 the Supreme Court adopted the broad concept of banking as "what
banks do" in its conclusion that banking "involved a set of interrelated financial
activities." Similarly, in Bank of]y[ontreal v. Hall, J92 the Court acknowledged the broad
scope of banking in its recognition that the taking of security is a vital part of the banking
enterprise.
Despite these decisions there is still ambiguity over the scope of the business of
banking. In Bank q(Nova Scotia and Optima Communications Canada Inc. v.
Superintendent ofFinancial Institutions et al.,193 the British Columbia Comt of Appeal
reversed a lower court decision, which had held that the telemarketing of creditor
(g) subject to any tenns and conditions prescribed by the regulations, guarantee the payment or repayment
of fixed sums of money with or without interest thereon.
189 Tennantv. Union Bank ofCanada [1894] A.e. 31, 46 (P.C.).
190 Wendy G. BELLACK-VINER, «The Business of Banking: C.D.I.e. v. C.e.B.», (1987-88) 2 B.F.L.R.,
p. 236, 248.
191 [1980], I S.e.R. 433.
192 [1990] I S.e.R. 121, 147.
193 (2003),223 D.L.R. (4th) 126; [2003] 5 W.W.R. 217; (2003), 31 B.L.R. (3d) I; (2003), II B.CLR. (4th)
206.
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insurance by the bank was part of the business of insurance, not the business of banking
and, therefore, was subject to provincial regulation.
The Alberta Court of Appeal more recently upheld a Queen's Bench decision,
which had determined that the promotion of insurance by banks, even when connected
with their lending activities, is not part of banking and that the licensing regime of the
Albelta 1I1sura11ce Act consequently applied to banks. In its decision, the COllrt of Appeal
rejected the banks' argument that section 409(2) of the Bank Act defines the "business of
banking" a'i the provision of "any financial service" by pointing out that the Bank Act
itself distinguishes between banking and insurance: Section 416 treats the "business of
insurance" as separate from the "business of banking.,,194 It should be pointed out,
however, the primary issue was whether the promotion of insurance was a "vital" part of
banking for the purpose of resolving constitutional questions, such as inte~jurisdictional
immunity. The fact that banking has been broadly interpreted by the courts was not truly
at issue in that case.
It is now generally accepted that the power is unlimited by the specific examples
provided in the Act. It should be noted that the Bank Act affects Schedule I or II Banks,
and, except as otherwise provided, does not apply to any other institution that may be
popularly considered a bank. 195 On June 28, 1999, amendments to Canada's Bank Act
carne into force, which permit foreign banks to establish Canadian Foreign Bank
Branches (FBB) rather than operating through bank subsidiaries in Canada. "Foreign
194 Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta (2005), 249 D.L.R. (4th) 523; [2005] 6 W.W.R. 226; (2005), 39
Alta. L.R. (4th) I. .
195 Cf, Patrick N. MCDONALD, «The BNA Act and the Near Banks: A Case Study in Federalism», (1972)
10 Alta. L. R. 155.
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banks have the option of choosing to establish either a 'full-service' FBB or a 'lending'
FBB .... A lending FBB has more restrictive borrowing powers. It may not accept
deposits or borrow in Canada or elsewhere, except from Canadian financial institutions
and certain foreign banks, and they may not have access to Canadian commercial paper
or bankers' acceptance markets."I96
Since bankers' acceptances are deposit liabilities of the bank, in the case of
insolvency they are combined with other liabilities and rank prior to the bank's
subordinated indebtedness pursuant to section 369 of the Bank Act. 197
There is a belief that the increasing use of these instruments will lead to greater
regulation as in the United States, where banks are limited in the volume of BAs they
may have outstanding as a share of their total capital. Participation arrangements have
been one means by which U.S. banks have sought to elude this regulation, although
196 Theodore P. AUGUSTlNOS, Walter Douglas STUBER, Adriana G6del STUBER, Jeffrey P.
GREENBAUM, Shourya MANDAL, Robert E. ELLIOT, Robert W. MCDOWELL, Kathleen S.M.
HANLY and Pandora D. STASLER, «International Legal Developments in Review: 2000 International
Banking and Finance», (2001) 35 Int'l Law. p. 287, 308.
197 M.H. OGILVIE, op. cit., note 3, p. 429. Section 369 reads:
369. (I) In the case of the insolvency ofa bank,
(a) the payment of any amount due to Her Majesty in right of Canada, in trust or otherwise, except
indebtedness evidenced by subordinated indebtedness, shall be a first charge on the assets of the
bank;
(b) the payment of any amount due to Her Majesty in right of a province, in trust or otherwise,
except indebtedness evidenced by subordinated indebtedness, shall be a second charge on the
assets of the bank;
(c) the payment of the deposit liabilities of the bank and all other liabilities of the bank, except the
liabilities referred to in paragraphs (d) and (e), shall be a third charge on the assets of the bank;
(d) subordinated indebtedness of the bank and all other liabilities that by their terms rank equally
with or subordinate to such subordinated indebtedness shall be a fourth charge on the assets of the
bank; and
(e) the payment of any fines and penalties for which the bank is liable shall be a last charge on the
assets of the bank.
(2) Nothing in subsection (I) prejudices or affects the priority of any holder of any security
interest in any property of a bank.
(3) Priorities within each of paragraphs (I)(a) to (e) shall be determined in accordance with the
laws governing priorities and, where applicable, by the terms of the indebtedness and liabilities
referred to therein.
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Canadian banks would have to consider section 415 of the Bank Act, which restricts
banks in acting in the placement of securities. The question in Canada today remains of
h . 1 th h . l' 198t eoretIca ra er t an practIca Importance.
The term "business of banking" also enables banks to engage in BA participation
facilities. The ruling in Re: Canadian Deposit Insurance COlporation (Re: C.D.I.C.) 199
presumably resolved many persisting questions as to the legitimacy and legality of
participated credit arrangements. The Bank Act appears to insinuate its endorsement of
facilitated participation arrangements. The premise upon which the court formed its
judgement was contingent on its interpretation of the term "business of banking" as part
of the Bank Act which allows a bank to engage in and carry on such business generally as
appertains to the "business of banking.,,2ooThe court mentioned part of the case of Central
Computer Services Ltd. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 201 which was pleaded in the
Manitoba Court of Appeal, in establishing the definition of the "business of banking."
The ruling concluded that "the business of banking" could only be determined by
analyzing and considering "current practices of reputable banks" and all other pertinent
information. It was the court's opinion that any and all banking activity not unequivocally
forbidden which conforms to standard procedure of risk-diffusion, low cost supply of
funding and maintenance of a competitive market, may be encompassed in the words
"business of banking." BA participation appears to have these criteria and adheres to the
198 M.H. OGILVIE, op. cit., note 3, p. 429. Section 415 of the Bank Act provides: A bank shall not deal in
Canada in securities to the extent prohibited or restricted by such regulations as the Governor in Council may make for
the purposes of this section.
199 27 D.L.R.(4th) 229 (Alta. Q.B.); 46 D.L.R. (2d) III (Q.B.); 56 Alta. L.R. (2d) 244 (Q.B.) (Three
different judgements in the same litigation).
200 Bank Act, C.S.E., [1991, c.46] s. 409.
201 (1980) 109 D.LR. (3d) 660.
91
guidelines of permitted banking practices. It was more precise from the court's
judgement that BA participation was an acceptable procedure.
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3.1.4 The Bank of Canada Act
Canadian banks have historically provided acceptances primarily for fmancial
activities that would generate sufficient capital to satisfy the acceptance before it became
due (i.e., self-liquidating transactions) not unlike their American counterparts. Although
Canadian chartered banks were not restricted by the regulations of the Bank of Canada,
growth in acceptance financing was constrained in large part because of the definition of
BAs eligible for Bank of Canada transactions.z°2 The Bank ofCanada Act stated that the
Bank may:
(f) buy and sell bills of exchange and promissory notes endorsed by a chartered
bank drawn and issued in connection with the production or marketing ofgoods,
wares, merchandise as defined in the Bank Act, excepting those mentioned in
paragraph (g), and having a maturity not exceeding ninety days, excluding days
of grace, from the date of the acquisition of the Bank;
(g) buy and sell bills of exchange and promissory notes endorsed by
a chartered bank drawn and issued in connection with the production or
marketing of agriculture, products of the forest, products of the quarry and mine,
or products of the sea, lakes and rivers, as definl~d in the Bank Act, and having a
maturity not exceeding one hundred and eighty days excluding days ofgrace
from the date of acquisition by the Bank.... 203
202 E. RAZIN, loco cit., note 10, p. 224.
203 Supra, note 52, s. 18( I)(j) (g).
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The Act states that the Bank of Canada could only deal in acceptances issued for
certain transactions, with maturity dates limited to 90 days and 180 days, respectively,
depending on the activity in question. We must keep in mind though, that although the
Bank of Canada was restricted in the types of acceptances in could deal in, the Bank of
Canada Act did not directly limit chartered banks in their acceptance activity. In any
case, the Act has since been amended; broadening the category of eligible acceptances
the Bank of Canada can deal with. The relevant sections now allow the Bank to:
(g) buy and sell bills of exchange and promissory notes endorsed, accepted or issued by a bank or
authorized foreign bank that is not subject to the restrictions and requirements referred to in
subsection 524(2) of the Bank Act and having a maturity not exceeding one hundred and eighty
days, excluding days of grace, from the date of acquisition by the Bank;
(g. I) if the Governor is of the opinion that there is a severe and unusual stress on a financial
market or financial system, buy and sell any other securities, treasury bills, obligations, bills of
exchange or promissory notes, to the extent determined necessary by the Governor for the purpose
of promoting the stability of the Canadian financial system;
(k) for the purpose of its open-market operations, buy and sell in the open market from or to any
person, either in or outside Canada, securities, bills of exchange and promissory notes of the kinds
and maturities and subject to the limitations, if any, referred to in paragraphs (c) to (e) and (g) with
or without the endorsement of a bank....204
The effects of these changes were considerable; notably, banks were no longer
limited to dealing with BAs used to finance transactions of a certain nature. The potential
204 R.S.C. (1985), c. B-2, s. 18(g)(g.I)(k).
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for greater involvement of the Bank of Canada meant not only increased demand, but
also established the security of the instrument.205
205 E. RAZIN, loco cit., note 10, p. 226.
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3.1.5 The Civil Code of Quebec
The Quebec Civil Code's relationship with federal legislation on bills and notes is
not an easy one to characterize. In 1866, the codifiers of the Civil Code of Lower Canada
generated 76 articles on Bills ofExchange, which they placed in Book Four of the code.
They relied on the 1849 statute on bills and notes, reproducing much of it in the code.
They were also inspired by both English and French law on bills of exchange and
promissory notes. Their codifiers cited, among others, the works of Savary, Pothier,
Nougier, Pardessus, Bayley, Story, 'Chitty and Hulme. Despite federal legislation in 1872
and 1877, these codal provisions remained largely in force until the enactment of the Bills
ofExchange Act in 1890. This Act repealed articles 2279 to 2354 (with the exception of
articles 2340 to 2342, 2346 and 2354) although there continues to be some doubt as how
much more of the civil law applicable to bills of exchange (and promissory notes) was
"repealed" by section 10 (now section 9) of the Act,206 In other words, while there is no
doubt that the codal provisions dealing expressly bills of exchange are no longer of any
effect, there is some question as to the applicability of the other provisions of the code
(e.g., those provisions dealing with contract and prescription for example) with respect to
bills and notes, and thus BAs.
206 See Rosalie JUKIER and Roderick Alexander MACDONALD, "The New Quebec Civil Code and
Recent Federal Law Reform Proposals: Rehabilitating Commercial Law in Quebec," (1992) 20 C.B.L.J p.
380,396.
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The courts and doctrinal authors have examined several aspects of the Bill of
Exchange in light of the Quebec Civil Code (and civil law generally), namely (1)
capacity to contract (e.g., incapacity by minors) (2) the liability of co-signers (joint and
several) (3) the liability of endorsers (4) the means of defence available against a holder
in due course (5) cause or consideration (6) proof (e.g., the admissibility of evidence
given orally, or by a consort, onus of proof of good faith) (7) procedure, and (8)
prescription?07 However, there is no consistent line of jurisprudence as to when the civil
law ought to be applied to issues of BAs arising in Quebec. We will examine these
aspects in Chapter 4 in our discussion of the interaction of provincial and federal law
with respect to bankers' acceptances.
207 J. LECLAIR, lac. cit., note 32, p. 695-696. See also, B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1218-19.
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APPLICABLE LAWS TO THE BA
US$ 20000
Montreal, April 20, 2005
(Canadian Bank)
--------PAY TO ---
(ABC Exports Canada)
TIlE ORDER OF ---------------------
Twenty thoosand US$---
TIlE SUM OF ---------------------
Walley Green
TO --------------
123 Plamandon
Montreal, Quebec
ABC Exports Canada
\
Creation of the BA into a negotiable
instrument
- Bills ofExchange Act
- The Depository Bills & Notes Act
Powers and restrictions
in the activities of the Bank
- The Bank Act
- The Bank of Canada Act
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3.2 Agreements pertaining to a Bankers' Acceptance Transaction
The BA, like a contract, will have at least two parties involved who are bound in a
legal relationship, governed by a law that sets out their respective rights and obligations
to each other. The law of the parties will be essential in depicting the proper law of the
BA. Still, the BA is unique since it is an instrument that is part of a wider transaction
which includes other parties, and several obligations, spanning a considerable period of
time. In this section, we will focus on the various stages in the creation and execution the
BA transaction.
First, a draft document is drawn by the customer on its bank (the drawee).
Generally speaking, a BA is referred to as a draft until it is accepted, and thereafter, as an
acceptance.208 Often, the named payee is the drawee bank or the customer, though it need
not be. The bill bears the date upon which it is drawn as well as an indication of the
number of days after sight upon which it matures. The draft is then sent to the bank,
which then accepts the draft by stamping it, or affixing its notation across the fact of the
draft which simply states "accepted" with the date of acceptance and the bank's signature
(either its corporate seal, or the signature of a signatory authorized to sign on its
behalf).209 Note that the word "accepted" is not necessary; the bank's signature is
sufficient for a valid acceptance.
208 See B. eRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1189.
209 L. SARNA, op. cit., note 65, p. 43.
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The bill may then be endorsed by the payee (either bank or customer) in blank
and then negotiated to a third party through delivery. "In commercial terms the act of
negotiation witnesses the sale of the bill in the acceptance market at a discount based on
the period of time to maturity. The proceeds of the sale of the bill at a discount rate on the
acceptance market are used to finance the commercial transaction of the customer.,,210
Bear in mind the BA is a bill of exchange; what distinguishes a BA from other bills of
exchange is that it is drawn on a bank. As such, BAs tend to be created pursuant to a
credit agreement and according to established practices in the banking industry.
Effectively, this mechanism enables the drawer of the BA to "borrow" funds until
it can generate sufficient capital from the proceeds of the transaction he or she is involved
in?" The bank never actually forwards funds to its customer, but simply promises to pay.
The BA captures the bank's promise to pay in a document, which has a market value.
This document can then be sold (discounted) to generate funds, or in some cases be
negotiated directly to the creditor seeking to be paid. The bank will assess the ability of
its customer to generate sufficient income to reimburse the bank when it is called upon to
pay as it promised. If the bank believes the transaction involved can generate these funds
(or the customer can access these funds from another source) it will "accept" the
document, thereby turning the draft into a bankers' acceptance.
In practice, acceptances are short-term in nature. "The short-term is a reflection of
the brief turn-around expected in realizing a return in the underlying financed transaction.
A longer term, with the resultant increased risks caused by the mere afflux of time and
210 Id., p.44.
211 B.J. TERRY, op. cit., note 8, p. 702.
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greater number of variables, calls for a different credit anangement, chiefly, a secured
long-term loan.,,212 However, there is no reason, in principle, why the BA cannot be
issued for any term the parties agree upon?13 Acceptance financing can be part of an
overall credit facility opened for the benefit of the customer, which serves both short and
long term financing needs.
The bank is compensated by the stamping fee it charges its customer to accept the
BA draft. This is paid when the BA is accepted, rather than as a commission later on, due
to the minimal amount of remuneration involved and the risk the bank takes by accepting
the instrument (which, as we pointed out, makes the bank primarily liable to pay the BA
upon maturity). Moreover, as one author pointed out, "it would add insult to injury for the
customer to default on the payment of remuneration as well as the amount of the
acceptance made by the customer immediately prior to, and not after, maturity.,,214
The BA operation has been described in the following hypothetical example:
Let us assume that the customer of Bank A wishes to finance its importation of certain raw
materials for 120 days. The customer expects that 120 days would be the time it would take for the
goods to be imported, resold, and paid for. Thus after 120 days, the customer expects to be able to
payoff the credit.
In this situation, once Bank A agrees to extend acceptance financing, it will usually require that
the appropriate acceptance credit agreement be executed. Under such an agreement, the customer-
importer will agree that in consideration for the bank's accepting one or more of the drafts drawn
on it as well as taking on his or her credit risk, he or she will pay the bank the amount of each draft
212 L. SARNA, op. cit., note 65, p. 10-38-10-39.
213 See B. eRAWFORD, op. cit., note 87, p. 880.
214 L. SARNA, op. cit., note 108, p. 10-39.
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the bank may accept on or before the last business day before its maturity (or at maturity in same
day funds), together with the appropriate acceptance commission. Apart from making clear the
terms of payment, the nature and amount of the commission, and other amounts payable by the
customer, the acceptance credit agreement also includes other agreement representations and
provisions aimed at protecting the credit position of the bank.
When the acceptance credit agreement has been executed, the customer-importer then draws a
l20-day time draft on the bank, payable to the order of the customer-importer. It is also possible
for the draft to be made payable to the order of the bank or to the bearer. The bank then accepts the
draft by stamping "accepted" together with the date and the authorized signature on the face of the
draft. Once accepted, the draft is a negotiable bankers' acceptance and can be transferred by the
customer-importer to another person by endorsement and deIivery.215
We have just seen how the BA is created and negotiated with the bank or investor
to secure funds, and possibly further traded, until presented for payment at maturity. In
the following section we will examine this process according to the typical chronology of
events.
215 E. M.A. KWAW, loco cit., note 5, p. 22.
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3.2.1 Credit Agreement
When a bank agrees to fmance a customer through a BA, the bankers' acceptance
becomes the direct and primary obligation of the bank by virtue of the statutory
engagement of s. 127 of the Bills of Exchange Act.216 Because the bank has agreed to
assume a primary obligation to honour the acceptance, it will always require some
agreement with its customer, involving a preananged line of credit.
Often, loans between banks and their larger commercial customers will involve a
bankers' acceptance facility. In these situations, the customer provides its bank with a
number of pre-signed bills where it names itself as drawer. The BA usually names the
customer as payee, so it also pre-endorses the back of the BA in blank.217 The credit
agreement is used to ensure that the bank receives adequate funds from its customer to
cover the face value of the acceptance. Through it, the bank can fulfil its obligation to pay
the holder at maturity, without having to use its own funds. 218 We must not forget that the
bank is also an accommodation party on the bill (pursuant to s. 54 of the Act). As such, it
retains a common law right to indemnification from the palty accommodated (in this
case, the customer). However, banks rarely rely on this right alone, but prefer to make
payment of money to cover the BA at maturity and pursuant to an explicit clause in the
credit agreement.219
216 Bills ofExchange Act, R.S.C., (1985), c. B-4, s. 127 (hereinafter cited as B.E.A.)
217 L. BOULTON, lac. cit., note 11, p. 32.
218 See M.H. OGILVIE, op. cit., note 3, p. 427; L. BOULTON, lac. cit., note 11, p. 32.
219 See B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 87, p. 878; E. RAZIN, lac. cit., note 10, p. 221-222.
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parties to meet the definition of a stipulation of adhesion, it would be interpreted
. . I d . I 1. I "26restnctlve y, an· agamst t lC oan \:. - .
These agreements will also provide for additional collateral, where necessary,
allowing the bank to assume an interest in insurance policies, warehouse receipts,
documents of title to the goods financed and ilie proceeds arising from the sale of the
goods. Security taken by bariks on loans to these customers will be extended to cover any
shortfall resulting from ilie failure of ilie customer to indemnify the bank upon which it
drew the BA.227
Most agreements will also contain a number of provisions that contemplate
certain possibilities. For example, ilie agreements may stipulate a term longer than the
usual six monilis (180 days) or establish a maximum value for outstanding acceptances. It
may also provide an option for the creation of a new acceptance following ilie maturity of
an older one. Other agreements will contain an offer by the bank to provide its customer
with a line of credit where the acceptance market is "reduced" or alternatively might call
for the customer to furnish promissory notes in the event iliat he or she defaults on
. b . h b--1• £ . h . 228relm ursmg t e d.lll\. or paymg t e acceptance upon matunty.
For those situations where the law restricts the nature of acceptances, ilie
agreement will set out, firstly, that the customer warrants iliat ilie acceptances will meet
the appropriate requirements and in some cases require iliat the customer supply the
appropriate documents to support iliis representation (e.g., contracts, receipts, shipping
[1988] R.R.A. 507 (C.A.); Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Transport Montkar Ltee, J.E. 95-373 (C.S.).
See also, Pierre GABRIEL, Les Obligations, 6th ed., Cowansville, Editions Yvon Blais, 2005, p. 951;
Didier LLUELLES and Benoit MOORE, Droit des obligations, Montreal, Editions Themis, 2006, p. 1787.
226 Pierre GABRIEL, Les Obligations, 6th ed., Cowansville, Editions Yvon Blais, 2005, p. 955.
227 B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 87, p. 879.
22R M.H. OGILVIE, op. cit., note 3, p. 428.
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documents and insurance documentation).229 The agreement may impose the additional
requirement of board of director's resolution that demonstrates it has authorized the
acceptance.230
As stated above, although the bank becomes primarily liable through its
acceptance, the acceptance credit agreement provides for the reimbursement of the funds
by the customer. In the context of a credit facility, to generate those funds the customer
will either obtain a prime rate advance or by creating and selling another BA. However,
"[i]f the latter approach is taken, there will often be a deficit between the amount due to
the bank for a maturing BA and the proceeds the borrower obtains on sale of a further
BA. The credit agreement should provide that any such deficiency will, to the extent of
availability under the credit facility, be funded as a prime rate advance and, failing that,
be funded by the borrower from its own resources.,,231
229 L. SARNA, op. cit., note 65, p. 47.
230 M.H. OGILVIE, op. cit., note 3, p. 428.
231 L. BOULTON, lac. cit., note II, p. 33.
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3.2.2 Bankers' Acceptance Draft
Following the credit agreement, the BA to be created must respect certain criteria.
Upon receipt of instructions from the borrower that it wishes to draw a BA, the bank will
begin by filling in the amount and term chosen by the borrower on a standard, pre-signed
form.232 The bank will then accept the BA by completing and signing the acceptance
portion of the form. BAs are typically drawn in multiples of $100,000 and have a
maturity of between thirty (30) and one hundred and eighty (180) days,233 although, as
mentioned above, the credit agreements may allow for a longer term. Additionally, the
draft accepted by the bank will contain the basic elements, such as the order to pay the
bill (usually, to the order of the drawer), the amount, the due date and the drawer's
signature. The draft will also contain the bank's acceptance (signature or stamp), the date
of acceptance as well as the accepting branch's address and signature of the person
authorized to sign the draft on behalf of the bank.234
Since bankers' acceptances are a type of a bill of exchange they must conform to
the requirements set out in the Bills ofExchange Act. If these requirements are not met
the instrument will not be deemed a bill of exchange, although it may continue to have
some legal effect. The effect of the instrument, and any possible cause of action, will
232 These pre-printed and pre-signed forms, which are used almost exclusively, prevent many of the
difficulties that arise from the requirement that the bill be unconditional. See B. eRAWFORD, op. cit.,
note 34, p. 1228.
233 M. H. OGlLVIE, op. cit., note 3, p. 426.
234 [d.
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depend on the particular circumstances.235 Instruments that do not meet the requirements
of the Act are not governed by the Act and derive their validity and effect, if any, from
the law of the particular province; this has been confirmed by the Supreme Court decision
ofMacLeod Savings & Credit Union Ltd. v. Perrett. 236 We must remember, however, that
a promissory note is based on the maker's promise, and thus a failed note may have effect
as a contract. Not so with bankers' acceptances, where the obligation derives not from a
promise made on the instrument, but from section 127 of the Act. 237 Likewise, the drawer
makes no promise, but rather an order on the drawee. 238
It should be noted that bankers' acceptances could refer to instruments subject to
the DepositOlY Bills and Notes Act. However, the requirements of form are quite similar
to the Bills ofExchange Act, because the DBNA "is not intended to replace the Bills of
Exchange Act or to provide for an alternate method of drawing negotiable instruments,"
and because the "DBNA is a temporary measure narrowly focussed on avoiding, rather
than solving, a number of difficult legal problems... ,,239 we will not, with some
exceptions, explore the implications of the DBNA on bankers' acceptances. We will
mention only that the Act requires the words: This is a depositOlY bill subject to the
DepositOlY Bills and Notes Act to be "marked prominently and legibly on its face.,,24o It
cannot prohibit negotiation, transfer or assignment; it must be made payable originally or
235 See I. F.G. BAXTER, op. cit., note 92, p. 6; B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p.1245-46.
236 [1981] 1 R.C.S. 78, (1981) 118 D.L.R. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.). SeeB. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note34,p.
1246.
237 B.E.A., s. 127.
238 This point in made by B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 87, p. 880.
239 See A. R. MANZER, loc. cit., note 168, p. 69.
240 D.B.N.A., S. 4(c).
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by endorsement to a clearing house, and be deposited at the clearing house to which it is
made payable.24I
Though there is no jurisprudence on the matter, certain authors suggest that the
bill must be a single instrument, which may consist of more than one page.242 They also
suggest that two valid instruments may be joined, if it does not affect their unconditional
status. Crawford remarked that " ... a recent practice has developed for bankers'
acceptances to be issued with other acceptances or notes for interest payments attached.
They are unprecedented but not, we think, unjustifiable.,,243
The form of the draft, which becomes the BA, is regulated by section 16(1) which
provides:
16. (I) A bill of exchange is an unconditional order in writing, addressed by one person to another,
signed by the person giving it, requiring the person to whom it is addressed to pay, on demand or
at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum certain in money to or to the order of a specified
person or to bearer.
The formal requirements of acceptance are that: (a) it must be an unconditional
order, (b) in writing (d) signed by the person giving it, (d) the order must be to pay on
demand, or (e) at a fixed or determinable future time, (t) it must be for a sum certain in
money, and (g) to a specified person or bearer. 244 We will now explore each element in
turn.
241 [d., s. 4(d)(e)(t).
242 See B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1246.
243 B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1228.
244 See I. F.G. BAXTER, op. cit., note 92, p. 39.
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An "order" is an obligation to pay and not merely grant permission or authority to
perhaps do SO?45 Vesting the drawee bank with discretion to pay is therefore insufficient
authorization. The order to pay must be without condition, and must not be the subject of
modalities or contingencies.246 Note that at least one author cautions against using other
terms in conjunction with the word "pay." In his view, the phrase "Please pay... " and
similar expressions create doubt as to whether there is a true order or merely
authorization?47 This requirement is to ensure that the holder need not inquire if the
condition has been fulfilled before circulating the bill.
The order of the drawer must be absolute. 248 Section 16(3):
(3) An order to payout of a particular fund is not unconditional within the meaning of this section,
except that an unqualified order to pay, coupled with
(a) an indication of a particular fund out of which the drawee is to reimburse himself or a
particular account to be debited with the amount, or
(b) a statement of the transaction that gives rise to the bill is unconditional.
An order conditional is payment to be made from a particular fund or account, but
it is not conditional if there is reference to a particular fund from which the drawee
should take reimbursement.249 A bill that orders any additional act other than the payment
245 N. L'HEUREUX, E. FORTIN and M. LACOURSIERE op. cit., note 57, p. 432 and M. CARON, op. c
it., note 155, p. 50.
See Brooklerv. Security National Insurance Co., (1915) 8 W.W.R. 861, 23 D.L.R. 595 (K.B.)
246 C.I.B.C. v. Morgan, [1993] 7 W.W.R. 171 (Q.B. Alta.), see also, Nicholas ELLIOT, John ODGERS and
Jonathan M. PHILLIPS (eds.) Byles on Bills o.fExchange and Cheques, 27th ed., London, Sweet &
Maxwell, 2002, p. I I.
247 A. PERRAULT, op. cit., note, 155, p.19I.
248 See N. L'HEUREUX, E. FORTIN and M. LACOURSIERE op. cit., note 57, p. 432
249 Wilson v. Pelletier, (1927) 54 N.B.R. 60; [1928] I D.L.R. 716 (C.A.).
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of money is not a bil1.25o Section 17(1) provides that "an instrument expressed to be
payable on a contingency is not a bill and the happening of the event does not cure the
defect.,,25I However, statements such as "On my death, pay X $500" or similarly, "Ten
days after my death, pay X $100" do not violate the requirement that the order be
unconditional, because death does not constitute a condition, but rather a term.252
Nevertheless, one is not likely to see this type of stipulation in a bankers' acceptance
today, as the form and procedures are fairly standardized. A statement on an instrument
that the consideration is executory does not make it conditional, unless payment is made
conditional upon performance of the consideration.253
Section ]6 requires that the BA be issued in writing, since a verbal order is not
sufficient.254 This may be inscribed by hand, printed or engraved on any material with
t' J" M . b . . I 2'6 d J Iany manner 0 apparatus. -_. oreover, It can e wntten 111 any anguage' an neeCt on y
be legible, though writingof a more permanent nature is preferred.
Certain Quebec authors maintain that electronic transactions that do not take the
250 B.E.A., s. 16(2).
251 See C.LB.C. v. Curtis, (1978) 15 Nfld. & P.E.I.R., 38 A.P.R. 92 (Nfld. C.A.); Bank ofNova Scotia v.
Kelly Motors Da11forth Ltd., [1961] O.W.N. 34 (C.A.).
252 M. CARON, op. cit., note 155, p. 52.
253 Anthony G. Guest, (ed.) Chalmers and Guest on Bills ofExchange, Cheques and Promissory Notes, 15th
ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1998, p. 24.
254 A. PERRAULT, op. cit., note 155, p.l87.
255 Where part of the bill is in writing, part in print, it would seem the part in print should prevail in the case
of any inconsistency. See Anthony G. Guest, (ed.) Chalmers and Guest on Bills ofExchange, Cheques and
Promissory Notes, 15th ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1998, p. 17.
256 See M. CARON, op. cit., note 155, p. 50. See also, N. ELLIOT, J. ODGERS and J. M. PHILLIPS, op.
cit., note 246, p. 14. See also, Re Marseilles Extension Ry. & Land Co., (1885) 30 Ch.D. 598, and more
recently, Banco Atlantico S.A. v. British Bank of the Middle East, [1990] 2 Llyod's Rep. 504.
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fOlm of written documents are not deemed to be bills of exchange.257 However, according
to the Interpretation Act (which provides definitions for terms used in federal legislation),
" a writing, or any term of like import, includes words printed. typewritten, painted,
engraved, lithographed, photographed or represented or reproduced by any mode of
representing or reproducing words in visible form.,,258 Accordingly, it could be argued
that the term "writing" in section 16 of the Act must be read as including the
representation or reproduction of words in a bill in electronic form as long as they were
capable of reproduction in a visible fonn. A reproduction on a computer screen or on a
print out would satisfy the definition ofwriting in the Intelpretation Act.
In Quebec, a BA would be considered 'private writing' under the Civil Code of
Quebec.259 As well, there seems to be unanimity on the fact that such instruments cannot
be made by notarial act or patent. 260 It should be noted that BA's in Quebec, do not need
to be written in French26I regardless of what the qtficial Languages Act (~f Quebec
requires of legal agreements drafted in the province. 262
257 N. L'HEUREUX, E. FORTIN and M. LACOURSIERE op. cit., note 57, p. 434.
258 R.S. 1985 c. 1-21, s. 35( I). Crawford queries whether under Canadian law, a bill of exchange could be
expressed in electronic or magnetic media, as long as it is visible (or can be made visible by computer)
because they would met the requirement of the Interpretation Act that the words be "in visible form"
whether or not the writing is tangible. See B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1202. In Quebec, it has
been suggested that a bill must be a private writing as defined in the Quebec civil code. An "ecrit en
brevet" before a notary would not qualify. See M. CARON, op. cit., note 155, p. 50.
259 C.C.Q., art. 2826. A private writing is defined as, "a writing setting forth a juridical act and bearing the
signature of the parties; it is not subject to any other formality."
260 M. CARON, op. cit., note 155, p. 50, See also, A. PERRAULT, op. cit., note 155, p.188-189; George
V.V. NICHOLLS, "The Bills of Exchange Act and Prescription in the Province of Quebec", (1936-37) 15
R. du D. 396,420; Robert v. Charbonneau, (1902) C.S. 466.
261 Abitbol v. Store & Office Equipment Co., [1984] C.A. 635.
262 B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1234; N. L'HEUREUX, E. FORTIN and M. LACOURSIERE op.
cit., note 57, p. 434.
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The tenn "person" is not defined in the Act. However, the Intelpretation Act63
includes a corporation in its definition. Thus, a "person" can include a legal or moral
person. It is interesting to note the liberal definition given to "person" in the Depository
Bills and Notes Act. The Act states that "person" means, "a natural person, a corporation,
a trust, a partnership, a fund, an unincorporated association or organization, Her Majesty
in right of Canada or of a province or the government of a foreign country or of any
political subdivision of a foreign country.,,264 It is doubtful whether, for example, a
partnership would constitute a person for the purposes of the Bills ofExchange Act.265
The courts may well construe the tenn 'person' to include a partnership, although there
has been little support for this in the case law.266 The one exception has been Canadian
Commercial Bank v. Carpentier. 267 In his decision, Justice MacKinnon agreed that the
Act should be amended, with respect to defining 'person' but he did not rule notes
payable to a partnership to be invalid. On this point, he asserted that "[t]he commercial
realities dictate that an instmment ought not to be invalid on this ground alone." 268
The bill must be addressed from one person (the drawer) to another (the drawee),
thus the BEA contemplates two persons. The Act requires that "[t]he drawee be named or
otherwise indicated in a bill with reasonable certainty.,,269 A document that is not drawn
263 R.S. 1985, c. 1-2, s. 35(1).
264 D.B.N.A., s. 2(1).
265 See Bradley CRAWFORD, Payment, Clearing and Settlement in Canada, vol. 2, Aurora, Ont., Canada
Law Book, 2002, p. 655, note 33. In Quebec, partnerships (societes) whether general, limited or
undeclared, are not legal persons and do not have an independent juridical personality. They must be
distinguished from socibes par actions (corporations), which are legal persons.
266 See Davey v. Shawcroft, [1948] I All E.R. 827 (K.B.); Re Warner and Manitoba Labour Board (1960)
25 D.L.R. (2d) 217 (Man. Q.B.); C.B.C. v. A.G. Ontario (1959) 16 D.L.R. (2d) 609 (S.C.C.).
267 (1991) 58 B.C.L.R. (2d) 209 (S.C.).
268 (1991) 58 B.C.L.R. (2d) 209 (S.C.) at 216.
269 B.E.A., s. 19.
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upon any person cannot be a bill of exchange (or BA).27o Where the drawer and the
drawee are the same person, where the drawee is a fictitious person, or the drawee lacks
capacity to contract, the instrument may be treated as a promissory note or bill, at the
discretion of the holder.271 Crawford points out that where the drawee and drawer are the
same person it is neither a bill nor a note, because it is not from one person to another as
required by section 16. It can nevertheless be treated as one 272 because the customer
must draw on a bank, a second party who perfects payment on the BA.
The requirement of it being addressed from one person to another is not to be understood
in its literal sense. The Act provides that a bill may be payable to two or more payees
jointly or payable in the alternative to one of two or more payees.273
The Bills of Exchange Act requires that the bill be "signed" by the person giving
it. 274 This requirement ensures that the consent of the drawer is expressed clearly. Since a
BA may be drafted in an electronic format, this presumes the possibility of an electronic
signature. However, this requires some careful consideration. Although the Interpretation
Act provides a definition of "writing" which seemingly allows for BAs in electronic form,
the Act nevertheless olTers no definition of the terms "signed" or "signature."Since the
signature is treated as an element of form,' which is part of the law of bills and notes in a
strict sense, we must look to the common law of England, pursuant to section 9 of the
Bills of Exchange Act, in order to determine whether an electronic signature is valid.
270 R. v. Jorgenson, (1953) 17 C.R. 52, 9 W.W.R. 189, 106 C.C.C. 94 (B.C.C.A.).
271 B.E.A., s. 25.
272 See B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1266-67. Crawford cites, Romer, LJ. in Re British Trade
Corp., [1932] 2 Ch. 1 (C.A.).
273 B.E.A., s. 18(2).
274 See generally, Ina ACKERMANN, "Signature and Liability in the Law of Bills and Notes", (1993) 8
B.FLR., p. 295.
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Can a BA validly be signed with a digital or electronic signature? The answer to
this question is complicated since there is simply no authoritative definition of the term
"signature" under common law.
In common law a signature is understood to be a mark that is attributable to a
•• ... ,27:; . •
source and used to SIgnIfy one's IlltentlOn. .. Accordmgly, It seems acceptable to
characterize asymmetric cryptography and a public key infrastructure (PKI) of digital
signatures as "signatures," although there is a marked absence ofjurisprudence on the
topic. This silence is probably due in part to the fact that the law of electronic commerce
and digital signatures has been developed through legislative enactments and directives.
As Jane Winn pointed out, " ....an obvious research problem was to find the existing law
of signatures to determine if it would validate the use of this new technology. Such
research efforts uncovered surprisingly Iittle on the' law of signatures'" 276
We must keep in mind the principle that the legal significance ofa "signature"
cloes not "lie in the form of the signature but in the information it conveys:,277 In
common law, a signature is any mark or symbol attached to a document and manifesting
the signatory intent to be bound by it. 278 In Iight of this, it is certainly arguable that
existing encryption techniques, namely digital signatures, are at the very least marks that
authenticate the document and identify it as an act of signing by the party attaching the
275 See generally, LeifGAMERTSFELDER, "Electronic Bills of Exchange: Will the Current Law
Recognise Them?", (1998) 21 (2) University ofNew South Wales Law Journal, 568. The civil law of
Quebec is essentially of the same view. "Signature" is defined in the Quebec Civil Code as " ... the affixing
by a person, to a writing, of his name or the distinctive mark which he regularly uses to signify his
intention," C.c.Q. 2827.
276 Jane K. WINN, "The Emperor's New Clothes: The Shocking Truth About Digital Signatures and
Internet Commerce", (2001) 37 Idaho L. Rev. 353, 367.
277 Jane VAUGHN, Tanya SEWARDS and Ross KELSO, Study ofthe Law ofInternet Commercial
Transactions, Centre for International Research on Communication and Infonnation Technologies, 1997, p.
34.
278 See e.g.. , Just Pants v. Wagner, 617 N.E.2d 246, 251 (III. App. Ct. 1993).
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digital signature. This idea satisfies the signature requirement of the Bills of Exchange
Act. Therefore, courts should adapt the legal definition of any mark or symbol made with
the intention of authenticating a text to the online environment. 279 As Professor Alan
Tyree maintains, digital signatures appear to satisfy "the legal criteria for valid signatures
under the general law even without legislative recognition.',28o
According to the Act, any person who is authorized to do so by the person who
must sign may affix the signature.28J A corporate seal may constitute a signature, but a
seal is not required for the bills or notes of corporations.282 The form of the signature is
interpreted liberally. As with all contracts, the signature must reflect the signatory's
desire to be bound by it.283
To constitute a BA, the bill must be payable at some fixed or determinable time; a
bill drawn on a bank, payable on demand, would be a cheque. Bills payable at some fixed
or determinable time are referred to as term instruments. According to BEA , the bill is
payable at a determinable future time, where it is expressed to be payable (a) at sight or at
a fixed period after date or sight;284 or (b) on or at a fixed period after the occurrence of a
specified event that is certain to occur, though that moment is often uncertain.285 A bill
containing the order to "Pay, 20 days from this date... " would be a valid bill as it is
279 See generally, Jane Kaufman WINN, «Open Systems, Free Markets ,and Regulation of Internet
Commerce », (1998) 72 Tulane L. Rev. I177.
280 Alan L TYREE, 'PINS and Signatures', Journal ofBanking and Finance Law and Practice.
281 B.E.A., S. 4.
282 [d., S. 5.
283 See N. L'HEUREUX, E. FORTIN and M. LACOURSIERE op. cit., note 57, p. 434.
284 Note that there is no logical distinction between bills payable on demand and bills payable at sight.
Despite the distinction in Canadian legislation, English, French and American law considers them to be the
same. See M. CARON, op. cit., note 155, p. 133.
285 BEA, s. 23. The fact that the time at which a specified event is to happen is not yet certain does not
render the bill "conditional" as long as its occurrence is a certainty. In Quebec civil law terms, it is the
difference between a condition and a term. See C.C.Q., art. 1497.
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payable at a fixed time after a given date. Likewise, an order to "Pay, 10 days after sight"
would be valid as a bill payable at a fixed peliod after sight,286 The order to "pay upon
the death of X" is considered certain, but to "pay upon the alTival of goods at point X" is
There is a difference in the English and Canadian case law respecting the validity
of a bill drawn payable, on or before a fixed date. 288 The English court of Appeal in
Claydon v. Bradlei89 reaffirmed its earlier decision29o that an order permitting payment
before a fixed date did not constitute an unconditional order to pay at a fixed or
determinable future time. On this issue, the Supreme Court of Canada maintained that
such a statement constitutes a bill payable at a fixed future time (the date stated) with an
option to pay earlier if so desired. 29 \ It is thus a valid bill in Canada, although not in
England. Nevertheless, BAs generally are created in standard form, so this type of
variation is not likely to alise in practice.
Bills payable at sight or a fixed time after the OCCUlTence of a certain event,
benefit from days of grace. Supposing that the last day of grace falls on a legal holiday or
non-juridical day, then the final day of grace is defelTed until the next following that is a
non-legal holiday or juridical day. Thus, for example, if the last day of grace was
Thursday, January 1, 2004, the bill would be payable on Friday, January 2, 2004.
286 See M. CARON, op. cit., note 155, p. 134.
287 Interestingly, English authorities have found that a note payable when a King's ship shall be paid off has
been held to be good, as the paying offof the ship is a thing ofa public nature. Nevertheless, there is some
doubt as to whether similar decisions would be arrived at today. See N. ELLIOT, J. ODGERS and J. M.
PHILLIPS,op. cit., note 246, p. 23.
288 See Emil HAYEK, "Recent Developments in Canadian Law: Bills of Exchange", (1989) 21 Ott. L. Rev.,
p. 263, 272-273.
289 (1986), [1987] I W.L.R. 521, [1987] I All E.R. 522 (C.A.).
290 Williamson v. Rider, (1962), [1963] I Q.B. 89, [1962] 2 All E.R. 268 (C.A.).
291 John Burrows Ltd. v. Subsurface Surveys Ltd., [1968] R.C.S. 607, 68 D.L.R. (2d) 354. See also, N.
L'HEUREUX, E. FORTIN and M. LACOURSIERE op. cit., note 57, p. 435.
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However, according to Crawford, Canadian commercial practice does not respect days of
grace in connection with instruments that are short or medium-term or with bankers'
acceptances.292
The BEA requires that the amount ordered on the draft be a "sum certain in
money.,,293 The BEA provides some examples of what constitutes a sum certain, which in
all likelihood are mentioned for illustrative purposes. They are not exhaustive?94 Where
the bill is required to be paid (a) with interest, (b) by stated instalments; (c) by stated
instalments, with a provision that on default in payment of any instalment the whole shall
become due; or (d) according to an indicated rate of exchange or a rate of exchange to be
ascertained as directed by the bill, the sum in certain.295
Nevertheless, according to one author this requirement "creates difficulty where
bills or notes are used in commercial transactions that demand flexible payment
schedules, flexible rates of interest and similar arrangements.,,296
Likewise, there have been decisions that have found that a note specifying as its
rate a particular bank's prime rate plus a certain percentage (a floating rate) is too vague
to be a sum certain?97 We must keep in mind though, that this does not mean that the
exact amount must be expressed on the face of the bill. The amount must be precise,298
but it is sufficient that the amount be easily calculable (e.g., interest, exchange rate). For
example, an order to pay "$50 per square foot, for 20,000 feet contained on lot X" has
292 See B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1276. But see Re Fraga Enterprises Ltd. and Wright, 208
A.P.R. 220 (Q.B.N.B.), 6 A.C.W.S. (3d) 38.
293 B.EA, s. 16( I).
294 See 1. F.G. BAXTER, op. cit., note 92, p. 8.
295 B.E.A., s. 27.
296 E. HAYEK, loco cit., note 288, p. 266.
297 Bank ofMontreal v. A & M Investments Ltd., (1982) 136 D.L.R. (3d) 181 (Sask. Q.B.); Bank of
Montreal v. Dezcam Industries Ltd., (1983) 147 D.L.R. (3d) 359, [1983] 5 W.W.R. 83 (B.C.C.A.)
298 MacMillan v. MacMillan, (1977) 76 D.L.R. (3d) 760 (C.A. Sask.); Matte v. Caisse populaire de
Donnacona, [1965] C.S., p. 535.
119
been held by one author to be a sum certain.299 Although other decisions have found
floating rates were in fact capable of constituting a valid sum certain,300 the fact that the
amount is ascertainable is not enough to make it a sum certain.30l Any amount that
requires some measure of research to be determined is not considered to be certain.302
Thus, it has been held that where the prime interest rate is not easily ascertainable, a note
was void for uncertainty.303 Where the amount is written in letters as well as numbers, the
sum is deemed to be the amount spelled out in words where there is a variance between
the twO. 304
It is impOliant to remember that issues of sum certainty are prevalent with
promissory notes, whereas bankers' acceptances do not generally have these problems
because they are issued with a face value of $100,000 or multiples thereof (and then sold
at a discount). In other words, BAs always have a certain sum payable because they trade
at a discount from their face value; it is this face amount which enables parties to
determine the discount. "The discount reflects the market-required yield and the time
value of money until maturity of the instrument.,,305
299M. CARON, op. cit., note 155, p. 67. This he acknowledges is contra to A. PERRAULT, op. cit., note
155, nO 129.
300 Royal Bank ofCanada v. Reed, (1982) 21 B.L.R. 64, [1983] 2 W.W.R. 419 (B.C.S.C.); Royal Bank of
Canada v. Stonehocker, (1985) 61 B.C.L.R. 265 (C.A.); National Bank ofCanada v. Pearl, (1983) 33
C.P.C. 158 (Ont. Co. Ct.). For a discussion of floating rates, see Emil HAYEK, "Promissory Notes and
Floating Interest Rates", (1989) 3 B.F.L.R. 210.
301 In Jones v. Simpson, (1823) 2 B. & C. 318, 107 E.R. 402, the order was to pay the total proceeds from
the sale of specific goods. This was found not to be a sum certain so as to make the bill negotiable.
302 See Alberta Treasury Branches v. D. & L. Insulation, [1991] 83 Alta. L.R. (2d) 181 (C.A.).
303 Alberta TreaslifY Branches v. N. Braaten & Sons Enterprises, (1987) [1988] 4 W.W.R. 79 (Alta. Q.B.)
304 Bank ofNova Scotia v. Guenette, 68 A.R. 369 (Q.B. Alta.).
305 B. CRAWFORD, loco cit., note 169, p. 221.
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The requirement that the bill be payable in money raises some interesting and
potentially complicated problems, none of which will be addressed here.306 Suffice to
say, the amount should be expressed in the currency of the location in which the bill is to
be paid; however, the amount on a bill can be expressed in a foreign currency.307 The Act
provides that on a bill drawn outside the country, payable in Canada but not expressed in
Canadian currency, " ... the amount shall, in the absence of an express stipulation, be
calculated according to the rate of exchange for sight drafts at the place of payment on
the day the bill is payable.,,308
The term "person" as we have discussed above, includes a corporation. "Bearer"
according to the BEA means "the person in possession of a bill or note that is payable to
bearer.,,309 The BEA states that a bill is payable to bearer where it is expressed to be so
payable or where the last endorsement on the bill is in blank.3lO If not payable to bearer,
the payee must be named with reasonable certainty.311 He need not be mentioned by
name, but he must be indicated for identification.312 To be payable to order, it must be
payable to a specified person, and contain no restrictions on transfer or otherwise
306 For a brief discussion of the issues, see B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1238-41. Some authors
suggest a bill or note can only be payable in specie or legal currency. See N. ELLIOT, J. ODGERS and J.
M. PHILLIPS, op. cit., note 246, p. 24.
307 Currency Act, R.S.C. (1985), c. C-52, provides:
13(1) Every contract, sale, payment, bill, note, instrument and security for money and every
transaction, dealing, matter and thing relating to money or involving the payment of or the liability
to pay money shall be made, executed, entered into, done or carried out in the currency of Canada,
unless it is made, executed, entered into, done or carried out in (a) the currency of a country other
than Canada; or (b) a unit of account that is defined in terms of the currencies of two or more
countries.
308 B.E.A., s. 162.
309 Ed., s. 2.
310 Ed., s. 20(3).
311 Ed., s. 20(4).
312 Lavoie v. Turbide, [1943] B.R. 1 (C.A.).
121
indicating that it should not be transferable.313 If payable to a person's order (and not to
him and his order) it is payable to that person or his order.314
The distinction is that a bill payable to the order of a person must be endorsed.
This gives rise to certain responsibilities in the event of non-payment, although a bill
payable to the bearer may be transferred with simple delivery. The payee may be a
fictitious person, in which case the bill is treated as payable to the bearer.315 As discussed,
certain elements of the bill are optional, since they are not essential for validity. Rather,
like many rules that form pmt of contractual laws, they are useful in terms of
management and circulation. These elements include the date of issuance, the place of
issuance and the place of payment.
313 B.EA, s. 21(1).
314 [d., s. 21(2).
315 [d., s. 20(5). See Bonza Mam(facturing Ltd. v. CfBC, [1996J 3 S.C.R. 727.
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CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BA
Section 16 (1) of the Bills of Exchange Act
For a Banker's Acceptance to be considered as a negotiable instrument
pursuant to the Bills of Exchange Act, it must be an:
unconditional order;
in writing;
made by one person to another requiring them to make payment;
at a future date;
for a sum certain;
and to a specified person;
us $ 20 000
Montreal, April 20, 2005
(Canadian Bank)
----------------------------- PAlT lr() ----------------
(ABC Exports Canada)
lrlIE ()FtI>EFt ()F -----------------------------------------------------------------
lrwenty thousand US $------------
lrlIE SUM ()F --------------------------------------------------------------------
Walley Green
lr() ------------------------------------------
123 Plamondon
Montreal, Quebec
ABC Exports Canada
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3.2.2.1 Acceptance
Once the draft has been fonned, the bank must "accept" it, in order to activate it
and make the draft a bankers' acceptance. An analogy can be made between the
acceptance of BAs and the certification of cheques. Sama states, "The most common
analogue of the banker's acceptance is the certified cheque. A certification by a bank
obliges the certifier to pay the face value of the cheque on demand." However, the two
can be distinguished, "[s]ince the cheque is a demand instrument, and there is no time
period during which the holder must wait prior to receiving payment.,,316
The draft is accepted, in practice, by writing "ACCEPTED" across the face of the
bill.
When the drawee accepts the bill, he or she is the acceptor and the draft an acceptance. If the
drawee is a merchant or some other person, the draft is referred to as a trade acceptance. On the
other hand, if the drawee is a bank, the acceptance is referred to as a bankers' acceptance. The
drawer of the bill is then said to possess a two-name bill because the draft bears the name of the
bank as well as his or her own name.317
316 L. SARNA, op. cit., note 65, p. 41.
317 E. M.A. KWAW, lac. cit., note 3, p. 21.
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US $ 20 000
ACCEPTEDBA
A sum certain Date
Montreal, April 20, 2005
(Canadian Bank)
----------------------------- PAY TO ----------
(ABC Exports Canada)
THE ORDER OF --------- -------------------------------------------- -
Twenty thousand US $-----
THE SUM OF ------------ -------------------------
Walley Green
o ------------------------- -------------
123 Plamondon
Montreal, Queb c
ABC Export Canada
Customer who requires a BA
Bank who accepts the BA
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According to the Act, "The acceptance of a bill is the signification by the drawee
of his assent to the order of the drawer.,,318 The Act sets out conditions for a valid
acceptance: (a) it must be written on the bill and be signed by the drawee; and (b) it must
not express that the drawee will perform his promise by any other means than the
payment ofmoney.319 The signature alone is sufficient for acceptance. No other words or
formula need accompany it,32o "The drawee may give his assent by accepting personally
or by an agent, and if the latter, questions about authority might arise.,,321
Acceptances, unlike the order, may be qualified. They fall into two categories,
general or qualified.322 A general acceptance is without qualification.323 A qualified
acceptance "in express terms varies the effect of the bill as drawn.,,324 This means that if
an acceptor wishes to modify the obligations which acceptance ordinarily imposes, he
must do so on the face of the bill in clear and unequivocal terms, and in such a manner
that any person taking the bill could not reasonably fail to understand that it was accepted
subject to an express qualification.325
The Act provides particular examples of qualified acceptances that are, (a)
conditional, (makes payment by the acceptor dependent on the fulfilment of a condition
therein stated); (b) partial, (an acceptance to pay part only of the amount for which the
bill is drawn); (c) qualified as to time; or (d) the acceptance of one or more of the
318 B.E.A., c. B-4, s. 34.
319 !d., s. 35(1).
320 ld., s. 35(2).
321 I. F.G. BAXTER, op. cit., note 92, p. 39.
322 B.EA, s. 37(1).
323 ld., s. 37(2).
324 !d., s. 37(3).
325 Canadian Bank ofCommerce v. B.C. Interior Sales Ltd., (1957) 23 W.W.R. 366, 9 D.L.R. (2d) 363
(B.C.S.C.). Affirmed (1957) 23 W.W.R. 682, II D.L.R. (2d) 609 (B.C.C.A.).
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drawees, but not of al1.326 A holder may refuse to take a qualified acceptance.327 ABA
drawn in conformity with the DepositOlY Bills and Notes Act must be accepted
unconditionally.328
The bank charges a "stamping fee" for accepting the BA draft, which is a
percentage of the face amount, expressed as a number of basis points.329 The stamping
fee, which has been known to fluctuate considerably, is a direct fee. However, because
this fee is not consideration for the bill, but rather consideration for accepting the bill, the
bank remains an accommodation party according to the Act.330 The stamping fee, which
varies, is based on a number of criteria, such as the creditworthiness of the customer, the
amount of the acceptance, the period of time until maturity, and market forces such as
"economic climate and competitive pressures.,,33l Celiain conditions associated with
holding a line of credit, which vary from one bank to another, are the indirect costs of
BAs. The total of the fees and discount is the cost to the customer for obtaining BA
fi . 332Inancmg.
As a matter of practice "... the acceptor has a keen interest, going beyond mere
reference purposes, in knowing the reason for or application of the funds. Not only does
326 B.E.A., s. 37(3).
327 See I. F.G. BAXTER, op. cit., note 92, p. 39.
328 D.B.N.A., s. 4(b).
329 L. BOULTON, lac. cit., note II, p. 33.
lJO The relevant section is B.E.A., s. 54(1). For a discussion see P. G. BEVANS, lac. cit., note 7, p. 526-
529. In Oriental Financial Corp. v. Overend, (1871) L.R. 7 Ch. 142, it was held not be an accommodation
bill because the acceptor had received a fee. However, it is generally conceded that the fee is not directly
related to the instrument, and the bills are therefore accommodation bills. See Eliahu Peter ELLINGER,
Eva LOMNICKA, and Richard HOOLEY (eds.) Modern Banking Law, 3rd ed., Oxford University Press,
New York, 2002, p. 717.
J3I L. SARNA, op. cit., note 65, p. 52.
l32 See L. BOULTON, lac. cit., note II, p. 33.
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the underlying transaction give some clue as to the risk involved, it also emphasizes the
desire of the acceptor that that transaction be self-liquidating." 333
If a bill is accepted, the primary liability falls on the acceptor, who engages that
he will pay it according to the tenor of his acceptance.334 The drawer and endorsers have
secondary liability. Tenor refers to the qualification of the acceptance, if any, permitted
by the Act. The bank thus assumes the primary obligation to pay the BA at maturity. The
Act precludes the acceptor from denying to a holder in due course, "(a) the existence of
the drawer, the genuineness of his signature and his capacity and authority to draw the
bill; (b) in the case of a bill payable to drawer's order, the then capacity of the drawer to
endorse, but not the genuineness or validity of his endorsement; or (c) in the case of a bill
payable to the order of a third person, the existence of the payee and his then capacity to
endorse, but not the genuineness or validity of his endorsement.,,335
III L. SARNA, op. cit., note 108, p. 10-38-10-39. However, the bank is not restricted to self-liquidating
transactions. It can choose to accept a draft, regardless of the purpose for which it is being used.
334 B.E.A., s. 127.
ll51d.,s.128.
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3.2.2.2 Discount
The bank's acceptance of the BA simply commits it to pay the holder of the
instrument at maturity. However, where the BA is used to finance an international trade,
by retaining the BA, a seller has an assurance from the bank that payment for the goods it
has sold will be made by the purchaser (the bank's customer).336 The more common
practice in a BA transaction is to deliver it to the drawer for endorsement, which is
normally done in blank so that the acceptance is payable to the bearer (though it can be
endorsed "specially" making it payable to a named broker).33? As a negotiable instrument
endorsed in blank, the BA is transferable by delivery.
The importance of delivery is often overlooked. According to the Act, acceptance
is completed by delivery or notification?38 Without delivery, every contract on the BA is
incomplete and revocable. However, where an acceptance is written on a BA and the
bank, "gives notice to, or according to the directions of, the person entitled to the bill that
he has accepted it, the acceptance then becomes complete and ilTevocable.,,339 "Delivery"
means transfer of possession, actual or constructive, from one person to another.340 Once
the BA is delivered to the customer, it is then sold in the money market, that is,
336 E. M.A. KWAW, lac. cit., note 5, p. 22.
337 See B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 87, p. 878.
338 B.E.A., S. 2.
339 ld., s. 38.
340 ld., s. 2.
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"negotiated to a third party in much the same way as other commercial paper, at a
discount so as to provide an appropriate yield at maturity.,,341
This means that a BA is sold for an amount different from the face value, the
interest being the difference between the sale price and the face value, rather than interest
being paid on the face value of the BA. In other words, the profit to the investor is the
difference between the face value and the price at which it is purchased. Through
discounting, the BA is negotiated, and the drawer receives the funds and may use them so
as to generate profit to pay the bank (pursuant to the credit arrangement) by the maturity
date. The amount of the discount is a function of a number of factors such as the
creditworthiness of the accepting bank, term to maturity and the opportunity for similar
returns with alternative investments with similar levels of risk. Because discounting takes
into consideration the accepting bank's creditworthiness, not all banks are equal when it
comes to discounting. Consequently, "BAs accepted by smaller, less active or less
established banks will have higher discount rates applicable to them. The discount rates
of BAs of varying terms of most Canadian chartered banks are determined each banking
day, and the resulting yields are then published on the Reuters Screen CDOR page. ,,342
There are a number of different ways the acceptance can be discounted. One
possibility is that the bank (as acceptor) may purchase its own acceptance, providing the
face value of the acceptance, at a discounted rate. This is what occurs when the customer
wishes to obtain payment of the acceptance immediately. When the bank discounts the
acceptance, it becomes a holder in due course and at maturity merely debits its customer's
account. It is also possible for the acceptance to be discounted with a bank other than the
341 M.H. OGILVIE, op. cit., note 3, p. 426-427.
342 L. BOULTON, lac. cit., note 11, p. 33.
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accepting ban1e343 The bank may decide to hold the bill itself until maturity or decide to
sell the BA on the acceptance market. By selling the acceptance, the bank is able to
discount the instrument (at a rate lower than it charged its customer) and thereby recover
the money it paid to the drawer immediately, rather than waiting for the customer to
reimburse it.344 If the bank chooses to sell the BA, it will then tum over BA to its own
money market desk for sale.
Alternatively, the customer may also arrange for the discount of the acceptance
with a money market dealer. The dealer in tum may hold the BA, or rediscount it to an
investor. The customer will contact a money market dealer while in the process of
alTanging an acceptance line of credit with the bank, to establish the annual rate of
discount at which the dealer is prepared to buy or sell the draft after it has been accepted
by the bank.345
Discounting through a money market dealer is more common because most
customers engaged in BA financing do not have any mechanism or department
sufficiently large or sophisticated to successfully deal with the money market.
Nevertheless, banks try to retain as much trading of the BAs as possible, so that they can
be involved in the money market themselves. 346
The provisions of the Bills ofExchange Act on negotiation will generally govern
most discounting activity.347 If the discounting transaction does not conform to the Act, it
is then only a transfer or assignment - not a negotiation - and therefore not subject to the
343 •E. M.A. KWAW, lac. cit., note 5, p. 22.
344 L. SARNA, op. cit., note 65, p. 45. Speaking of English and American BA's, Brian Terry stated that the
accepting bank will invariably be the discounting bank; however, it is quite likely to rediscount the bill
rather than hold it to maturity. See B.J. Terry, op. cit., note 8, p. 702.
345 See S. SARPKAYA, op. cit., note 18, p. 61.
346 L. BOULTON, lac. cit., note II, p. 33.
347 B.E.A. of Exchange Act, R.S., 1985, c. B-4, ss. 59-72.
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special protections of the Act. The bank, or other parties to whom a bill has been
discounted, will become the holder in due course if they meet the eight requirements of
the Act; namely, (1) that they are a holder, that is, the payee or endorsee of a bill or note
who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof348 ; (2) that the bill was complete and
regular on the face of it; (3) that he became the holder of it before it was overdue; (4)
without notice that it had been previously dishonoured; (5) that he took the bill in good
faith; (6) for value; (7) the bill was negotiated; and (8) without notice of any defect in the
title of the person who negotiated it. 349
348 B.EA of Exchange Act, R.S., 1985, c. 8-4, s. 2.
349 B.E.A. of Exchange Act, R.S., 1985, c. 8-4, s. 55(1). For a discussion ofsome the holder in due course
issues, see B. GEVA, loco cit., note 133, p. 271-302.
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AN ACCEPTED BA THAT IS TRADED IN THE MONEY
MARKET
us $ 20000
ABC Exports Canada
April 20, 2005
Accepted at a
Discount on
March 20, 2005
Sold at an amount
different from the
face value
Customer
Sold to investors, dealers, brokers, banks, financial
institutions
i
Money Market
I
Drawee Bank
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3.2.2.3 Maturity
Before it finally matures, the BA may come into the possession of many other
parties, including investment dealers, banks, financial and non-financial corporations.
The ultimate holder of a BA waits until maturity, at which point the customer has
presumably placed the accepting bank in funds to make payment on the acceptance. 350 At
that time, the BA is presented for payment at the designated branch of the accepting
bank, which must make payment of the sum stipulated.351 Effectively, the ultimate holder
of an acceptance is the one financing the customer's transaction.
The Act lays out several rules regarding presentment for payment. For example, a
BA is duly presented for payment on the day it falls due.352 Abel views the requirement
of reasonable diligence as a guiding principle in dealing with issues of presentment.353
Delays in presentment are excused where it is beyond the control of the holder, but
presentment must be made with "reasonable diligence" when it becomes possible.354
Maclaren offered several examples of excusable delays, including the outbreak of
hostilities, delays in the mail or death of the holder.355 Falconbridge pointed out that
Russell356 concurred with this view, although he was partial to the more cautious
350 See S. SARPKAYA, op. cit., note 18, p. 63.
351 See M.H. OGILVIE, op. cit., note 3, p. 426-427.
352 B.EA, s. 85(1)(a).
353 See Albert S. ABEL, "Presentment, Notice, Protest" (1974) 24 U.T.LJ., p. 191.
354 /d., s. 90( I(2). On the other hand, it would appear from s. 6(4) that the holder of a bankers' acceptance
does not seem to have a cause of action, for example, where the branch at which it is payable is closed due
to a labour disturbance. See B. CRAWFORD op. cit., note 87, p. 691.
355 John James MACLAREN, MacLaren's bills, notes and cheques, 6th ed., Frederick READ, ed., Toronto,
Carswell, 1940, p. 250.
356 Benjamin RUSSELL, A Commentary on the Bills ofExchange Act, 2nd ed., Montreal, Burroughs & Co.,
1921, p. 315-316.
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approach of Chalmers,357 who emphasized that an excusable delay would be the "sudden
death of the holder just before the bill matures," 358 not simply the death of the holder.
The failure to duly present the BA for payment will discharge the customer and
endorsers from liability.359 Presentment for payment is dispensed with in a case where it
could not be done, despite reasonable diligence or where the bank is fictitious, etc.360
However, presentment is not dispensed with solely because one entertains the belief that
the BA will be dishonoured on presentment.36I
Presentment for payment must be made by the holder, or someone authorized to
receive the payment on the holder's behalf, to the person designated by the bill as payer
(i.e., the bank), its representative, or someone authorized to payor refuse payment on the
bank's behalf.362 If the person were an agent not authorized to act on behalf of the holder,
the payment would not discharge the BA.363 The BA must be presented at the proper
place, namely, the place indicated in the draft or acceptance.364 In such cases, the
acceptor is not discharged by the failure to present the BA on the day it matures (subject
to any express stipulation to the contrary).365 Where no place is specified, it must be
presented at the address noted in the bill or acceptance or, alternatively, at the place of
business of the bank.366 Presentment for payment is not necessary to render the bank
357 David A.L. SMOUT, (ed.), Chalmers on bills ofexchange: A Digest C?fthe Law ofBills C?fExchange,
13 th ed., London, Stevens, 1964, p. 150.
358 See B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1565.
359 REA, s. 84(2).
360 Id., s. 91 (1)(a)(b), etc.
361 Id., s. 91(2).
362 Id., s. 86(1).
363 See Murphy v. Canning, (1905) 2 W.L.R. 103 (N.W.T.S.C.T.D.). Emphasis is placed on the word
authorized, though Crawford suggests it might be reconsidered in light of modem agency law. See B.
CRAWFORD,op. cit., note 34, p. 1559.
364 REA, s. 87(a).
365 !d., s. 92(2).
366 Id., s. 87.
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liable.367 Either the customer or the bank may stipulate the place of payment. Where no
branch is specified of a particular bank, but it is dated in a particular city, it should be
presented in that city, at the principal branch, not at the head office.368
Where a BA is duly presented for payment, and is refused or cannot be obtained,
or presentment is excused and the bill is overdue and unpaid, the bill is dishonoured by
non-payment. 369 Consequently, the holder gets an immediate right of recourse against the
customer, bank and endorsers. 370
A BA is discharged where there is payment in due course, that means, "payment
made at or after the maturity of the bill to the holder thereof in good faith and without
notice that his title to the bill is defective.,,371 Because the BA is an accommodation bill,
if the customer pays in place of the bank, it is paid in due course, and thus discharged.372
The BA is also discharged if, after maturity, the bank becomes the holder of it373 or the
holder "absolutely and unconditionally renounces his rights against the acceptor.,,374
367 Id., s. 92(1).
368 Royal Bank ofCanada v. Boyce; Royal Bank ofCanada v. Wildman, (1966) 57 D.L.R. (2d) 683 (ant.
Co. Ct.); Commercial Bank ofCanada v. Bissett, (1891) 7 Man. R. 586 (Q.B., Appeal Side); See B.
CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1562.
369 REA, s. 94(1).
370 Id., s. 94(2).
371 Id., s. 138(1)(2).
372 Id., s. 138(3).
373 Id., s. 140.
374 Id., s. 141(1).
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RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF IMMEDIATE PARTIES
TOABA
CUSTOMER
(BUYER)
Obligations: to respect
credit agreement with
Bank and to pay interest
fees and commissions to
bank.
Rights:
- to obtain goods/ services
from seller
- to demand the Bank to
make payment as er BA
BENEFICIARY
(SELLER)
Obligations: to deliver
goods/services.
Rights:
- full security from buyer's
bank to receive payment
- recourse against Buyer on
sales agreement.
DRAWEE
(BANK)
Obligations: to secure
buyer's duty to pay
seller as per the BA.
Rights: recourse against
customer on credit
agreement.
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3.2.2.4 Roly-poly
The roly-poly has an amazing benefit for the customer. It is a method by which a
customer can take advantage of the BA financing but with a much longer repayment
schedule.375 This minimizes the exposure of the customer to shifting interest rates as BAs
mature. 376
The roly-poly arrangement was designed to provide for an ongoing financing
which exceeds the term of individual acceptance. The roly-poly agreement is established
at a predetermined discount or rate of interest; the terms of roly-poly are between six
months and a year although the commitment extends over several years. Under this type
of arrangement, a financial institution (such as a pension fund or insurance company)
agrees to purchase the BA at a long-term rate, to an agreed maximum, while the customer
engages in BA financing to the maximum short-term maturity limit allowed by its
bank.377 This period is usually between three to five years but may be as long as seven
years. 378 "Generally, in order to set up the roly-poly, it is necessary to have an established
acceptance credit with a chartered bank for a fixed term, as set out above.,,379
In practice, banks have been said not to be very sympathetic to this type of
arrangement, as they would prefer to remain the primary purveyor of long and medium
term loans. Increasingly, they are inselting clauses in their credit agreements that would
375 L. SARNA, op. cit., note 65, p. 50.
376 See P. G. BEVANS, loco cit., note 7, p. 543.
371 L. SARNA, op. cit., note 65, p. 50.
378 P. G. BEVANS, loco cit., note 7, 543.
379 Id, p. 544.
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prevent the customer from entering agreements with other parties for the purchase of
accepted drafts. Naturally, customers try to avoid such clauses.38o
There is the question as to whether this clause is abusive, and therefore, if the
customer may seek to have it shuck down, pursuant to article 1437 of the Civil Code of
Quebec. Being as this clause forms part of the banker-customer agreement generally,
distinct from any relationship arising from the BA instmment itself, the contract ought to
be governed by provincial contractual law. To avail oneself of the remedy in article 1437
C.c.Q., one must establish (1) that the clause in question forms part of a consumer
contract or contract of adhesion, and (2) that the clause is excessively and unreasonably
detrimental to the consumer or the adhering party and is therefore not in good faith.
Authors have suggested that that the notions of consumer contract and contract of
adhesion should not be interpreted restrictively, and that courts have adopted a global
approach to determining whether a contract is one of adhesion or mutual agreement. 381
This seems to be a preferable approach given that, as another author put it, " .. .il apparait
que Ie concept de contrat d'adhesion est, pour ainsi dire, indefinisable.,,382 In any case,
these criteria leave a large scope for evaluation by the judge. Clauses may be considered
to be abusive in three ways; (i) the clause may be intrinsically abusive, (ii) the clause may
be abusive in its combined effect with other clauses in the agreement, or (iii) the clause
may be abusive in light of other contracts to which it is closely connected.383
380 Ed.
381 J.-L. BAUDOUIN and P.-G. JOBIN, op. cit., note 127, p. 121.
382 Benoit MOORE, "A la recherche d'une regie generale regissant les clauses abusives en droit
~uebecois", (1994) 28 R.J.T. 177, p. 205.
33 J.-L. BAUDOUIN and P.-G. JOBIN, op. cit., note 127, p. 122-23.
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Although theoretically possible, it is highly unlikely that the underlying
agreement with respect to financing will be considered a consumer contract, as BA
financing is likely to be used to finance international trade or generate capital, not for
"personal, family or domestic purposes.,,384 It could of course be considered a contract of
adhesion, pursuant to article 1379 of the C.C.Q. The issue will turn on the extent to which
negotiation of the contract was possible. This is a question of fact, and will depend on the
relationship of the bank and customer, and their relative bargaining strength. With respect
to the abusiveness of the clause, this too will depend on the particular fact situation.
Preventing the customer from selling accepted drafts to any other party mayor may not
be "excessively and unreasonably detrimental to the consumer or the adhering party" as
required by article 1437 C.C.Q. Among other things the courts will have to determine
are: what other means of financing are open to the customer, the cost this restriction
imposes on the customer, and the creditworthiness of the customer and the risk the bank
is exposed to when its customer engages in roly-polys.
384 Art. 1384 C.c.Q.
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3.2.3 Participation Agreement
We have seen the complexity of the BA and its operation. Because the nature and
structure of BA ftnancing has changed, multi-bank participation arrangements have
become more common than they once were.385 Despite the credit agreement between the
bank and its customer discussed in section 3.1, it is necessarily more complex when there
are a number of ftnancial institutions and/ or banks are involved. However, "Despite their
widespread usage, the legal position of all credit participations has been dealt with at law
only recently; even following that legal study, the position of participated BA ftnancings
is subject to question.,,386
There are a number of policy objectives that are achieved with participation
agreements. The court in Re: C.D.L C. 387 describes these objectives as "facilitating loans
while diversifying the incumbent risks associated with loans" as well as fostering "the
lending of funds at the lowest cost to borrowers while enhancing the return to savers and
investors" and "enabling smaller banks the ability to participate in loan agreements which
would normally be beyond their limited asset base.,,388
BA participation arrangements involve the bank, known alternatively as the
"lead," "selling," or "senior" bank, and other institutions (not necessarily banks) known
as "participants," or "sub-participants." These participating institutions are not required to
385 E. RAZIN, loco cit., note 10, p. 218.
386 Jd.
387 Supra, note 167, p. 233.
388 Jd., 233.
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be able to accept bills as required by the BEA.389 There are various methods to
orchestrating these participation arrangements, namely BA risk participations and BA
generic participations.39o "Risk participations" create an arrangement that "allows the
transfer of all of the economic benefits and risks without the transfer of legal obligations
or rights.,,391 The legal obligation concerning the issuance and payment of the BA exists
only between the customer and lead bank; there is no contractual relationship between the
customer and the participants. Risk participations have no effect on the agreement
between the customer and lead bank; they are separate contracts between the lead and
participating banks.392 The bank does not act as agent for the participants when it sells
them portions of the 10an,393 nor does it act as agent for the borrower though there remain
general duties owed by a bank to its customer (for example with regard to
representations).394 The lead bank allots a percentage interest in the present and future
obligations of the customer. In return, the participating institutions enter into a binding
agreement with the assigning bank to indemnify it for the funds it may pay upon the
maturity of the acceptance. The bank remains primarily liable pursuant to the Ace95 but
retains a separate claim against each of the participants. The participants maintain only an
indirect claim on the customer, while directly responsible to the lead bank.
389 Jd., 237. Section 46(2) of the Act (R.S., 1985, c. B-4) provides that a corporation can only make itself
liable on a bill if permitted under its governing law.
390 There is also discussion of funded participations at BA rates, but these are not true acceptance
arrangement, but rather a participated loan at lower BA rates. See E. RAZIN, lac. cit., note 10,241-242.
391 Jd., p. 243.
392 For the distinction between syndications and participations, see E. P. ELLINGER, E. LOMNICKA, and
R. HOOLEY, op. cit., note 330, p. 669.
393 N. L'HEUREUX, E. FORTIN and M. LACOURSIERE op. cit., note 57, p. 234-235.
394 Banks can be held liable for negligent misstatements made to their customers. See Hedley Byrne & Co.
v. Heller & Partners Ltd., [1964] A.C. 465, [1963] 2 All E.R. 575 (H.L.).
395 B.E.A., s. 127.
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"Generic participations," on the other hand, differ in that the participants accept a
portion of the drafts rather than indemnifying the lead banle This is arranged in one of
two ways. In one type of generic acceptance, the customer signs a blank draft and
authorizes the lead bank to complete the BA by including the accepting institution.
Alternatively, the participants may provide a bank with their own completed drafts,
which are then given to the customer to sign.396 The lead bank often finds the
orchestration of a generic participation most appealing because, in part, it ensures its own
exemption from liability by redistributing it among the participating institutions in
proportion to their acceptance of the drafts. Generic BA participations are a form of BA
syndication or an assignment, because there are separate acceptances by the participating
banks governed by a single agreement. 397 In a syndication arrangement, each bank
acquires a direct contractual relationship with the borrower (or in this case, the drawer).
In an assignment, the parties are in the same situation, except that the direct contractual
relationship arises from the sale of the lead bank's rights and obligations to another bank
or banks. Each bank will normally be able to independently verify the customer's
creditworthiness and conduct its own risk analysis.398
The characterization of participations between the parties has been unclear. In the
United States, where participation agreements are now drafted as the purchase and sale of
an undivided interest in the loan, courts interpreted the grant of a veto power over
changes to the security corresponding to the underlying loan as establishing the
396 This is permitted by the Act. See B.E.A., s. 36(1)(a).
397 For the distinction between syndications and participations, see E. P. ELLINGER, E. LOMNICKA, and
R. HOOLEY, op. cit, note 330, p. 662.
398 Peter J. LEWARNE and Kenneth E. THORLAKSON, "Syndications, Assignments and Participations
by Canadian Banks," (1991) 6 B.FLR. p. 1,2-3.
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participant as a creditor of the lead bank.399 The court viewed the participation as a
commitment by the participant to extend credit or loans to the lead bank in the future, if
necessary.400 Such reasoning was rejected in a subsequent case401 in which the court
found that the language of assignment in the participation agreement produced a sale by
the lead bank of an interest in future income. They also imposed a constructive trust on
the lead bank in favour of the participants, which is what a Canadian court did in the only
similar case to arise here.402 The comi implicitly found that what had occurred was the
sale of a future stream of income, rather than a loan and commentators noted that under
Canadian law. This sale excludes the notion that the participating banks are creditors of
the lead or senior bank.403 This may be true of risk participations, but with respect to
generic participations, the situation is different. The lead bank doesn't "sell" anything to
the participating bank, but rather allots a percentage of the acceptances to the banks,
which they accept, creating a direct relationship to the customer. In this sense, the lead
bank is the agent of the participating bank in creating the BA.
In either case, these arrangements enable banks to unite with other banks in their
acceptance activity where the amount of debt sought by the customer is particularly great
or too burdensome for a single bank. It also allows the bank to reduce its own risk in
losing a large amount of money to cover the BA. As mentioned above, under the credit
agreement, the customer has the duty to put the bank in funds to pay the BA at maturity.
However, there is the risk that the customer will be insolvent and that the bank will be
399 Taylorv. Arkansas Democrat Co., 54 S.W.2d 59 (Ark. 1932); Stratford Financial Corp. v. Finex Corp.,
367 F.2d 569 (2nd Cir. 1966).
400 See also P. J. LEWARNE and K. E. THORLAKSON, loco cit., note 398 p. 1,4.
401 Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Madamemoiselle ofCal., 379 F. 2d 660 (9 th Cir. 1967).
402 Canada Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Canadian Commercial Bank (1986) 27 D.L.R. (4th) 229, 59 C.B.R.
(N.S.) I. Additional reasons at, (1986) 62 C.B.R. (N.S.) 205 and (1987) 64 C.B.R. (N.S.) 9 (Alta. Q.B.).
403 See W. G. BELLACK-VINER, loco cit., note 1190, p. 236 and P. J. LEWARNE and K. E.
THORLAKSON, loco cit., note 398, p. 1,5.
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left to shoulder the burden by itself. One way of reducing this risk is to set up a
participation agreement between other banks. This can be done by the customer's bank,
acting as the lead bank, inviting other banks into the financing transaction, thereby
sharing in the risk (and the rewards) of the alTangement. Essentially, the lead bank
assigns interests in the financing alTangement to other banks (known as participants or
sub-participants). The participants agree to indemnify the lead bank proportionally to
their interest in the financing. In practice, most participations are risk participations,
whereby the lead bank will accept the draft and then rely in turn on its right of
indemnification against the other participants, should the customer ultimately default at
maturity.404
Though banks are not required under the Bank Act405 to retain reserves against
outstanding acceptances, practical concerns motivate them to retain a certain amount in
reserve to repay the acceptance at maturity. Because the revenue generated from
stamping fees is small and profits are modest, retaining such reserves is quite costly.
Participation anangements enable banks to put more of their capital to more productive
uses, without jeopardizing their ability to pay the BA at maturity.
This arrangement not only reduces risk for the banks, but it facilitates and
improves relationships between banks and other non-bank financial institutions.406 The
orchestration of a bankers' acceptance participation strengthens the affiliation of the
institutions involved. Participation alTangements also allow smaller banks to engage in a
sphere of banking activity they would otherwise be effectively excluded from. Also, their
404 L. SARNA, op. cit., note 65, p. 50.
405 1991 ,c.46.
406 Frederick H. JENSEN and Patrick M. PARKINSON, "Recent Developments in the Bankers'
Acceptance Market", (1986) 72 Federal Reserve Bulletin p. I, II.
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customers are not forced to seek out other financial institutions to handle their requests.
This promotes the overall competitiveness of the banking industry. If it were not for
participation in facilities, individuals seeking credit financing in the world's financial
markets would be forced to employ other, more expensive methods (such as bank loans at
the prime rate plus).
Numerous benefits and drawbacks exist in both risk participation and generic
participation. Much of how beneficial or disadvantageous the different acceptances
appear depends on the standpoint from which the situation is viewed. They must be
carefully contemplated in each case to ensure the most fitting participation has been
facilitated for the particular circumstances. To the customer, risk participations can
access a greater measure of credit and ensure relatively stable pricing of funds, while
generic participations offer the potential of financing at more economical rates because
they can provide diversified price schedules. To a bank, generic participations are
preferable because under such arrangements, the bank will take in fees regardless of the
fact that any liability to pay, which it undertakes as an acceptor, will be covered by the
funds remitted to it by its customer pursuant to the underlying credit agreement. In the
eventuality that the customer defaults on the agreement, the bank has diversified the risk
and has thus mitigated the negative effects.
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Moreover, for the purposes of accounting, bankers' acceptances are treated as on-
balance sheet items.407 With risk participations, no portion of the bankers' acceptance
may be removed from the balance sheet, according to the policy of the Office of the
Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI). This policy is unlike regular loans,
where participations transfer the asset from the lead bank to the other bank's balance
sheet. This can make risk participations unacceptable to the lead or senior bank.408
Nevertheless, it is risk participations that are preferred, as they do not require the
customer's approval of the participating institutions and because it broadens the number
of institutions that may pat1ake in the participation, and consequently indemnify the lead
bank.
407 P. J. LEWARNE and K. E. THORLAKSON, loco cit., note 398, p. I, 16. The authors note that this
treatment has been confirmed by the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) of
Canada, in a letter dated, April 18, 1989 to the Canadian Bankers' Association (CBA).
408 P. J. LEWARNE and K. E. THORLAKSON, loco cit., note 398, p. I, 16.
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POSSIBLE CLAIMS BETWEEN PARTIES TO THE BA
TRANSACTIONS
Are the parties in the same jurisdiction?
If yes, which rules governing contract apply? (Section 9 of the Bills of Exchange Act)
(1) Who is claiming from whom?
(2) Is the dispute between the customer and the payee bank?
(3) Is the dispute between the customer and the beneficiary?
(4) Is the dispute between the payee bank and the sub-participating banks?
(5) Is the dispute between the payee bank and a financial institution in a Roly Poly?
(6) Is there a Letter of Credit in place?
What is the relationship between the applicant/customer and the issuing bank?
What is the relationship between the beneficiary and the paying bank?
What is the relationship between the payee bank and a financial institution concerning a
maximum extension on the maturity date?
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3.2.4 Letter of Credit Agreement and the Bankers' Acceptance Draft
To understand the relationship between the BA and letter of credit, a brief
explanation of the letter of credit transaction is in order. International sales transactions
differ from domestic sales in that, while the former involve the movement of products in
the form of goods and services sold by a domestic-based enterprise to a foreign customer
based in a different jurisdiction and vice versa, the domestic sale will be localized within
the same jurisdiction. Furthermore, the economic and political risks involved make an
international sale more complex.
The greatest concern of a seller is the risk of non-payment by a buyer in a foreign
country.409 The seller would rather not spend money wastefully in manufacturing,
packaging and shipping goods without knowing for certain that the buyer will be solvent.
The buyer however, will favour not paying the seller until he knows that the goods have
left the seller's possession and are on their way to him. This scenario is usually proven by
documents produced by the seller. In this context, banks have taken an active role in
securing payment to the seller
Therefore, at the request of the seller, the buyer will call upon a bank to guarantee
the execution of the obligation ofpayment. This payment technique is known as opening
409 Louis PERRET, "Qu'est-ce que la gestion des risques dans les contrats intemationaux?" (1990) I
Assurances 45. Nicole LACASSE, "L'6valuation et la gestion du risque de defaut de paiement dans les
contrats intemationaux," (1989) 20 R.O.D. p. 451.
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a letter of credit to the benefit of the seller.410 In this transaction, the buyer in one
jurisdiction contacts his bank to issue a letter of credit to the benefit of the seller. The
issuing bank promises to pay the seller upon delivery of documents ensuring security of
the goods being bought in the transaction. If this procedure is properly carried out, then
risks are greatly diminished for both the buyer and the seller.411
As an accepted rule, all letters of credit will be governed by the ICC Uniform
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, (UCP).412 The body of the UCP consists
of numerous general definitions, rules on the form and notification of credits, obligations
and responsibilities of the parties involved, an analysis of the essential documents,
various rules concerning expedition, presentation and terms, and rules regulating transfer
of credits and the assignment of proceeds. Although the UCP is not, as such, a statute,
once it is incorporated into the letter of credit, it becomes the law of the contracting
parties.390.1
Letters of credit by their nature are separate and independent from the sales or
other contracts on which they may be based.413 In Bank of Nova Scotia v. Angelica-
410 Letters of credit may also be referred to as documentary credits, commercial letters of credit, or simply,
credit. A letter of credit may also be used as a guaranteeing instrument issued at the request of the seller in
favor of the buyer, usually as a performance bond. This type ofletter of credit is known as a standby letter
of credit, ICC Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, (1993 Revision) Publication No
500, (hereinafter referred to as the UCP) see Article 2 for differences.
411 Suzanne COTE and Francois BOURASSA, "Quelques aspects pratiques du credit documentaire,"
Banque Nationale du Canada, 1991, p.2.
412 Due to the new practices in international trade, introduced within the last ten years, the International
Chamber of Commerce's Commission (LC.C.) on Banking Technique and Practice, had set up a Working
Group to revise the UCP 400. The authorization for changes took place at a meeting held in November
1989. The UCP new rules were approved by the Banking Commission on March 10, 1993, and became
effective on January I, 1994.
393.1 It might be argued that underlying the reception of the UCP, is the implicit acceptance for the parties to
choose a national law to their letter of credit.
413 Article 3, UCP 500. The independence principle is also codified in the American UCC, sections 5-109
and 5-114(1).
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Whitewear, Ltd. 414 Justice LeDain of the Supreme Court, in acknowledging the existence
of the autonomy principle, stated the following:
The fundamental principle governing documentary letters of credit and the characteristic which
gives them their international commercial utility and efficacy is that the obligation of the issuing
bank to honour a draft on a credit when it is accompanied by documents which appear on their
face to be in accordance with the terms and conditions of the credit is independent of the
perfonnance of the underlying contract, for which the credit was issued. Disputes between the
parties to the underlying contract concerning its perfonnance cannot as a general rule justify a
refusal by an issuing bank to honour a draft which is accompanied by apparently confonning
documents.415
Consequently, a bank undertaking a letter of credit operation is in no way bound
by such underlying contract, and there need be no mention whatsoever of such contract in
the credit. Thus, any claims or disputes which may arise between the buyer and the seller
or between the buyer and the issuing bank will not affect the credit.416 The main concern
in effecting a viable transaction is that the documents presented by the beneficiary at the
time of payment comply strictly with the terms and conditions set forth in the letter of
credit.417
414 (1987). 36 B.L.R-140; 36 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (S.C.C.):[ 1987] I S.C.R. 59. The Angelica case will be
referred to in B.L.R.).
415 Id, p. 148 (LEDAIN, J.).
416 In Malas (Hamzeh) and sons v. British Imex Industries, [1958] 2 Q.B. 127, Mr. Justice Jenkins states
that:
"[ ... It] seems to be [... ] that a confinned letter of credit constitutes a bargain between the banker and the
vendor of the goods which imposes on the banker an absolute obligation to pay, irrespective of any dispute
which there may be between the parties on the question whether the goods are up to contract or noL"
417 Article 4 and Article 7, UCP 500.
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The BA acceptance in relation to the letter of credit has been described in the case
of Guaranty Trust Co. ofNew York v. Hannay & CO. 418 In this decision, the court referred
to the role of the acceptance in relation to a letter of credit transaction as follows:
The vendor, to help the finance of his business, desires to get his purchase price as soon as
possible after he has dispatched the goods to his purchaser, with his object, he draws a bill of
exchange for the price, attaches to the draft the document of carriage and insurance of the goods
sold and sometimes an invoice for the price, and discounts the bill-i.e. sells the bill with
documents attached to an exchange house. The vendor thus gets his money before the purchaser
would, in ordinary course, pay; the exchange house duly presents the bill for acceptance, and has,
until the bill is accepted, the security of a pledge of the documents attached and the goods they
represent. The buyer on the other hand may not desire to pay the price until he has resold the
goods. If the draft is drawn on him, the vendor or exchange house may not wish to part with the
documents of title until the acceptance given by the purchaser is met at maturity. But if the
purchaser can arrange that a bank of high stand ing shall accept the draft, the exchange house may
be willing to part with the documents on receiving the acceptance of the bank. The exchange
house will then have the promise of the bank to pay, which if in the form of a bill of exchange, is
negotiable, and can be discounted at once. The bank will have the documents of title as security
for its liability on the acceptance, and the purchaser can make arrangements to sell and deliver the
goods. Before acceptance, the documents of title or the security, and an unaccepted bill without
documents attached are not readily negotiable. After acceptance, the credit of the bank is the
security, and an accepted bill with documents attached is unusual and not readily negotiable. If
further appears from the evidence as to commercial use on which the above statements are based,
that it is commercially convenient to have on the face of the bill an indication of the transaction in
f h· h· . d 419respect 0 w IC It IS rawn.
418 [1918J 2 K.B. 623 (C.A.).
419 [1918J 2 K.B. 623 at 659 (C.A.).
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Although the COUlt discusses the role of acceptance in association with a letter of
credit in Guaranty Trust Co., still the case does not demonstrate the actual practice in a
letter of credit transaction. Today, the letter of credit itself is the payment security. As
well, any documents connected to the transaction such as that of carriage and of title are
stapled to the letter of credit and not the draft, and are delivered to the buyer at the
moment when payment is rendered to the vendor or acceptance stays certain. Although
two parties are sure of each other's intentions, reputations and solvency, what they do not
have is security from a bank (third party) against default. In this respect, the BA
guaranteed by a bank carries the most ideal form of a guarantee in the market place.
Particularly, the BA will often be used in conjunction with the letter of credit to guarantee
payment by a bank to its final beneficiary. The advantage for the beneficiary is that he
will be paid, whether or not the applicant of the letter of credit is completely satisfied
with the condition of the goods purchased and delivered.
Like letters of credit, the BA may also become the victim of fraud. For example,
the BA may be issued and accepted by a bank that is nonexistent, or a bank that does not
have the funds to make payment and is insolvent. The rules on fraud regarding letters of
credit essentially stipulate that, even where documents presented appear to comply with
the terms and conditions of the letter of credit. payment may be stopped. This is on
condition that the fraud has been committed and the person demanding payment is not in
a protected c1ass.42o The leading Canadian case on the fraud rule is Bank qlNova Scotia
420 See Xiang GAO, The Fraud Rule in the Law ofLellers ofCredit, London, Kluwer Law International,
2002, p. 29.
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v. Angelica-Whitewear, Ltd.'l2I, which relied on the foundational case of Sztejn v. J:
Hem:v Schroder Banking Corp.422
The word fraud in Canadian law has been described as "impropriety, dishonesty or
deceit,,423 This definition comes from Cineplex Odeon Corp. v. 100 Bloor West General
Partner 11lC., where the court's comments on fraud were as follows:
Fraud is not simply a legitimate dispute or disagreement over the interpretation of a contract,
however one-sided that dispute may appear. While the notion of fraud may elude precise
definition. it is a concept well-known to the law, and it must, in my view, import some aspect of
. . d' h d' 424nnpropnety, IS onesty or eceIt.
The cOUli went on to conclude that there was a strong prima facie case of fi'aud:
Where the demand on the letter of credit can be said to be "clearly untrue or false." or "utterly
without justification," or where it is apparent there is "no right to payment," all fall within the
foregoing principles and must be read in the context of those "thud" principles. 42.5
421 (1987).36 B.L.R-140; 36 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (S.C.C.):[1987] 1 S.C.R. 59.
422 (1941) 31 N.Y.S. 2d 631.
423 See, e.g., Royal Trust Corporation ofCanada v. Royal Bank ofCanada, [1993] OJ. No. 718 (Gen.
Div.); 930154 Ontario Inc. v. Onofri, [1994] 0.1. No. 2095 (Gen. Div.); Royal Bank v. Centra Canada
Investments Inc. (2000), 1 B.L.R. (3d) 170. See also Royal Bank ofCanada v. Darlington, [1995] OJ.
No. 1044 (Gen. Div.), where the court reviewed definitions offraud provided to bank officers who
testified at the trial, which definitions stressed that fraud required an absence of actual and honest
belief in the truthfulness of a statement and an intention to deceive or the reckless disregard of the
truth (at paragraphs 154 and 155).
424 [1993] OJ. No. 112 (Gen. Div.), para. 31.
425 [1993] OJ. No. 112 (Gen. Div.), para. 33, referring to C.D.N Research & Development Ltd. v. Bank of
Nova Scotia (1980),18 C.P.C. 62 (Ont. H.C.), 65; Henderson v. Canadian Imperial Bank ofCommerce et
al., (1982),40 B.C.L.R. 318 (B.C.S.C.), 320; Edward Owen Engineering Ltd. v. Barclays Bank
International Ltd., [1978] 1 Q.B. 159, 169 (C.A.).
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The decision in Angelica-Whitewear is to the same effect:126
Angelica-Whitewear also showed that the fraud exception should not be applied to
a holder in due course of a draft on a letter of credit.427 In Quebec, this question was
considered in Les industries Almac Ltee v. Al_Arishi,428 which maintained the defendant
had not negotiated the draft; he did not have status as a regular holder in due course. The
court also touched on this question in Geestemiinder Bank AG 1'. Barzele.x Inc.,·129
IJowever, the Court of Appeal in this trial found that regardless of whether Geestemiinder
Bank was a holder in due course, Barzalex could in this case claim the causes of nullity
under civil law. The court asserted the rights of the Bank of Nova Scotia, an immediate
(or near) party in tbe circumstances.
The case is interesting because it deals with both letters of credit and acceptances
(in that case, of a bank draft). In Geestemiinder, the issue was whether the Bank of Nova
Scotia had to honour the draft it had accepted in favour of Geestemilnder Bank. The
fonner maintained that Geestemilnder Bank had committed fraud with respect to celtain
documents; namely, by inselting the wrong date into an invoice that had been left blank,
and by having issued a second bill of lading when the original one was found to be
incorrect. Given that the dra.ft was accepted on the strength of these documents, it was
argued that the draft should not have been paid.
The COUlt of Appeal found that, although Geestemilnder had been acting as a
mandatory ofM.E.C.S. (the vendor, in this case), one could not impute knowledge of the
426 See Bank ofNova Scotia v. Angelica-Whitewear Ltd., [1987] I S.C.R. 59, 84-85.
427 Bank ofNova Scotia v. Angelica-Whitewear Ltd., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 59, 84.
428 [1991] R.J.Q. 830 (C.S.).
429 [1995] RJ.Q. 88 (C.A.).
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falsity of the bills of lading to the bank. In f11Ct, as tar as Geestemlinder was concerned,
the issuance of a second bill of lading was made in good faith and the first bill of lading
had contained a mistake rather than a deliberate forgery. Accordingly, Barzelex could not
request the resiliation of the letter of credit nor its effect in leading the Bank of Nova
Scotia to accept the draft. The case teaches us that, for fraud to exist, the party must have
actual knowledge of what is transpiring since imputed knowledge is insufficient.
Like the BA, a letter of credit may be transferable to a second beneficiary,
provided that it is expressly designated as "transferable" by the issuing bank.43o The BA,
however, is always transferable since it is a negotiable instrument, subject to the rules of
the Bills of Exchange Act. As well, the beneficiary of a BA (called the holder in due
course) like a letter of credit beneficiary, may hold the draft until it is payable, or transfer
it to another party for early payment, but at a cost as discussed above. The beneficiary of
a letter of credit may also choose to assign any proceeds to which he may be entitled
under such credit, even when the credit does not stipulate transferability.43I
In practice, the letter of credit must state whether it is revocable or irrevocable. In
the absence of such mention, the credit is deemed ilrevocable. 432 A revocable letter of
credit is one which can be revoked at any time, up to the moment when the seller presents
the necessary documents. An in-evocable letter of credit is one that is final and annullable
430 Article 48, UCP 500.
431 Article 49, UCP. For further study on this point see Rolf EBERTH and E.P. ELLINGER, "Assignment
and Presentation of Documents in Commercial Credit Transactions", (1982) 24 Ariz. L. Rev. 277; see also
Jean-Pierre STOUFFLET, "Payment and Transfer in Documentary Letters of Credit: Interaction Between
the French General Law of Obligations and the UCP", (1982) 24 Ariz. L. Rev. 267.
432 Article 6(c), UCP 500.
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only upon agreement of all the parties to the transaction, or upon evidence of a "strong
primafacie case of fraud" in the documents presented by the seller to his bank.433
The court in Angelica in stating the exception to fraud when dealing with letters
of credit noted that a bank must honour a draft, assuming that the tendered documents
appear, on their face, to be regular and in conformity with the terms and conditions set
out in the letter ofcredit. Justice LeDain made this point in the following terms:
An exception to the general rule that an issuing bank is obliged to honour a draft under a
documentary credit when the tendered documents appear on their face to be regular and in
conformity with the terms and conditions of the credit has been recognized for the case of
fraud by the beneficiary of the credit which has been sufficiently brought to the knowledge
of the bank before payment of the draft or demonstrated to a Court called on by the
customer of the bank to issue an interlocutory injunction to restrain the bank from
honouring the draft.434
Irrevocable and confirmed letters of credit are the prefelTed choice of sellers,
since they secure payment upon presentation of the documents, provided that they
conform to the terms and conditions of the letter of credit.435 The BA, however, becomes
irrevocable once the bank has stamped its acceptance on the bill and payment will be due
at its maturity. The BA is used together with the letter of credit, when payment is
demanded before it becomes payable.
433 Angelica, supra n06 at 160. The court held that the requirement of a "strong prima facie case of fraud"
was necessary for a customer who wished to stop the issuer from honoring the letter of credit by way of an
interlocutory injunction. On the other hand, when a customer claims fraud in his defense to a suit initiated
by the issuing bank for reimbursement, the test would be to determine whether or not the fraud has been
adequately brought to the knowledge of the bank before payment or intended payment of the draft.
434 Supra no. 6, at 150.
435 Article 9, UCP 500. See Clive M. SCHMITTHOFF, SCHMITTHOFF'S Export Trade, 9th ed., London,
Stevens and Sons, 1990, pp. 441-445.
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Other important stipulations include a statement of the amount of the credit, the
letter of credit's expiry date, and a list of the documents which must be presented by the
seller.
Still, the courts have expressed a reluctance to interfere in such matters. In R.D.
Harbottle (Mercantile) v. National Westminster Bank,436 for example, one finds the
following passage: "It is only in exceptional cases that the court will interfere with the
machinery of the irrevocable obligations assumed by the banks. They are the life-blood of
international commerce."
In the scheme of a letter of credit, there are usually at least four parties involved,
namely the buyer-applicant, the bank issuing the letter of credit, the seller-beneficiary,
and the correspondent bank, confirming and advising or negotiating the letter of credit.437
These parties may often be situated in different jurisdictions having different laws
as regards both substance and procedure. Furthermore, when incorporated, letters of
credit will be governed by the UCP.438
Because the VCP is a set of rules and practices generally recognized and adopted
by merchants, traders and bankers, one might conclude that it is effectively the lex
mercatoria (commercial law) regulating all issues involving letters of credit transactions.
436 [1977] 3 W.L.R. 752; [1978] I Q.B.P. 146; [1977] 2 All E.R. 862 and 870.
437 While the second bank confirms the letter of credit, a third bank may be elected to advise and/or
negotiate it. The purpose of the seller's engaging a confirming bank is to ensure that he will be paid on time
at the place he chooses. Similarly to the issuing bank's role, the confirming bank must inspect the
documents. It will then pay the seller the amount due under the credit, provided the documents are
satisfactory: Article 9, UCP 500, and Lazar SARNA, Letters a/Credit: the Law and Current Practice, 3'd
ed., Toronto, Carswell, 1993, section 3 et seq. The role of the advising bank, on the other hand, consists in
notifying the seller that a credit has been issued in his favor. Other than being responsible for transmitting
accurate information the advising bank has no ability under the letter of credit in general (Article 7, UCP
500).
438 Incorporation of the UCP into a letter of credit will not prevent a court from applying its national laws,
especially when there is a conflict between the UCP and the former. See Charles D. BUSTO,
"Documentary Credits - UCP 500 and 400 Compared", 1993, ICC Publication No 511. See comments on
Article I, UCP.
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The BA is, however, governed by the Bills ofExchange Act. Any solution introduced to a
problem involving a BA must respect the inherent nature of the BA as a negotiable
instrument, governed by the federal laws of Bills of Exchange Act and the Depository
Bills and Notes Act. Thus, in the case that a Canadian BA is used with a letter of credit
and a problem arises between the parties, these federal laws will apply. While the UCP
governs the rights and obligations of parties to a letter of credit, and prescribes the form
and usage of letters of credit,439 it does not offer solutions in the case that their may be
several jurisdictional legal systems that can apply, and the parties fail to choose a law to
govern a particular letter of credit.44o
Issues pertaining to conflicts of laws are beyond the scope of this paper.
Nonetheless, since both a BA and a letter of credit have issues that entail application of
several systems of law, it is important to briefly explain how the law is treated in cases of
letters of credit. Understanding the letter of credit and the jurisdictional problems it may
face is helpful because it is often used together with a BA or they are used as options to
one another.
Unlike the UCP, the Bills ofExchange Act contains section 9, a rule for choosing
the appropriate law to govern the BA. Section 9, discussed in detail further in this work,
provides that the rules of the common law ofEngland, including the law merchant, save
in so far as they are inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act; apply to bills,
notes and cheques.
439 The VCP 500 is divided into seven sections. Section A deals with general provisions and definitions,
Section B with the form and notification of credits, Section C with liabilities and responsibilities of the
parties, Section D with types of documents, Section E with miscellaneous provisions on the conformity of
shipments, Section F with transferable credits, and Section G with the assignment of proceeds.
440 Neither does the VCP deal with questions of fraud, common in disputes arising in letter of credit
transactions, nor does it deal with procedures available in such situations. See David R. STACK, "Conflict
of Laws in International Letters of Credit," (1983) 24 v.J.J.L. 176.
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Since this provision explicitly stipulates the common law of England will apply, it
has created confusion as to the usage of Quebec civil law to matters of bills of exchange.
Later, we shall see from a review of the jurisprudence that the courts, for the most part,
have been conciliatory to the application of provincial law in issues involving bills of
exchange. The majority of judges express a hesitance to jeopardize the integrity of the
provincial law as complimentary law in order to accommodate the idea that Parliament's
desire was to enact an extensive and far-reaching law of bills and notes. This is also the
position of most doctrinal writers. On the other hand, in letters of credit, the COUltS will
turn to the conflict of laws rules and/or mandatory rules of their jurisdiction to decide
which law will govern the document.
Consider, for instance, a court in Quebec, which must rule on a case of fraud in a
letter of credit transaction. When there are elements in a transaction that are attached to
few jurisdictions, and the parties have not chosen a law to govern that transaction, the
court must decide whether to apply the rules or the mandatory laws of its forum, which
would each lead to different conclusions.
In the former case, the court would apply in a letter of credit transaction, the law
of the jurisdiction with which the Act is most closely connected. As a matter of public
order, the COUlt would apply its own law in order to protect Quebec's political, social and
economic status. All foreign laws relevant to the issue would thus be dismissed in order
to uphold Quebec's imperative rules. 441
441 Article 3076 CCQ.; see also Article 7 of the European Economic Community Convention, June 19,
1980, on the law concerning contractual obligations 80-934 E.£. C, where mandatory rules have been
codified and accepted. This Convention came into force on April I, 199 I, and is usually referred to as the
"Rome Convention. "
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Specifically, the courts, in analyzing the connecting factors of a letter of credit,
will choose the system of law most appropriate to the situation. Court decisions may vary
since conflict of law rules often differ, particularly with respect to the weight given to
factors closely connected to a particular situation. Often, the application of one system of
law will be favoured over another if it is more beneficial to the interests of the parties in
the dispute.
In principle, a court will consider such criteria as the law of the locality of
contracting, the governing law intended by the palties, and finally the law having the
closest and most real connection to the transaction.442 In letters of credit, because the
banks involved are not parties to the principal underlying contract or transaction,
attention must be given to the places of business of the issuing bank and the other banks
involved, the site of application for a letter of credit, the site of payment and the site of
presentation of the documents.443 The law of the BA, however, will not be dependent
upon such criteria. Once it has been established that BA draft has the legal requirements
to be considered a bill as discussed in section 3.2.2, the next step will be to understand
the application of section 9 of the BEA, to be examined in Chapter 4.
The independence rule plays a central role in analyzing the letter of credit
engagement itself, and not the underlying contract. When the origin of a dispute in a
letter of credit transaction is determined, and the relationship between the parties has
been examined, the factors relevant to establishing the law with the closest and most real
connection to the transaction must be evaluated. For purposes of clarity, we must
remember that the letter of credit engagement must be treated independently of any
442 L. SARNA, op. cit.65 No. 13, section 9-1.
443 !d.
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related contracts. Moreover, where more than one bank is involved in the transaction, the
bank having the closest and most real connection to the letter of credit transaction must
be determined by examining the obligations and functions of each bank.
The actual and potential connecting factors relevant in determining which
jurisdictional laws should apply to an inevocable letter of credit are: (1) the place of
conclusion of the contract with the bank, of the lex loci contractus; (2) the place of tender
and examination of the documents; (3) the place of payment; (4) the place of
incorporation, domicile and place of business of the bank; and (5) the language and the
currency used in the letters of credit.444
Depending on the interpretation we give, various sites may possibly apply to the
letter of credit. The site would, in summary, be as follows: (1) between the applicant and
the issuing bank: the site of the issuing bank; (2) between the beneficiary and the
advising bank: the site of the advising bank or of the issuing bank; (3) between the
beneficiary and the confirming bank: the site of the confirming bank; (4) between the
beneficiary and the issuing bank: the site of the paying bank or ultimately the site of the
issuing bank; (5) between the conespondent bank and the applicant (either the site of the
issuing bank or the site of the correspondent bank); and (6) between the issuing bank and
the conespondent bank: either the site of issue or the site of performance.
Supposing we were to analyze each of these relationships on an individual basis,
as separate from the letter of credit transaction, it is our thesis that it would be possible to
envision different laws as applicable to each. This would be by either stipulating an
applicable law clause, or legally, in the absence of stipulation, by locating the site where
the offer and acceptance were made, in virtue of provisions governing the formation of
444 Id.
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contracts in national laws.445 Deciding the proper law in a BA is a question of interpreting
section 9 of the BEA, as discussed further in chapter 4.
In a letter of credit transaction, although each of the six relationships mentioned
above are autonomous, they are nonetheless united and interconnected by the letter of
credit transaction. When conflict of laws occurs in a letter of credit transaction, the
accepted rule, as we have seen, is to apply the law of the site of the banle The bank, and
not the applicant or beneficiary, is the party having the central obligation, unlike in a
regular contract of sale. In fact, the courts should always apply the law of a bank when
faced with a conflict in such circumstances. Consequently, the courts will have no choice
of applying either the law of the issuing bank, or that of the correspondent bank,
depending on which site has the closest connection to the transaction.
All the parties to the transaction are affected by the tender and examination, since
it is a prerequisite to the payment of the letter of credit. The beneficialy makes the first
tender to the correspondent bank, which will then make the second tender to the issuing
bank, which will make the third tender to the applicant. At each tender, the party
receiving the documents will examine them for conformity.446 Assuming that the
documents presented by the beneficialy appear to be on their face in compliance with the
terms and conditions of the credit, the correspondent bank will then have the obligation to
tender them. 447 If the documents presented have discrepancies, the bank may refuse to
honour them. 448
445 /d, p. 218; see also Article 1387 C. C. Q., where a contract may be formed at the site where acceptance is
received. Nonetheless, in matters of letter of credit transactions this Article should only be applicable when
this site corresponds to the site of the bank.
446 In this sense, the letter of credit may be looked upon as a conditional payment, since actual payment to
the beneficiary is contingent upon the tender and examination ofdocuments.
447 Article 13, VCP 500.
448 Article 14(b), VCP 500.
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The beneficiary will have until the expiry date of the letter of credit to remedy the
situation. If the beneficiary decides not to remedy the discrepancies, the applicant may
choose to bring suit against him on the basis of their underlying contract. Nonetheless,
the bank cannot exercise recourse against the beneficiary because of these
discrepancies. 449
Kurkela is of the view that the tender and examination should not be accorded too
much weight, as it may happen that the site of tender will not be the same as the site of
payment.450 However, in practice, the bank counters where the documents are tendered
and examined will usually be the site where the beneficiary will get paid.
While in the first tender, the beneficiary is not obliged to act with reasonable care
(although if he does not it will be to his detriment), the correspondent bank vis-a-vis the
issuing bank is obliged to act with reasonable care in verifying the authenticity of the
documents.451 The correspondent bank will then be reimbursed by the issuing bank, after
it has confirmed the validity of the documents and paid the beneficiary.452 The issuing
bank will then make the third tender to the applicant, in order that he might be able to
present the documents to the transporter, in exchange for the goods he has bought.453
While for the first and third tenders, the parties are usually located at the same
site, for the second tender, between the correspondent bank and the issuing bank, the sites
will differ. 454 Consequently, one should not give too much importance to the site of
449 Matti, KURKELA, Letters a/Credit Under International Trade Law: u.c.c. u.c.p and Law Merchant,
New York, Oceana Publications, 1985.
450 Id. The delivery of documents by mail or by messenger can hardly be considered to constitute any
characteristic or crucial performance under the letter of credit.
451 Articles 7 and 13(a), VCP 500.
452 Article 19, UCP 500.
453 See beginning of Chapter one on the operation of the letter of credit.
454 The second tender is normally made by the confinning bank, which mails the documents to the issuing
bank. See M. KURKELA, op. cit. no. 53, note 420, p. 223.
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tender, unless it coincides with the site of payment, such as in the case of an in-evocable
and confirmed letter of credit.
Three payments will be made during the course of the letter of credit transaction:
(l) the payment by the correspondent bank to the beneficiary; (2) the reimbursement of
the con-espondent bank by the issuing bank; and (3) the reimbursement of the issuing
bank by the applicant. 455 The con-espondent bank will usually pay the beneficiary at its
counters upon presentation of the documents. The reimbursement of the con-espondent
bank will be made either at its place of business or at an account held by it in either the
city of the issuing bank or elsewhere, in major world financial centers such as New York
or London. The applicant will reimburse the issuing bank at the bank's counters. 456 Of the
three sites of payment, the most important in terms of being closely connected with the
letter of credit transaction, is that made by the cOlTespondent bank to the beneficiary.
Often, the site of the bank doing business will not necessarily be the same as its
head office or site of incorporation. Thus, its place of doing business will be a more
important connecting factor in determining the appropriate choice of law. What is
important is to locate the site where the letter of credit was issued, advised, confirmed
and paid to the beneficiary.457
The language in which the letter of credit is drafted and the type of cun-ency used
may be helpful in certain situations as indications of a choice of law. For example, a letter
455 Id., p. 225.
456 /d. Payment may also be made at a branch of the issuing bank located in a different jurisdiction, and
may be made either before or after tender of documents, depending upon the agreement of the parties.
457 Questions ofjurisdiction may arise, especially when it is the branch of the bank, which executes
payment. In the commentaries made on the UCP 500 and 400 Compared, supra no. 18, under Article 2, we
are reminded that branches are separate from their head offices. Therefore, a court, when faced with a
situation in which a bank's branch is the party acting, it must be treated as separate from its head office.
This will affect the law applicable, given the locations of the head office and the branch.
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of credit is issued by an Indian bank in favour of an American beneficiary and payable by
an American bank both located in the U.S ... The letter of credit is in English and is
payable in U.S. dollars. In such a case, the language and currency may lead a court to
apply U.S. law rather than Indian law.
Since English is an internationally accepted language in business and U.S. dollars
are commonly used in transactions, one must be careful not to accord these factors too
much weight. However, if the parties to a transaction use a language and currency which
are completely foreign to them, this choice may be of great import in determining the law
applicable. To return to the example of the Indian bank and the American paying bank,
the parties may prepare the letter in Chinese and stipulate payment in Chinese Yuan, and
this would be taken as significant.
Looked at broadly, the letter of credit transaction creates a relationship between
several parties, namely: the applicant, the issuing bank, a beneficiary, and the
correspondent bank in some cases. Similar to the BA, it is therefore imperative to
distinguish the letter of credit engagement fi·om all other contracts developed between the
parties, and isolate the letter of credit operation for consideration. The BA is a federal
instrument, governed by federal laws, and in case of inconsistency, a choice must be
made between applying common law or Quebec civil law, pursuant to section 9 BEA,
explained in our Chapter. Since the letter of credit will only succeed if it is independent
of these related contracts, this engagement must be analyzed as a single contract
consisting of several parties. Like the BA, it is the bank(s) which normally assumes the
principal roles, and therefore the governing law of the letter of credit is normally that of
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the bank's location. 458 The BA is a separate issue and when used with the letter of credit,
the Bills of Exchange Act, as well as the DepositOlY Bills and Notes Act, will apply.
When there are issues of inconsistency, how we interpret section 9 will be essential.
458 Nonetheless, when analyzing each of the different relationships developed, other than the letter of credit
engagement, application of several laws such as that of the site of the applicant or beneficiary may come
into play. See H.C. GUTTERIDGE and Maurice MEGRAH, The Law ofBanker's Commercial Credits,
1984, London, Europe Publications Ltd., p.243.
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TRANSACTION
.- Sales Contact -..
EXPORTER IMPORTER
Shipment -..
BENEFICIARY APPLICANT
(Customer)
BA Payment
\ iPayment r DocumentsLetter of Credit Credit Agreement L/CA ication
Documents ~ Imbursement ~
BA Agreement
PAYING BANK Documents ISSUING BANK
Letter of Credit
Participating Banks Participating Banks Participating Banks
171
3.2.5 Agreement between Bank and Holder of the Bankers' Acceptance
at Maturity
By accepting the draft, the bank becomes the primary obligor towards any
eventual holder of the BA, according to the tenor of its acceptance. 459 Particularly, the
bank that has acquired an unconditional obligation for payment will be required to pay
the holder at maturity of the BA.
In the case of a letter of credit however, the solution is not as obvious, since in
one transaction, there may be several banks involved and each is situated in a different
jurisdiction. Moreover, every bank will have its specific set of obligations to fulfill at a
certain time and place, all of which are necessalY for the letter of credit to become
payable. Thus, the relationship between the advising bank and the beneficiary is limited
to the latter's obligation to take reasonable care in checking the apparent authenticity of
the credit which it is to advise. The advising bank has no formal commitment or
obligations vis-a-vis the beneficiary. Rather, it has a duty towards the issuing bank to
advise the letter of credit. If the advising bank is unable to establish the apparent
authenticity, it must inform without delay the issuing bank of this liability. If it elects
nonetheless to advise the unauthenticated letter of credit to the beneficiary, it has a duty
to inform him of this inability.
The confirming bank does not guarantee the fulfilment of the obligations of the
issuing bank. Rather, the confirming bank provides an independent undertaking to the
459 B.E.A., s. 127.
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beneficiary so that the beneficiary may have the right to look to both the issuing and the
confirming bank. When a bank has confirmed the letter of credit, it has committed itself
directly to the beneficiary, either to pay upon presentation ofthe documents or to confirm
that the credit issued by the issuing bank or third bank will be honoured. Thus, the
liability of the confirming bank due to its own undertaking is owed towards the
beneficiary.
A relationship between the beneficiary and the issuing bank will be developed
when in a three-party situation, the issuing bank is the only bank involved, or in four-
party situation, where the correspondent bank merely advises the letter of credit without
confinuing. In both these cases, the issuing bank is committed to the beneficiary, since it
is this bank which must pay at one point upon presentation of the required documents and
drafts, which comply with the credit's terms and conditions.
Two opinions exist as to location of the most important performance.46o The site
of the advising bank was considered as the place of performance, since payment was
made there. According to this view whether or not the advising bank has confirmed the
letter of credit, its jurisdictional laws shall govern the relationship.
On the other hand, others stress that it is better to apply the law of the issuing
bank when the correspondent bank is not continuing the letter of credit.461 The
justification is that the site of the issuing bank, the only bank personally and unilaterally
obligated towards the beneficiary, is the site of conclusion of the undertaking.
460 A. GOZLAN, op.cit, note 136, pAS.
461 A. GOZLAN,Op. cit., note 136, p.50.
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Consequently, supposing the cOlTespondent paying bank became bankrupt the
beneficiary would most likely have a direct recourse against the issuing bank for
payment, for the reasons stated previously.
Different from the letter of credit, although the BA draft orders payment, the bank
acquires no obligation towards any party until it accepts the order by signing as
acceptor.462 Additionally, as an accommodation party to the BA, the bank "is liable on a
bill to a holder for value, and it is immaterial whether, when that holder took the bill, he
knew that party to be an accommodation party or not.,,463 If he is not a holder in due
course, the holder does not escape of all defences.
With respect to the holder, the bank as drawee is precluded from denying: " .. .(a)
the existence of the drawer, the genuineness of his signature and his capacity and
authority to draw the bill (b) in the case of a bill payable to drawer's order, the then
capacity of the drawer to endorse, but not the genuineness or validity of his endorsement;
or (c) in the case of a bill payable to the order of a third person, the existence of the payee
and his then capacity to endorse, but not the genuineness or validity of his
endorsement.,,464 It is interesting to note that the old case law had extended the protection
of the preclusions even where the holder was found to be aware of the true facts. 465 With
respect to (c) Crawford points out that no case since the enactment of the Bills of
Exchange Act has distinguished between "validity" and "genuineness" of signature;
however prior to the Act, "validity" refelTed to the fact that the bill had the legal effect it
462 See Hopkinsoll v. Forster, (1874) L.R. 19 Eq. 74.
463 B.E.A., s. 54.
464 Id., s. 128.
465 See Braithwaite v. Gardiner (1846) 8 Q.B. 473, 477; 115 E.R. 954; Perkins v. Beckett (1878) 29
U.C.C.P. 395. Cited in Crawford & Falconbridge, Vo. 2, p. 1613.
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purported to have while genuineness referred to the fact that the signature was not
forged.466
466 Crawford and Falconbridge, Vol 2., p. 1614.
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3.2.6 Agreement between the Customer, (Lead) Bank and Participating
Institutions
Earlier, we explained how the participation of two or more financial institutions in
issuing banker's acceptances is a complex matter. The involvement of an increasing
amount of institutions in acceptance activity compounds the difficulty and it is further
complicated by the fact that the Bills ofExchange Act makes no mention of participation
arrangements.
As discussed previously, in matters of letters of credit it is very common to have
several banks participate in a given transaction. The difference, however, is that while in
a participating arrangement of a BA transaction, the banks are often sharing the risks and
responsibilities in a letter of credit situation, each bank assumes its own risks and duties.
What both a BA and a letter of credit have in common at this level is that any disputes
arising between the banks must be dealt with separately.
Bank participation similar to that in a BA transaction is less commonly practiced
In letters of credit. In fact, BAs that involve issuing extensive sums in acceptances
. h' d bank .. . 467transactIOns ave Increase partIcIpatIOn.
Risk participations and generic participations create different relationships among
the parties involved. Risk participations, as mentioned above, create a legal obligation
only between the customer and lead bank; there is no contractual relationship between the
customer and the participants. All the documentation is drafted in the name of the lead
467 See Daniel DESJARDINS, «Assignment and Sub-Participation Agreements - A Basic Overview»,
(1986) 65 Call Bar Rev. 224.
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bank, so there is no connection through the BA itself The lead bank has a separate
contractual arrangement with the participants, which is governed by the rules of contract
of the common law or Quebec Civil Code, as the case may be. The relationship between
lead bank and participating bank has been described as analogous to that of a vendor and
purchaser, because of the promise of the participating bank(s) to pay an amount of money
for a specified good (a share of the loan, which is assigned to it by the lead bank). 468
Because the contract exists only with the lead bank, the customer cannot directly enforce
the obligations of the participating banks, nor can the participating banks enforce the
obligations of the customer.
Generic participations are different from risk participations, because the
participants accept a portion of the drafts rather than indemnify the lead bank. Thus,
generic participations do not appear to be true participations at all; they more closely
resemble other arrangements such as club deals or syndications, because in true
participations there is a lack of contractual privity between the customer and the
participants,469 whereas with their acceptance of the draft, the participants engage their
liability through the BA. There can therefore be a legal relationship between the parties,
as the participants are now deemed accommodation parties by acceptance.
In one type of generic acceptance arrangement, the customer signed the draft in
blank, and thus he or she is unaware of the participating bank. The participants are
nevertheless primarily liable as acceptors, though the customer deals with the lead bank
468 E. RAZIN, loco cit., note 10, p. 256.
469 For an examination of the various structures and legal analysis of multi-lender financing see Paul H.
HARRICKS, «Legal Aspects of Multi-Lender Financing» in Lazar. SARNA, (ed.), Corporate Structure,
Finance and Operations: Essays on the Law and Business Practice, vol. 5, Scarborough, Carswell, 1992, p.
I. See also, Jacob ZIEGEL, «Characterization of Loan Participation Agreements» (1988) 14 C.BLJ. 336.
Roderick Alexander MACDONALD, «Legal Bilingualism», (1997) 42 McGill LJ 119, 148.
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(to which the customer provides the funds). The participants may not have an
indemnification agreement with the lead bank; however, the lead bank acts as trustee, and
is obligated to remit the funds it receives to the participants, so that they can pay the
holder at maturity.47o In the other type of generic participation, the customer is aware of
the identity of the accepting banks, and in those cases, there may in fact be an
indemnification agreement between the customer and participants, as in an ordinary BA
transaction. Moreover, in either case, because the participating banks accept the drafts as
accommodation parties for the lead bank,47! the latter has a common law obligation to
reimburse the participants, independent of any formal agreement or trust. This obligation
would exist in Quebec as wel1.472
Whether acting as agent for the other banks, or simply facilitating the
arrangements between the customer and the individual banks, the importance of the lead
bank will vary. In the former situation, the role of the lead bank is quite far-reaching; in
the latter it is quite limited. Nevertheless, because there is no existing contractual
relationship between the customer and the paIiicipating institutions, in both types of
generic participation arrangement, the customer must plainly consent to the proposed
acceptance facility.473 It would appear that difference between the two types of
participation would arise in case of insolvency474 or dishonour of the acceptance by the
470 E. RAZIN, lac. cit., note 10, p. 246. See also, F.H. JENSEN and P.M. PARKINSON, lac. cit., note 406,
p.7. .
471 See B.E.A., s. 54.
472 As the liability of accommodation parties is considered part of the law of bill and notes in the "strict
sense," the common law obligations of accommodation parties apply in Quebec by virtue of s. 9 of the Bills
of Exchange Act. See B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 87, p. 878; E. RAZIN, lac. cit., note 10, p. 221-222
and "Resolving the Problem of the Law Applicable to Bas", illfra.
473 E. RAZIN, lac. cit.lO, note, p. 246.
474 See for example, W. STAHL, "Loan Participations: Lead Insolvency and Participants' Rights, Part I",
(1977) 94 Banking L. J. 882; and W. STAHL, "Loan Participations: Lead Insolvency and Participants'
Rights, Part II", (1978) 95 Banking L. J 38; Eric G. BEHRENS, "Classification of Loan Participations
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lead banle For example, it would seem that where the lead bank dishonoured the BA by
non-acceptance, participants under a generic participation would be liable to the holder
(pursuant to s. 54(2) of the Act), whereas risk participants never engage any liability on
the BA, and thus have obligations only towards the lead bank; they do not have any
obligation to the holders at maturity.
Another issue which has arisen, specifically with respect to risk participations, is
the extent to which the participants can directly intervene or consult with the customer if
any difficulties arise. Naturally, such rights can be explicitly included in the agreement
itself, which would be preferable. However, it has been suggested that participating banks
might attempt to establish the existence of a fiduciaIy obligation (above and beyond what
is expressly stated in the agreement) on the part of the lead bank, which it owes to the
participants. The duty in the context of a participation would be for the bank to, "act in a
commercially reasonable manner to meet traditional expectations of bankers.... ,,475
Although participation agreements will often contain exculpatory clauses, limiting
liability to situations of gross negligence, trust law (upon which fiduciary obligations are
based) would likely preserve the obligation of the lead bank to act in a reasonable and
prudent manner.476 Failure to act in this manner will allow the participants to seek redress
before the courts. Nevertheless, there is no indication in standard participation
agreements that lead banks owe any duty to participating banks, and given the relative
equality and sophistication of the parties involved, courts will likely be reluctant to find
Following the Insolvency of a Lead Bank", (1984) 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1115. Wendy Bellack-Viner suggests
that the problem of characterization of the arrangements has tended to emerge upon the insolvency of the
lead bank, See W. G. BELLACK-VINER, loco cit., note 190, p. 246.
475 P. 1. LEWARNE and K. E. THORLAKSON, loco cit., note 398, p. 1,20.
476 Id, p.22.
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that such a fiduciary obligation exists unless the lead bank acted in the utmost bad
faith. 477
With generic participations, where the participants provide the lead bank with
their own completed drafts, which are then given to the customer to sign, the situation is
different. In that case, there is a mandate involved as defined in the Quebec Civil Code
(or agency, in the common law world), because the lead bank is empowered to represent
the participant in completing the BA.478 There is no need to impute a fiduciary duty;
obligations arise from the mandate itself. The lead bank is encumbered with duties of a
mandatary as set out in the civil code. The lead bank must act with prudence and
diligence and prevent placing itself in a position of conflict of interest.479 As one Quebec
author recently noted, except for limitations of liability for gross or intention fault48o(as
mentioned above), the courts should enforce contractual restrictions of liability by the
mandatary. He noted, "There is no reason why an agent cannot relieve itself of liability
contractually, particularly when the lenders are sophisticated institutions represented by
knowledgeable counsel. In addition, Quebec courts are not likely to 'second guess' an
agent's actions taken within the confines of the credit agreement.,,481
477 [d.
478 C.C.Q., art. 2130.
479 C.C.Q., art. 2138.
480 C.C.Q., art. 1474.
481 Nonnan A. SAIBIL, « Relations Between Co-Lenders» in Developpements recents en droit bancaire,
Service de la fonnation pennanente, Barreau du Quebec, 195, Cowansville, Yvon Blais, 2003, p. I, II.
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BA CHECKLIST
(With L/C)
(1) Has the Bank signed a credit agreement with customer?
(2) Does the BA respect conditions of Section 16 (l) of the Bills of
Exchange Act?
Does it consist of an:
(a) unconditional order;
(b) in writing;
(c) made by one person to another requiring them to make payment;
(d) at a future date;
(e) a sum certain;
(f) to a specific person;
(3) Is it payable at maturity?
(4) Is it discounted?
(5) Is there "Roly Poly"
(a) Has the BA been sold by the bank to a financial institution (ie.
Pension Fund Insurance Co.) at a longer term;
(b) Has the customer agreed to the maximum short term maturity
by its bank;
(6) Are there any Bank participants?
(a) Is there a lead bank;
(b) Are there sub-participating banks who have accepted to share in the
financing and risks of the customer?
(7) Has a letter of credit been issued?
(a) Is the letter of credit in conformity with the underlying contract?
(b) Is the letter of credit subject to the current ICC Uniform Customs and
Practice for Documentary Credits?
(c) Have the parties designated a law to govem the letter of credit?
(d) Is there more than one bank involved in the letter of credit operation?
(e) Is the letter of credit payable at the maturity of the BA?
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CHAPTER 4. The Interaction of the Federal and Provincial
Systems: Reconciling Federal and Provincial Law Pertaining
to Bankers' Acceptances
Previously, we discussed the BA operation on a step-by-step basis and explained
the relationships created within every stage (including its involvement with letters of
credit) leading to its maturity. We have seen that many obligations are formed in the
transaction, which are primarily governed by federal legislation and at times subject to
provincial law. How do we reconcile federal and provincial laws pertaining to BAs?
When do we apply provincial law to an issue concerning the BA transaction?
We have purposely entitled this chapter "The Interaction of Federal and
Provincial Systems" rather than "The Interaction of the Bills of Exchange Act and the
Civil Code of Quebec" or "civil law." We have done so because several difficulties
arising from the interaction of the Bills of Exchange Act and the private law of the
province of Quebec (based on the civil law tradition as set out in the civil code) are not
exclusive to Quebec. Below, we shall see that the Bills of Exchange Act (especially
section 9) is a problem for all provinces that follow the common law tradition, because of
the difficulty stemming from section 92 on the constitutional division of powers of the
provinces.
In this chapter, we will look at the ways in which federal and provincial law
interact, and then examine the specific question of section 9 and its impact on the
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applicability of provincial law to the BA transaction. To this end, we will examine
different interpretive approaches to section 9, notably, grammatical, interpretive/
contextual, historical and constitutional approaches. We will then propose a method to be
used in evaluating problems arising from the BA transaction, to guide us in determining
the applicable law.
The Bills of Exchange Act is perhaps the best example of exclusive federal
jurisdiction, which clearly would have formed part of property and civil right had the
division of powers in the Constitution Act, 1867 (specifically, article 19(18)) not made it
a federal head of power. Whatever the reasons, parliament's legislative jurisdiction over
bills and notes is beyond any doubt; however, there are a number of issues that are
unclear and undecided. For example, what is the extent of the federal legislature's power
to enact law over matters of bills and notes? Can the federal govemment regulate all the
contractual and proprietary elements of bills of exchange? What do we do when federal
legislation is silent? How do we interpret legislation, whose two linguistic versions
conflict or express two different legal rules/ norms? Where should a lawyer look for the
applicable law? Is the matter govemed by the civil code or by special legislation?
We will look at types of interactions between provincial and federal law and
determine the appropriate role for each sphere, in light of the Bills of Exchange Act's
unique statutory provisions (e.g., section 9). Determining the proper scope of provincial
law with respect to federal legislation is a daunting task. In fact, such efforts have been
the subject of discussion and debate in both doctrine and in jurisprudence. Part of the
problem lies in the fact that federal law does not constitute an autonomous legal system
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(systeme juridique).482 That which is "federal" cOlTesponds to a level of government, not
a telTitorial unit. Therefore, there was never any reception of law into federal jurisdiction;
it exists only in the form of what was created by written enactments. Accordingly, it
presupposes a body of law outside of it, to which one can have recourse to understand the
law.
As a result, federal legislation is locked into a relationship of dependence with
provincial law because it does not systematically and exhaustively regulate the general
rules of private law. Private law generally falls within provincial legislative competence
by virtue of section 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867.483 Granted, Parliament may
define basic terms for the pmposes of its own legislation, but these definitions may
operate only within the scope of federal legislative power. Federal private law does exist,
but only "en quelque sorte du droit d'exception.,,484
Thus, by force of circumstance, federal legislation is incomplete and,
consequently, it is joined in a relationship of dependence with the Civil Code of Quebec
485 and the common law of the other provinces and telTitories. The jus commune of the
provinces serves as the "legislative dictionary in any jmisdiction, such as that when a
concept - for example, lease - is used in an ordinary statute the meaning normally to be
given to that concept is the meaning provided by the jus commune.,,486 This role as
482 See Andre MOREL, "L'hannonisation de la legislation federale avec Ie Code civil du Quebec -
Pourquoi? Comment?" in Hannonization ofFederal Legislation with Quebec Civil Law and Canadian
Byuralism: Collection ofStudies, Ottawa, Department of Justice, 1997, p. I at page 4.
48 Jean-Maurice BRISSON, "L'impact du Code civil du Quebec sur Ie droit federal: un problematique",
(I 992) 52 R. du B. 345, 349.
484 Franyois CHEVRETTE and Herbert MARX, Droit constitutionnel, Montreal, Les Presses de
l'Universite de Montreal, 1982, p. 639 cited in Jean-Maurice BRISSON, "Le code civil, droit commun?" in
Le nouveau Code civil: interpretation et application, Montreal, Editions Themis, 1993, p. 298.
485 J.-M. BRISSON, loco cit., note 483, p. 298.
486 Roderick Alexander MACDONALD and Francis Reginald SCOTT, "Hannonizing the Concepts and
Vocabulary of Federal and Provincial Law: The Unique Situation of Quebec Civil Law" in Harmonization
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legislative default dictionary is usually not perceived, especially in unitary states such as
England.487 In Canada, which is a bilingual and bijuridical state, the role ofjus commune
as a legislative default dictionary is more nuanced and complex.
The civil law of Quebec constitutes the jus commune of Quebec. This is clear
from the preliminary provision of the code, which provides:
The Civil Code comprises a body of rules which, in all matters within the letter, spirit or object of
its provisions, lays down the jus commune, expressly or by implication. In these matters, the Code
is the foundation of all other laws, although other laws may complement the Code or make
exceptions to it. [emphasis added].4sR
The Civil Code thus plays an analogous role to that of the unenacted common
law. 489 In these situations, Quebec civil law takes on a suppletive role in applying a
federal law in Quebec. Since federation, the principles, rules and concepts of the Civil
Code of Lower Canada supplemented (and in some cases, was the base for) federal
legislation and served to fill gaps or silence in the law. This continues to be the case,
despite the fact that the Quebec Civil Code has replaced the Civil Code of Lower
Canada. 49o The enactment of the new code did not alter the basic structure of interaction
between federal and provincial law. 491 The code is thus the jus commune of Quebec, and
the reservoir, upon which federal legislation draws. Some authors described it in the
following way:
ofFederal Legislation with Quebec Civil Law and Canadian Bijuralism: Collection ofStudies Ottawa:
Department of Justice, 1997, p. 29 at page 44.
4R7 R. A. MACDONALD and F.R. SCOTT, lac. cit., note 486, p. 47.
4RR Civil Code ofQuebec, S.Q., 1991, c. 64.
489 See A. MOREL, lac. cit., note 482, p. 4.
490 J.-M. BRISSON, lac. cit., note483, p. 296.
491 See A. MOREL, lac. cit., note 482, p. 4-5.
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The universe of possible legal concepts and relationships is exhausted prima facie by a civil code.
In addition, the ideology of codal interpretation is such that, over time, unenacted customary
practices and general principles oflaw get woven into the code's fabric. Thereafter, rather than the
code being seen as ultimately resting on unenacted law, these practices and principles are seen as
existing by virtue of the positive law set out in the code itself. Hence, a civil code serves (just like
the unenacted common law in uncodified systems) as the principal repository of the jus
commlille.492
The federal legislation's dependence on provincialjus commune manifests itself
in different ways. It can be explicitly expressed or it can be implicit. Parliament can
explicitly determine the meaning it intends a particular word of term to have. For
example, it may decide for whatever reason that the word "mammal" employed in its
legislation excludes marine mammals such as dolphins. It may do this in a particular
provision, in a definition section or by reference to other legislation, or the legislation of
a foreign jurisdiction.493 The federal legislature may enact rules that are irreconcilable
with the private law of the provinces, or that derogate in part from provincial law. It
could also conceivably enact a law with complete autonomy from provincial law by
creating its own institutions, concepts and principles (in a given area, within federal
legislative competency), in other words, a sui generis private law system.494 When a legal
492 R. A. MACDONALD and F.R. SCOTT, lac. cit., note 486, p. 44.
493 See Id., p. 49.
494 See A. MOREL, lac. cit., note 482, p. 7-8.
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rule prohibits suppletive application of provincial legislation, the situation is referred to
as dissociation.495
However, as mentioned above, this is possible but not pragmatic. In any case, it is
worth noting that relying on the legal institutions and definitions of provinces already in
place is far more common than explicit displacement; it is far more common to find
. 1" d' 1 496 Th dImp IClt ISP acement. us, one commentator note :
Federal legislation, by avoiding any reference to or reliance on rules, principles, terminology or
concepts having their source in provincial law, may be independent of and unaffected by
provincial law for its scope and meaning. For example, to the extent that federal legislation
governing bills of exchange, patents and copyright were to establish complete, comprehensive and
self-contained regimes for these s. 9 I matters, no room would be left for the operation of
provincial law. But these federal enactments are not sealed off entirely from provincial law.
Promissory notes and bills of exchange depend on contract -as an essential conceptual
underpinning; and a patent is not only a form of property but a patent licence is based on
contract.497
In most cases, the federal legislator is content to allow provincial law to play a
complimentary role as the general rule.498 Where, for example, the federal law makes
reference to terms such as "property" or "partnership," it will take its meaning from the
Quebec Civil Code (or the common law, in the rest of the provinces) unless otherwise
495 See Jean-Maurice BRISSON and Andre MOREL, «Droit federal et Ie droit civil; complementarite,
dissociation» in Harmonization ofFederal Legislation with Quebec Civil Law and Canadian Bijuralism:
Collection ofStudies, Ottawa, Department of Justice, 1997, p. 213 at page 215.
496 R. A. MACDONALD and F.R. SCOTT, loco cit., note 486, p. 49.
497 Henry L. MOLOT, «Clause 8 of bill S-4; Amending the Interpretation Act» in Harmonization of
Federal Legislation with Quebec Civil Law and Canadian Bijuralism: Collection ofStudies, Ottawa,
Department of Justice, 200 I, p. I at page 3.
498 See A. MOREL,loc. cit., note 482, p. 7-8.
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defined in the Act itself or in the b1telpretation Act.499 This is by far the most widespread
manner of dependence. It may well be that federal government did not make any explicit
enactment that would interfere with the suppletive role of the Civil Code, for reasons of
efficiency. It would be difficult and unnecessary to have to define basic terminology in
every Act of Parliament.500
It is not surprising therefore to find at least one author who stated unequivocally
that there in fact should be a constitutional presumption that federal legislation was
enacted with the intent that provincial law playa suppletive role. 501 In other words, there
is a presumption that when parliament refers to terms such as "property" or "contract" it
intends that the common law meaning apply in its application in Ontario or
Saskatchewan, and the civil law notion of contract to operate in Quebec.502
Nevertheless, this remains only a presumption. This presumption could be
rebutted if it can be demonstrated that parliament explicitly derogated from the
complimentary role of provincial law by legislating alternative definitions or creating
alternative legal institutions. As mentioned above, the legislator is free to choose the
body of law it wishes to take on a suppletive role, so as long as it remains within the
confines of its sphere of legislative power. The Bills of Exchange Act is one example
where federal law has expressly referred to another body oflaw (English common law) as
suppletive.503 Section 9 of the Act provides:
499 R.S. 1985 c. 1-21.
500 See 1.-M. BRISSON, lac. cit., note 483, p. 350.
501 Roderick Alexander MACDONALD, «Provincial Law and Federal Commercial Law: Is "Atomic
Slipper" a New Beginning?», (1992) 7 B.F.L.R. p. 437, 442.
502 See R. A. MACDONALD and F.R. SCOTT, lac. cit., note 486, p. 47-48.
503 The other example is the Federal Court Act, R.S. 1985, c. F-7. See 1.-M. BRISSON, lac. cit, note 483, p.
354.
188
9. The rules of the common law of England, including the law merchant, save in so far as they are
inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act, apply to bills, notes and cheques.
What is the proper scope of section 9'1 We would be remiss if we did not note that
the Bills of Exchange Act is hardly the only federal legislation that interacts with
provincial law and that raises questions as to the proper scope of each. For example,
section 91 (24) of the Constitution assigns exclusive jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands
reserved for the Indians" to the Parliament of Canada. This raises, among other question,
the issue of whether provincial legislative jurisdiction over "property and civil rights"
extends to lands held by aboriginal title. 504
Recently, another author has examined the relationship between federal tax law
and provincial private law. He argued that:
...where the ITA employs concepts with established private law meanings that are not defined in
federal legislation, relies on private law rules or principles to define the legal relationships to
which specific provisions apply, or is silent on a matter that is governed by a specific provincial
rule fonning part of property and civil rights, Canadian bijuralism requires that courts refer to the
private law of the applicable province in order to interpret the relevant concepts or provisions.505
504 See Kent McNEIL (1998) «Aboriginal Title and the Division of Powers: Rethinking Federal and
Provincial Jurisdiction», (I 998) 61 Sask. L. Rev. 431. See also Doug SANDERS, "The Application of
Provincial Laws" in Bradford W. MORSE (ed.), Aboriginal Peoples and the Law: Indian, Metis and Inuit
Rights in Canada, Ottawa, Carleton University Press, 1989; Noel LYON, "Constitutional Issues in Native
Law" in Bradford W. MORSE (ed.), Aboriginal Peoples and the Law: Indian, Metis and Inuit Rights in
Canada, Ottawa, Carleton University Press, 1989; Micheline PATENAUDE, Le droit provincial et les
terres indiennes, Montreal, Yvon Blais, 1986.
505 David G. DUFF, "The Federal Income Tax Act and Private Law in Canada: Complementarity,
Dissociation, and Canadian Bijuralism", (2003) 51 Can. Tax J. I, I. See also, Marc CUERRIER, Sandra
HASSAN, and Marie-Claude GAUDREAULT, "Canadian Bijuralism and Hannonization of Federal Tax
Legislation," (2003) 51 Can. Tax J. 133.
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Still, the Bills of Exchange Act remains unique because of section 9, for which
there is no comparable provision in other federal legislation. Indeed, section 9 is drafted
in a rather peculiar manner because it purports to retain the common law as the law
applicable to bills and notes. As we mentioned above, in discussing the nature of the BA,
this has been the topic of doctrinal and jurispmdential controversy for over a century. For
the most part, Quebec courts have limited the scope of this section to those matters of
bills and notes in a strict sense. Recall that the distinction between the law of negotiable
instruments in the strict sense and the law of negotiable instmments in the broad sense is
not expressly referred to in section 9 of the Bills of Exchange Act. The distinction is
premised on "the double nature of the bill or note as a 'negotiable instmment' governed
by special law.. ,and as a chattel and obligation governed by the general law of property
and contract."S06 It is on this basis that the majority of doctrinal writers maintain that the
proprietary and obligational elements of the instrument not dealt with by the Act - the law
of bills and notes in the wide sense - ought to be governed by provincial law, specifically,
the Civil Code of Quebec. However, there is nothing in the text itself that compels such
an interpretation, and others, have questioned an interpretation of section 9 that would
limit it thus.so7
For some, the question on section 9 is strictly one of statutory interpretation, since
it seems impossible to ignore the constitutional dimension of the issue. The entire
distinction between bills and notes in a strict sense and in a wide sense is based on the
double nature of the bill as property and contract on the one hand and as a negotiable
instrument on the other. This double natw'e is problematic because it splits along
506 B. GEVA, loco cit., note 153, p. 198.
507 See, for example, Gerald Eric LEDAIN, "Book Review: Banking and Bills of Exchange by J.D.
Falconbridge," (1956) 3 McGill L.J p. 113, 118-19.
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constitutional lines. The aspect of the BA that relates to property and contract falls within
provincial legislative jurisdiction. Those aspects that relate to the negotiable instrument
fall within the scope of federal legislative competence over bills of exchange. The
competing heads of power are section 91 (18) "Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes"
and section 92(13) "Property and Civil Rights in the Province."
The question of the interaction of provincial jus commune with the Bills of
Exchange Act (and indeed any federal legislation, including the Deposit01Y Bills and
Notes Act) is not limited to section 9 but may arise anywhere in the Act; in particular with
respect to matters of capacity508 and consideration.509 However, understanding the scope
of section 9 is important because those palis of the Act that appear to refer to provincial
law are often ambiguous and confusing, especially once the French version is considered.
Therefore, section 9 also becomes important for those situations where issues of drafting
and language create uncertainty if there was, in fact, a reference to provincial law,
specifically the problems of consideration (simple contract! contrat simple) and of
capacity. We must then tum to section 9 to help us with these issues as well.
We must also consider that the difficulty with the scope of the interaction between
the federal Bills ofExchange Act and provincial law, with respect to BAs, is particularly
salient in Quebec because its private law is based on the French civilian tradition, rather
than English common law. It seems obvious that differences at the conceptual,
institutional and linguistic level between the civilian private law tradition of Quebec and
the common law of the other provinces makes it far more difficult to accommodate the
Quebec system within a federal statute than trying to facilitate minor differences among
508 REA of Exchange Act, R.S., 1985, c. 8-4, s. 46.
509 B.E.A., s. 52.
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legal systems within the same legal tradition.510 However, this issue is one related to the
separation of powers in the constitution and federalism generally, the problem is not
limited to Quebec. 511 As we know, when parliament deliberately enacts its own
legislative default dictionary, provincial jus commune will not apply, whether it is
Quebec civil law or Nova Scotia common law. 512
For example, Justice Meredith., in discussing the liability of the parties, in the
Ontario case of Cook v. Dodds,513 stated:
The Bills of Exchange Act does not deal with the consequences ...These consequences, in my
opinion, fall to be determined according to the law of the province in which the liability is sought
to be enforced, and, inasmuch as in this province the common law rule as to joint contracts has
been superseded by statutory enactment, R.S.O. 1897, ch. 129, s. 15, the provisions of the latter
are to govern in determining the right of the respondent to sue in this province.514
Because of the constitutional division of powers, and parliament's exclusive
jurisdiction over bills of exchange and promissory notes, any provincial legislation
purporting to directly regulate bills, cheques and notes in the strict sense would be ultra
vires and unconstitutiona1.515 For example, in Red River Forest Products Inc. v.
Ferguson,516 the court considered the reach of provincial legislation (the Gaming Act)
that declared a gambling debt to be illegal consideration for a bill of exchange. Helper
found this legislation to be ultra vires because it infringed upon the exclusive power of
510 R. A. MACDONALD and F.R. SCOTT, lac. cit., note 486, p. 52.
511 A. BARAK, lac. cit., note 85, p. 72-73.
512 R. A. MACDONALD and F.R. SCOTT, lac. cit., note 486, p. 49-50.
513 (1903) 6 O.L.R. 608 (Div. Ct.).
514 Id.,613.
515 B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1185.
516 [1993] 2 W.W.R. I (Man. C.A.).
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the federal parliament to legislate on bills and notes pursuant to section 98(18) of the
Constitution.517 In summary, a provincial statute may change, modify or alter the jus
commune, and thereby impact the effect of federal legislation regarding bills of exchange;
it may not, however, purport to legislate on bills and notes.
As mentioned earlier, the problem of section 9 is not limited to Quebec, but may
prove to be a problem for all provinces. Increasingly, legislation in other areas, notably
tax and secured transactions, have highlighted the issue for lawyers in the other
provinces. This led two Quebec academics to note:
After a century of decrying (without much sympathy or understanding from their common law
confreres and consoeurs) the misfit between federal commercial law statutes and general
principles of the civil law, Quebec commercial lawyers witnessed in the 1980s the arrival of new
allies. With the enactment of the Personal Property Security Act regimes, many jurists at last
began to see and appreciate the difficulties created by systemic conflict between provincial and
federal law (even though these new conflicts were trivial compared to those lived with for decades
in Quebec).518
Nevertheless, section 9 will always be a greater problem for Quebec and its civil
law system than for the rest of the provinces who follow common law.
A number of opinions have been offered for the interpretation of section 9 in
support of one of two basic alternatives: (1) that section 9 requires the application of the
common law, in a systematic fashion, to every aspect of a bill of exchange transaction,
regardless of the difficulties or inelegance it creates or (2) that the common law rules
517 See also, Attorney General ofAlberta and Winstanley v. Atlas Lumber Co., [1941] R.C.S. 87, [1941] I
D.L.R. 625; Banque Royale du Canada v. Garber, [1982] C.S. 1114.
518 R. JUKIER and R.A. MACDONALD, loco cit., note 206, p. 380-381.
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refelTed to in section 9 are understood in a restricted sense. Provincial law (the civil law
in Quebec) will apply to the wider transaction, in its typical complimentary and
suppletive role. In reality, aniving at an acceptable understanding and application of this
section requires an interpretation that is more nuanced than the suggestions heretofore
offered by some leading authors.
We will begin by identifYing the key issues underlying this question of
interpretation and examine them in more detail. This will enable us to evaluate the
various interpretations that have been offered regarding section 9, with a view of
determining which approach is most suitable with respect to this legislation. We will then
be able to use this interpretation to arrive at a solution as to which law is applicable to
BAs in a given situation.
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4.1 Situating the Section 9 Question
The question of section 9 differs significantly from the questions of interpretation
raised by other sections of the Act, such as section 46 (the capacity and authority of
parties), section 52 (consideration), and section 179 Goint and several liability). To
repeat, section 9 provides that the common law applies, save in so far as it is inconsistent
with the express provisions of this Act. In this regard, we should consider what Lord
Herschell believed to be the proper mle of constmction for the Bills ofExchange Act:
I think the proper course is in the first instance to examine the language of the statute and to ask
what is its natural meaning, uninfluenced by any considerations derived from the previous state of
the law, and not to start with inquiring how the law previously stood, and then, assuming that it
was probably intended to leave it unaltered, to see if the words of the enactment will bear an
interpretation in conformity with this view.... The purpose of such a statute surely was that on any
point specifically dealt with by it, the law should be ascertained by interpreting the language used
instead of, as before, by roaming over a vast number of authorities in order to discover what the
law was, extracting it by a minute critical examination of the prior decisions ....519
Lord Herschell's method simply directs us to focus on the text itself, before
resorting to old case law to determine the law. One must distil the law from the text, and
refer to jurispmdence forming the common law prior to codification only exceptionally
and with great caution. Professor Cote distilled the essential point of Lord Herschell's
remarks by stating that the words of the enactment should be given due attention; the
519 Banko/Eng/andv. VaglianoBrothers, [1891] A.C. 107, 144.
195
authority of code should not be challenged by unnecessary reference to the law as it
. d' d'fi' 520eXlste pnor to co 1 lcahon.
However, this rule of interpretation is not concerned with, nor does it affect, the
scope of section 9. The rule is effectively saying that the common law, consisting of pre-
existing law, is of no effect in light of an explicit legislative enactment. The law is
expressed solely in the legislative provision. The previous case law is no longer an
expression of the law, but rather, it can be used, in some cases, to help us determine the
meaning of a particular provision, that is, legislative intent.
Section 9 is not concerned with this body of common law, (the body of common
law that has been codified by the Bills ojExchange Act) as it would be "inconsistent with
the express provisions of this Act." Rather, one might suggest that section 9 exists to
preserve the common law with respect to all other aspects of the law of bills and notes.
We must therefore be cautious in applying section 9. We must first determine the
legislator's meaning from the specific provision itself, and be certain that a particular rule
is not expressed in the Act itself. If it is not, we may then resort to applying section 9.
Indeed, many of the eight topics listed by Professor Leclair521 regarding bills of exchange
and promissory notes could have been resolved by the courts of Quebec without making
reference to section 9. The essential issue in most of those cases was the proper
interpretation of bilingual legislation, not the scope of section 9.
520 Pierre-Andre COTE, The Intelpretation ofLegislation in Canada, 3rd ed., Scarborough, Carswell, 2000,
p.49.
521 They are, I) Capacity to contract (defence of incapacity by infants); 2) Liability of co-signers (joint and
several); 3) Liability of endorsers; 4) Means of defence available against a holder in due course; 5) Cause
or consideration, 6) Proof (admissibility of evidence given orally, or by a consort, onus of proof of good
faith); 7) Procedure, 8) Prescription. See J. LECLAIR, lac. cit., note 32, p. 695-696.
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To illustrate this point, consider for example, Roy v. Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce,s22 in which Roy - a minor - drew cheques payable to a language school (the
payee) as part of a contract to receive English language instruction. The cheques were
drawn on his chequing account, which he had at the Bank of Nova Scotia. The school,
Ecole Audio Vocale, did not provide the services it promised, and so Roy issued a stop
payment on four cheques. However, before the stop payment could be made, the payee
had endorsed the cheques and transfelTed them to the Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce (CIBC). It was admitted that the respondent CIBC was a holder in due course.
At trial, the bank's claim on the cheques was maintained.
The question at law was whether Roy could invoke his minority so as not to be
liable to the bank. Justice Hyde, writing for the court, found that section 47 of the Bills of
Exchange Act refers us back to the laws of the province. Justice Hyde rejected the
decision in Consumer's Acceptance Corp. v. Lebeau523which stated the incapacity of a
minor could be held up against a third party. He found that section 48 makes it clear that
whatever the capacity of as minor under provincial law, the bill or note remains valid
with respect to third parties. Because the incapacity of a minor is relative in the civil
code, a bill or note made by a minor is valid, unless he or she can invoke lesion. Such an
act is personal to the minor.
Crawford and Falconbridge detect that this judgement " ... has repudiated the rule
of English law and held that minority is not always a real defence available against
holders in due course but must be given the various consequences in various
m [1971] C.A. 32 I.
523 [1962] C.S. 352 (Que. S.c.).
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circumstances required by the application of the distinct rules of the Civil Code.,,524 In
Quebec, the defect in consent due to minority gives rise only to a relative nullity, and
cannot be held against holders in due course.525 Commenting on this decision, Leclair
remarks, "En somme, si l'on se fie au raisonnement des juges de la Cour d'appel, une
incapacite, source de nullite relative, ne pouna en aucune fayon faire obstacle a la
reclamation d'un detenteur regulier puisqu'elle ne sera jamais den de plus qu'un moyen de
defense personnelle. ,,526
Justice Hyde refers to the civil law of Quebec because it is widely viewed (though
not unanimously) as being incorporated by reference by virtue of section 47 (now section
46). That is, the determination of capacity is determined according to the civil law when
this issue arises in Quebec because the Act itself makes it so. However, insofar as this
provision provides a reference to provincial law, it is only with a view to determining
whether the individual has capacity. Justice Hyde is careful to limit its scope, in that the
effects of capacity are not imported by section 47 because the Act itself deals with these
effects. Thus, how the Civil Code of Quebec deals with contracts made by those lacking
capacity or those with relative capacity does not impact bills of exchange or promissory
notes.
The point is that the issue of capacity did not require the Quebec Court of Appeal
to resort to section 9, as the matter of capacity is refened to expressly in the Act. Rather,
the real issue was the interpretation of the provisions concerning capacity in the Act.
524 B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1347.
525 See N. L'HEUREUX, E. FORTIN and M. LACOURSIERE op. cit., note 57, p. 456.
526 J. LECLAIR, lac. cit., note 32, p. 698.
See also case comments by S. ROBERT, "Droit Commercial- Lettres de Change," (1971) 3 R.J. T. 450;
and Nicole L'HEUREUX, "Une nouvelle exception en matiere d'incapacite du mineur dans les effets de
commerce?" (1973) 14 C. de D. 557.
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This, we believe, is the correct approach. Contrast this with cases of Ricard v.
Banque Nationale527 and Morin v. Dion528where the judges ignore the Act entirely and
apply provincial civil law to the question of capacity.
In Ricard v. Banque Nationale, the appellant, Dame Henriette Ricard, made a
promissory note to J.R. Weir, on his authority, and it was endorsed by both of them. She
maintained that according to article 1301 of the Civil Code, "she could not bind herself
either with or for her husband, otherwise than as being common as to property; any such
obligation contracted by her in any other quality is void and of no effect.,,529 She further
alleged she had received no consideration for the note, and that the respondent knew of
the circumstances under which the note was given. The trial judge found that Dame
Ricard could not invoke article 1301 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada against a third-
party holder of the note.
On appeal, Justice Lactose overturned the decision of the trial judge. Writing for
the court, he found that the wife had in fact signed for the husband, without
consideration, and that her husband had deposited the note, using the name M.M. Weir.
He concluded that Dame Ricard was able to invoke article 1301 of the Civil Code of
Lower Canada, which provides, "[aJ wife cannot bind either herself either with or for her
husband, otherwise than as being common as to property; any such obligation contracted
by her is any other quality is void and of no effect." 530 The nullity established by this
provision is of public order and can be invoked against third party holders in good faith.
527 (1893), 3 B.R. 16 I.
528 [1957] C.S. 53. For a commentary on the case, see J.-G. CARDINAL (1957), "Billet souscrit par un
mineur - nuIIite sans preuve de lesion - article 1009 C.c.", 59 R. du N. 56 I.
529 (1893), 3 B.R. 162.
530 Supra, 162.
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Interestingly, Lacoste completely ignores the fact that as the case concerns a promissory
note, one must turn first to the Bills ofExchange Act.531 There is no mention of the Act in
the judgement, which appears incorrect, because the capacity of a person to incur liability
on a bill is dealt with in the Act (at article 46).532 Nor was their any mention of section 74
(now 73(b)) which provides that, "The rights and powers of the holder of a bill are as
follows ...where he is a holder in due course, he holds the bill free from any defect of title
of prior parties, as well as from mere personal defences available to prior parties among
themselves, and may enforce payment against all parties liable on the bill."m
In Morin v. Dion,534 a minor named Dion borrowed money from plaintiff Morin,
to purchase an automobile. The loan was made through a note, which was used to make
the initial down payment. The minor made several payments on the automobile loan, but
then defaulted. The automobile was then repossessed and the lender sued for payment.
The plaintiff! lender claimed payment on the note plus interest; the defendant pleaded
minority and lesion.
Justice Choquette found that Dion got involved in a transaction that was too
burdensome, and which he did not have the means to complete. He could thus annul his
contract on the basis of lesion. Moreover, he cited articles 297 and 1009 of the Civil
531 In fairness, the Bills of Exchange Act was fairly new legislation at the time the decision was rendered.
532 In a similar case, concerning the capacity of a wife to bind here husband Justice Doherty referred to the
Bills of Exchange Act with respect to liability, but not with respect to the capacity to incur liability. As in
Ricard v. Banque Nationale, he applied article 1301 of the civil code. It should be mentioned, for the
purpose of completeness, that from a practical perspective the status of married women has undergone
tremendous change; they no longer raise any issues of capacity. As Falconbridge has pointed out that cases
like Ricard v. Banque Nationale, "typically cited by English language texts on bills of exchange as
examples of the incapacity of married women in the civil law of Quebec, have no further validity." (B.
CRAWFORD,op. cit., note 34, p. 1353, specifically note 7.)
Nevertheless, these cases remain useful in analyzing how provincial civil law interacts with the Bills of
Exchange Act with respect to capacity.
533 B.E.A., s. 73.
534 [1957] C.S. 53.
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Code, as well as jurisprudence, which suppolis the idea that lesion need not even be
proved for a minor to avoid a contract, such as the one in this case. Given that the
contract was null, the plaintiff could not exact the repayment of the money he lent
because he had not shown that loan was turned to Dion's profit (as was required by
article 1011 of the Civil Code). Again, interestingly, Choquette refers exclusively to the
Civil Code to resolve the question at law, despite the fact that the capacity of a minor is
central to the case. No mention is made of section 47 of the Bills ofExchange Act. He
may have implicitly subscribed to the widely held view that section 47 (now section 46)
incorporates provincial law, which led him to apply the civil law in Quebec to issue of
capacity of minors. 535
In the cases above, the question of whether civil law ought to apply was raised by
express provisions of the Act, rather than as a result of the suppletive role of provincial
law. In other words, civil law could be said to apply when (1) there is reference to the
provincial law in the Act itself, or (2) provincial law takes on a suppletive role (requiring
of course, a limited interpretation of the scope of section 9). There is a tendency to gloss
over the distinction between these two major lines of inquiry when the question is framed
as: Does common law or civil law apply to matters of bills and notes? For an example of
another issue that might be resolved without reference to section 9, consider the case of
Entreprises Loyola Schmidt Ltee. v. Cholette. 536 That case involved a note that was made
535 Arguably, the failure to mention the Act at all seems to suggest that he didn't even consider the relevant
sections of the Act, but simply applied provincial law in an unthinking manner without considering the
interplay of the Act and provincial law. This is certainly a possibility; however, in a later case, Rouleau v.
Poulin, dealing with the issue of consideration, Choquette, J. cites the relevant section of the Act, and yet
applies the civil law anyways. With both capacity and consideration, the Act can be understood to be
referring to provincial law, and so we impute this understanding to Choquette, J. in this case, based on his
future decision, even though there is no mention of the Act itself in this earlier decision.
536 [1976J C.S. 557. For a similar question, see Montenay fnc. v.fmbrook Properties Ltd., [1989J R.J.Q.
846 (C.A.).
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by three individuals, which they were later sued upon for failing to pay at maturity. One
ground of defence raised by one of the defendants was that he was only liable for his
share (one third) of the note. At issue were section 179 and the liability of multiple
makers of a note set out therein. A problem arose from two different language versions of
section 179 and the different meanings attributed to the words in the civil law and
common tradition. The two versions of section 179 read:
179. (I) A note may be made by two or more makers, and they may be liable thereon jointly, or
jointly and severally, according to its tenor.
(2) Where a note bears the words "1 promise to pay" and is signed by two or more persons, it is
deemed to be their joint and several note.
179. (I) Un billet qui peut etre souscrit par plusieurs personnes qui peuvent s'engager
conjointement ou solidairement, selon sa teneur.
(2) Le billet qui porte les mots "Je promets de payer" et la signature de plusieurs personnes rend
les souscripteurs solidaires.
Bohemier and Richard describe the problem created by the text that states
"jointly, or jointly and severally" in the English version, and "conjointement ou
solidairement" in the French version.537 They point out,
... [L]a comparison entre l'obligation conjointe et solidaire du droit civil et l'obligationjoint and
several du droit anglais peut, pour raisons de terminologie, preter aconfusion. D'abord, parce que
la consonance du mot <goin!» nous amene spontanement arUerer mais erronement al'obligation
537 For a detailed analysis of the s. 179 problem, see John Delatre FALCONBRIDGE, Banking and Bills of
Exchange, 6th ed., Toronto, Canada Law Book, 1956, p. 429ff.
202
conjointe du droit civil; ensuite, parce que ce retlexe est plus ou moins renforce par les textes
legislatifs.5J8
Bohemier and Richard maintain, quite rightly it our opinion, that despite
similarities between the tenns responsabilite corljointe and joint liability, assimilating, or
conflating the two concepts would be indefensible.539 In the civil law of Quebec, a joint
obligation is one in which each creditor is liable in proportion with his or her share of the
debt. 540 Conversely, in the common law world, a joint obligation renders each party liable
for the whole of the debt. 541 The conflicting meanings attributed to the tenn "joint" is but
a symptom of a deeper problem inherent in federal legislation that is applicable in
provinces whose systems private law systems differ from each other. Ruth Sullivan
summed up the challenge ofbijuralism in Canada in the following manner:
Federal legislation in Canada is not only bilingual, but also bijuridical in the sense that it is
applicable to persons, places and relations that are subject to the civil law in Quebec and to the
common law in the rest of Canada... Although Quebec is the only province with a civil law
system, the French version of federal legislation is meant to operate in all the provinces. This
makes it impossible simply to reserve the English version of legislation for application in the
common law provinces and the French version for application in Quebec.542
5J8 Albert BOHEMIER and Louise-Helime RICHARD, «Le billet brutalement presume commercial
Montenay Inc. c. In/brook Properties Ltd.», (1990) 24 R.J. T. 153, 157-158.
5J9 Id., p. 174, cited in J. LECLAIR, loco cit., note 32, p. 705.
540 Cc.Q., art. 15 I8.
541 See Stephen Martin LEAKE, Principles ofthe Law o.fContract, 4th ed., London, Stevens, 1902, p. 293-
297. This text was cited by Pare, J. in Entreprises Loyola Schmidt Ltee. V. Cholette, p. 559-560.
542 Ruth SULLIVAN, Driedger on the COl1stl1lctiOI1 ofStatutes, 3rd ed., London, Butterworths, 1994, p.
235.
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The problem is that we have two texts that rest on different conceptual bases,
employ dissimilar legal institutions and terminology, and are expressed in different
languages. Moreover, in this particular case, the terminology employed by the English
words express a common law norm that does not conespond precisely to the civilian
notion or solidarity of debtors. 543
It is well known that the expression of a single legal norm in more than one
language can create problems. Denis Tallon pointed out, "Certaines des contraintes
viennent d'abord de la langue elle-meme. Le schema semble simple: a un mot dans une
langue correspond un mot dans I'autre. Et, comme je l'ai deja signale, la langue de depart
a ete en generall'anglais. Et c'est la qu'on peut constater Ie poids de la langue de depart:
Ie mot anglais appelle Ie concept anglais. C' est a l'autre langue de s'aligner. Et c'est
d'autant plus difficile que les concepts ne cOIncident pas toujours ou pas completement
(I'hypothese la plus complexe).,,544 He went on to say that awkward or uneasy
translations often indicate that a concept is too tied to a system to be properly understood
by others.545
Jurists writing in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, probably never
contemplated the impact of the French version of the text. But because of the equally
authoritative nature of each version,546 there is a very complex issue of interpretation.
Three discrete interpretive challenges arise from this legal bilingualism, " ... uncertainty
about the relative authority of the two versions; doubts about the degree to which either
543 Jean-Claude GEMAR and Vo HO-THUY, Difficultes du langage du droit au Canada, Cowansville,
Yvon Blais, 1997, p.65.
544 Denis TALLON, «Le choix des mots au regard des contraintes de traduction» in Nicolas MOLFESSIS,
(ed.), Les mots de la loi, Paris, Economica, 1999, p. 30 at page 32-33.
545Id., p. 35
546 See Official Languages Act, R.S.C. (1985), c. 31 (4th Supp.), s. 13 and the Canadian Charter ofRights
and Freedoms, part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 [annex B of the Canada Act 1982 (1982, U.K., c. II )], s.
18(1 )
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reflects the nonn; and the embedded character of language.,,547 In the words of one
author, we must distinguish between problems of interpretation, which require us to opt
for an interpretation of legislation from among a number of plausible meanings, and from
those questions of interpretation which require us to choose between two equally
authoritative versions of official text that must be applied within two separate legal
systems.548 This difficulty, which is pervasive in Canadian legislation, was explained
quite lucidly by one author:
If legal bilingualism presupposes equal authority of both versions of a text, how ought the
interpreter to react when one such version is patently a derivative translation of the other? Given
the draftsperson's necessary fidelity to textual symmetry, the implicit and symbolic meanings of
the primary version will inevitably be lost, ignored or compromised for pragmatic reasons in any
translation. For this reason, it is doubtful that legally significant one-to-one translations are even
possible, even where the principal nouns in the norm are transliterated terms of art: contract, offer,
acceptance, capacity, cause. Such an exercise is predicated upon the dubious proposition that
words (and especially legal tenns of art) carry with them detachable, fixed meanings that can be
derived from a bilingual dictionary (footnotes omitted).549
The court's approach in resolving this problem has led Professor Cote to comment
that, "[e]ven if, in the eyes of the law, the two versions are equally official, obviously one
is sometimes nothing more than a translation of the other. This is not supposed to be
considered by the courts. But what is the judge to think when one version is just a pale
547 R. A. MACDONALD, lac. cit, note 469, p. 119, 148.
548 Remi Michael BEAUPRE, Interpreting Bilingual Legislation, 2nd ed., Toronto, Carswell, 1986, pAD.
549 R. A. MACDONALD, lac. cit., note 469, p. 148.
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imitation of the other? In law, the two are equal. In fact, one is often 'more equal' than
the other.,,550
Nevertheless, any solution to this dilemma will ultimately depend on rules of
interpretation, even though traditional cannons of construction are not particularly useful
in interpreting bilingual legislation.551 Thus, in looking at section 179, some would
suggest that the utilization of terms and concepts exclusive to the civil law of Quebec in
the French version of the act indicates parliament's intent that the civilian meaning be
applied.552 This has some support in the case law. In Gulf Oil Canadian Ltd. v. Canadien
Pacifique Ltee.,553 the court considered the legislator's intent. It asked, "A-t-il voulu
conserver la notion de common law dans la traduction? Je crois que non, car, dans un tel
cas, il n'aurait pas employe les mots 'cas fortuit ou de force majeure' qui n'ont pas la
meme portee juridique dans notre systeme de droit. ,,554
In the opinion of some authors, when differences do exist between English and
French versions of the law, they should be reconciled by finding a common meaning to
both.555 However, this is easier said than done. Others determine that giving the
550 P.-A. COTE, op. cit., note 520, p. 331.
551 One author suggests there are independent categories of rules (traditional and for bilingual legislation)
that may conflict with each other. The traditional rules must then yield to the rules of his interpretation
croisee. See Reynald BOULT, «Le bilinguisme des lois dans la jurisprudence de la Cour supreme du
Canada», (1968-69) 3 Ott. L.Rev. 323, 324. Beaupre suggests that this view does not have jurisprudential
support. Rather, he suggests these techniques have "fused into a single dynamic process of reading and
applying bilingual legislation." See R. M. BEAUPRE, op. cit., note 548, p. 41.
552 J. LECLAIR, loco cit., note 32, p. 704.
553 [1979] C.S. 72.
554 [d., p. 75. That case was the first to apply s. 8 of the Official Languages Act, which is no longer in
effect. The Official Languages Act was repealed in 1988 and replaced by a new Act of the same name,
Official Languages Act, S. C. 1988, 35-36 El. II C. 38, S. 110. The new statute does not have a provision that
deals with the interpretation of bilingual legislation corresponding to s. 8. Nevertheless, though the
provision has been repealed, the principle of interpretation it set out has been retained, as the s. 8 merely
codified principles of interpretation already developed by Canadian courts. See R. BOULT, loco cit., note
551, p. 323.
555 See P.-A. COTE, op. cit., note 520, p. 324. Macdonald explains his own view on how we ought to
practice legal bilingualism in Canada. He states, "Authoritative interpretation of legislative texts would
reconstruct the expansive process of their drafting. Just as the drafters of bilingual legislation are engaged
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provisions, "such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the
attainment of its objects,,556 will lead us to apply the common law meaning. However,
any undue favouring of one version over another violates the equal authenticity rule and
may appear to usurp parliament's legislative function. 55? It is thus hue, and not
surprising, that provisions such as section 179 of the Bills ofExchange Act have led to "a
great deal of doctrinal friction and many contradictory decisions. ,,558
But Entreprises Loyola Schmidt Ltee. v. Cholette559 was not the first case to
consider the problem ofjoint liability of debtors. A number of cases dealt with this matter
shortly after the enactment of the Bills ofExchange Act. For example, the case of Noble
v. Forgrave560 concerned a plaintiff who sought to recover $203.33 (capital and interest)
on a promissory note, by which Forgrave and Wilson, for value received, had promised to
pay four months from the stipulated date, at the office of the Eastern Townships Bailie
The plaintiff maintains that the defendants ought to be held liable conjointement et
solidairement.
in the translation ofa single juridical idea into two natural languages, interpreters would come to accept
that knowledge of one version alone is an insufficient point of reference for understanding the juridical idea
in question. They would understand legislative texts as fully embracing both English and French
connotations and contexts, and as necessarily meaning what both versions say. No longer would it be
possible to speak oftwo texts being equally authoritative. To the extent that any formulation of a legal rule
can be authoritative, it will be necessary to speak of one authoritative bilingual text in French and English.
For this reason, formal incommensurability, or even substantive inconsistency, of legislative texts would
pose no special interpretive problems. Interpreters would treat any apparent incommensurability of material
presentation and substantive inconsistency between English and French versions of a statute no differently
than they would treat any apparent commensurabilities and consistencies between them. In both situations,
interpreters would construct, to the best of their ability, the legal norm immanent in the language of the two
texts." R. A. MACDONALD, loco cit., note 486, p. 160-161.
556 Interpretation Act, R.S., C. 1-23, S. 12
557 •R. M. BEAUPRE, op. cit., note 548, p. 40.
558 R. JUKIER and R.A. MACDONALD, loco cit., note 206, p. 399.
559 [1976] C.S. 557. For a similar question, see Montella)' Illc. v. Imbrook Properties Ltd., [1989] RJ.Q.
846 (C.A.).
560 (1899) 17 C.S. 234.
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The question at law debated was whether the plaintiffs were liable conjointement
et solidairement on the note. Lemieux found that the obligation by the signers of the
promissory note in question was only conjoint and not solidaire. The note did not contain
any indication that the obligation of the defendants was solidaire. While it is true that the
promissory note is a commercial debt, and thus according to article 1105 of the Civil
Code of Lower Canada it is deemed to be solidaire.561 Nevertheless, the provision makes
exception for situations governed by "special laws." Lemieux went on to say that section
84 of the Bills ofExchange Act, 1890, stated: "A promissory note may be made by two or
more makers, and they may be liable thereon jointly or jointly and severally, according to
its tenor.,,562 Thus, the obligation of multiple signatories of note is not always "joint and
several" (clearly displacing the presumption in the code with respect to negotiable
instruments governed by the BEA). Signatories are only liable conjointement if solidarite
is not stipulated.
Leaving the actual reasoning aside,563 what is important about this decision is not
only that Lemieux recognized that this was a situation where conflicting norms came into
play, given the different meanings in the civil and common law, but also that he did not
feel the need to resort to section 10 (now section 9) to resolve the matter. Rather, he
approached the question as simply a matter of dealing with the Act and distilling the
561 Note that presently, article 1525 of the Quebec Civil Code sets out a presumption of solidarity where the
obligation is contracted for the service or carrying on of an enterprise.
562 Supra 235
563 This case is interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, Lemieux, J. states that, "La distinction des
obligations conjointes d'avec les obligations conjointes et solidaires est la meme en droit anglais qu 'en
droit francais." He understands jointly and conjointe, as meaning the same thing, which is incorrect.
"Jointly" in the common law is actually closer to the civil law conception ofsolidaire. It is also interesting,
because the same judge, Lemieux, J. applied a civil law conception ofjoint liability, but in an earlier case,
Crepeau v. Beauschene ((1898), 14 C.S. 495 (C. cir.) he applied the common law. See B. CRAWFORD,
op. cit., note 34, p. 1837.
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norm it sought to set out, be it the common law or Quebec civil law (by the Act's allusion
to provincial law). Likewise, Justice Panneton, in Cassaubon v. Bedard564 also makes
note of section 179 before turning to the civil law of Quebec.
In that case, the plaintiff sought to recover three hundred dollars ($300.00),
"conjointment et solidairement" from Therrien, Bedard and Brisson. The amount was in
the form of three bills of one hundred dollars, dated April 29, 1914, and payable at four,
five, and six months, respectively. Therrien alleges he was a minor at the time he signed
the bill, that he received no benefit from the three hundred dollars ($300.00), and that he
was not personally liable, as he signed as the secretary of the St-Louis Amateur Athletic
Association, not in his personal capacity. The plaintiff alleges that Therrien did benefit
from the aforementioned monies. Moreover, he maintained that signing the bills was a
commercial act, and that for his commercial purposes, a minor is considered to be a
person of the age of majority.
In dismissing the plaintiffs action, Justice Panneton noted that the notes in
question stated, "We promise to pay" without adding "conjointement et solidairement."
He noted that the Bills of Exchange Act provides that a bill signed by two or more
persons makes them liable either "conjointment" alone or "conjointement et
solidairement" according to its tenor. Despite the fact that each simply provided a
promise to pay, the defendants would be liable "conjointement et solidairement" if the
bill was issued for a commercial debt. Therrien, a minor at the time of the signing, did not
benefit personally; the money benefited the association. The association wasn't engaged
in commerce, but rather entertainment and amusement. The sale of refreshments (in small
quantities) was incidental, and the loan was therefore not for a commercial purpose.
564 (1917) 54 C.S. 38
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Therrien was found not liable for the amount of the note.
One can infer from the reference to section 179 of the Act, and then to the civil law, that
the provision itself led to the application of provincial law to the matter of joint and
several liability. Recourse to section 10 [now section 9] became unnecessary. This idea is
seen most recently in Montenay Inc. v. Imbrook Properties Ltd.565 That case involved a
note, dated November 29, 1979, to the order of Montenay Inc., promising to pay them
$300,000, three years hence, with interest, for value received. The note was signed by
Imbrook Properties Ltd. and 89826 Canada Ltd. The appellant had obtained judgment
against the respondents at the trial of fIrst instance, but appealed because the respondents
were only held jointly liable in the Quebec civil law tradition. The appellant contended
that the common law concept of "joint liability" should have been applied by the court.
The difference, according to the court, was that under the English common law, each
debtor would be liable for the totality of the debt, whereas in Quebec they would only be
liable for their respective share.
The question at law was: were the two makers of that bill1iable solidairement?
The respondent fIled a notice challenging the constitutionality of article 10 [now article
9] of the Bills ofExchange Act. The court, however found it unnecessary to address the
constitutional question. Justice Nichols found that the court in the fIrst instance had erred
and that the parties were, in fact, liable conjointement et solidairement. He stated that
nothing in the Act or code gives a bill a commercial or civil character. However, by
nature notes are commercial, as they are effets de commerce, and as such they are subject
to the presumption that commercial transaction gives rise to liability that is conjointe et
so/idaire, pursuant to article 1105 of the Civil Code. He went on to say that the
565 [1989] RJ.Q. 846 (C.A.)
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distinction between commercial and civil transactions exists only in the law of Quebec,
not in the English common law. Neither the Civil Code nor the Bills of Exchange Act
give any indication of the bill's nature. However, from its historical origins to the very
present, all bills of exchange, regardless of the circumstances of their formation, are
commercial and therefore subject to the presumption in article 1105. The appeal is thus
allowed, and both makers are liable conjointement et solidairement.
From Justice Nichols' decision, it is clear that, in determining the "tenor of a bill"
(to determine if the liability is joint or jointly and several) as per section 179 of the Bills
ofExchange Act, he preferred to follow the jurisprudence and apply the presumption of
cornmerciality for bills and notes. Therefore he relied on Quebec civil law (specifically
article 1105) to create an obligation that is conjointe et solidaire, rather than import
English law via section 10. Again, we see the focus remains on understanding the true
import of the provision of the Act, rather than applYing section 10 haphazardly.
Joint and several liability is not the only issue in the Act that has created
controversy regarding the interpretation of the Act. The notion of "consideration" has
also proved to be a contentious issue. The relevant sections of the Act read:
52. (1) Est atitre onereux la lettre dont la cause:
a) peut faire I'objet d'un contrat simple;
52. (1) Valuable consideration for a bill may be constituted by
(a) any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract; or
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Crawford describes the problem this way:
A question arose almost from the start whether the Canadian Act's reference to "any consideration
sufficient to support a simple contract" was to be interpreted the same way in Quebec as in the
common law provinces. On the one side it was argued that the expression "simple contract" was a
term of art in the common law and had been translated as such by Parliament in the French version
of the Act as "contrat simple" rather than "obligation ordinaire" or simply "contrat"...On the other
side it was pointed out that in Canadian constitutional law, the law of contract is within the
competence of the provincial Legislatures as a matter of property and civil rights; the Act
appeared to be expressed permissively only, and (perhaps most importantly) the Canadian case
law appeared to recognize and give effect to the less stringent requirements of the Civil Code of
Lower Canada governing the enforceability ofpromises.566
In Re: Ross, Hutchison v. Royal Institution for the Advancement ofLem:ning,567
the issue of consideration was raised. The plaintiff, the Royal Institution for the
Advancement of Learning (which for the purposes of the action, was effectively McGill
University), was the beneficiary of a promissory note made by J.K.L. Ross, whereby the
latter promised to pay $100,000 after the date stipulated on the note. This amount
represented half the outstanding amount of a subscription he made to the university in
1920. The amount promised was to be a donation for the construction of a gymnasium.
Mr. Ross, however, went bankrupt, and so the petitioner sought the amount plus interest
from the trustee in bankruptcy. The trustee denied the claim, saying that there had been
no consideration for the note. Justice Panneton heard the case, and admitted the
566 B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1421-1422.
567 (1931) 50 B.R. 107
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petitioners claim, and admitted the university as a creditor of the estate. The case was
appealed to the Quebec Court of Appeal.
In his judgement, Justice Dorion referred to section 53 of the Act. He found that
consideration in the common law is much nalTower than cause ou consideration in the
civil law, and a donation will have cause ou consideration (which means simply "a
reason" for the transfer) but not necessarily consideration as required by the Act.
However, he notes, even though a contract without valuable consideration is a gratuitous
contract, a moral obligation can be valuable consideration where the contract is onerous
(a titre onereux). Notwithstanding his attempt to bolster his conclusion by invoking
section 10, it is clear that Justice Dorion's conclusion (that we must apply English law)
does not depend on this section 10. Rather, it is evident from his words that it is section
53 of the Act itself that requires the application of common law principles. As he states,
"[d)'apres Ie texte anglais du statutje ne doute pas que les mots simple contract signifient
Ie simple contract du droit anglais dans l'interaction de ceux qui l'ont redige.,,568 Dorion
explained the practical problem that the words created, and the reason he arrived at his
conclusion.
The words "simple contract" is a technical term which has no particular meaning
in the civil law of Quebec, but it is significant in common law. A simple contract is a
contract not under seal, and accordingly it requires consideration, that is, valuable
568 CITE See also the concurring judgment of Bemier, J., who rejects the assertion that that
"valuable consideration" must be interpreted, by virtue of s. 10, to mean valuable consideration as in the
English common law, because 'consideration' is set out in article 53, which deals specifically with the
"cause ou considerations d'un contrat" and therefore, the term must be interpreted according to provincial
law. He concluded that McGill University could recover the amount, as there had been a natural obligation
sufficient to support the note.
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consideration. In Quebec, however, obligations can be constituted by cause or
consideration, that is, it need not be valuable consideration.569 This is an example of
where the French text of the Act is an awkward and inelegant translation of the English
version, and fails to use clear civilian language. 57o Despite numerous amendments of
section 53 (now section 52),571 the term "contrat simple" remains in the French version of
the Act.
If the legislator intended English common law notions of consideration to be the
rule, they could have adopted a provision similar to section 27(1 )(a) of the Ceylon Bills of
Exchange Law, which provides "any consideration which by the law of England is
sufficient to support a simple contract" is sufficient consideration.572
Another important case illustrating this point is Stephen v. Perrault573 involving a
note made by the defendant to the order of the plaintiff, for $12,000, dated December 1,
1913. The balance owing on the note was $1,080 (with interest). The plaintiff maintained
he had a number of shares, as a guarantee, but that he would return them upon the
repayment of the debt. The defendant maintained there was a lack of consideration, as his
reasons for having paid part of the note so far were "moral and sentimental," and thus
could not constitute valuable consideration. The question at law was how we interpret
whether, according to the Bills ofExchange Act, there was valid consideration.
569 !d., p. 109.
570 See Jean-Maurice BRISSON and Andre MOREL, «Les langues de la Loi sur les ietters de change et la
common law au Quebec, atravers Ie contentieux judiciare» in Harmonization ofFederal Legislation with
Quebec Civil Law and Canadian Bijuralism: Collection ofStudies, Ottawa, Department of Justice, 1997, p.
767 at page 771.
571 For a description of the numerous changes, see J.-M. BRISSON and A. MOREL, loco cit., note 570, p.
787-789.
572 See 1. LECLAIR, loco cit., note 32, 741, who cites, Aharon BARAK, «The Requirement of
Consideration for Bills or Notes in Israel», (1967) 2 [sr. L. Rev. 499, 508.
573 (1918), 56 C.S. 54 (C. rev.)
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Justice Panneton denied the appeal, upholding the judgement at trial. He found
that according to section 53 of the Bills ofExchange Act (now section 52) consideration
sufficient for a "simple contract" means, sufficient consideration as determined by each
province. The defendant knew he was not responsible to the plaintiff, since he made no
mistake. Panneton concluded that a moral debt can be consideration for a promissory
note, and ordered the defendant to pay as per the original judgment.
Justice Lafontaine, on the other hand, looked to articles 948 and 1140 of the Civil
Code to resolve the matter of consideration. He found that although the Bills ofExchange
Act is a federal Act, drawn primarily from English law; nevertheless, section 53 of the
Act directs us to apply provincial law in this regard.
Although both justices applied provincial civil law to determine the issue of
consideration, neither Justice Panneton or Justice Lafontaine mentioned section 10 (now
section 9) of the Bills ofExchange Act in their decision. They interpret the reference to
contract in section 53 ("consideration sufficient to support a simple contract") as a
legislative indication that provincial law (in this case, the Civil Code of Lower Canada)
should apply to the matter. It is the Act itself which guides them to provincial law. This is
expressed quite clearly when Justice Lafontaine declared, " ... c'est tout de meme notre
droit franyais qui s'applique en la matiere, en vertu d'une disposition expresse de cette
loi, la clause 53, qui dit que toute cause suffisante pour donner validite a un simple
contrat est une cause suffisante d'une lettre de change." 574 There is no need to resort to
section 9 to apply provincial civil law in respect to consideration; it is simply a matter of
interpreting the Act.
574 /d., p. 61
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Likewise, in Morin v. Chambre de Commerce de St-Hyacinthe,575 where the
plaintiffs sought payment on a promissory note against the Chamber of Commerce and
one of the endorsers, the question at law was whether the chamber of commerce and the
endorser were liable on the note. One of the issues concerned consideration on the note.
Trahan found that section 53, dealing with "cause ou consideration" for notes and bills of
exchange, must be interpreted according to the laws in force in the provinces of Canada,
and consequently, according to civil law in Quebec. Section 10 was not considered,
because the case concerned the meaning of section 53 - an express provision of the Act.
Still, the consideration issue is another example of where provincial law - for
example, the civil law in Quebec - might apply to bills and notes, without invoking
section 9.576 In considering section 9 we should not be concerned with whether to apply
either common or civil law (because section 9 clearly requires us to apply common law),
but rather the extent, that is, to what matters did the legislators wish us to apply common
law by enacting section 9. Provincial law, in its suppletive role as jus commune, would
then govern whatever falls outside the scope of section 9. In Quebec, civil law would
govern those aspects, as the Quebec Civil Code is the jus commune of the province. In
any case, determining what parliament intended through enacting section 9 is no easy
task, as Leclair notes: "En effet, la ligne de demarcation qui separe les spheres
d'application du droit civil et de la common lawen matiere de lettres de change et de
billets n'est pas toujours facile atracer."S77
575 (1934) 72 C.S. 323 (affd, 61 B.R. 244).
576 It should be noted that Crawford does use s. 10 to bolster the argument "simple contract" is a term of art.
See B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1421-1422. However, the argument can be made even without
invoking s. 10.
577 J. LECLAIR, loco cit., note 32, p. 701.
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Finally, in Rouleau v. Poulin,578 Rouleau owed the plaintiff/respondent $840
before his bankruptcy. After the bankruptcy's liberation, he signed a promissory note for
repayment of a debt that existed before the bankruptcy. On March 14, 1963, the plaintiff
sought payment for the note, at which time the defendant alleged false representation and
absence of consideration. He claimed, specifically, that the debt was incurred before the
bankruptcy, and so there was no legal basis for the note. Moreover, he invoked article
1140 of the Civil Code to support his claim. He argued that under that provision, there
can be no recovery for what was paid out in voluntary discharge of a natural obligation,
but that it does not compel payment of what was only a promise to pay. The court
rejected this defence and allowed the plaintiffs motion. The defendant appealed.
The question at law was whether the plaintiff could obtain the amount owed on
the note. Justice Choquette, writing the majority opinion, found that the payment in
question was in light of the original debt, not the one created after bankruptcy. Citing
article 53 of the Bills of Exchange Act, he found that according to authors and
jurisprudence, a bill or note can have a pre-existing natural or moral obligation. This
moral or natural obligation to repay can persist even though the civil obligation was
extinguished by the bankruptcy. As in his earlier decision in Morin v. Dion579 Choquette,
demonstrates that section 10 (now section 9) is not relevant for determining the
applicable law when the Act itself discusses the matter. It simply becomes a matter of
statutory interpretation.
Thus the question of whether common law should apply (by virtue of the
technical term employed) or whether provincial law should apply (in light of the fact that
578 (1964), [1965] B.R. 292. See Albert BOHEMIER, Commentaire d'arret on Rouleau v. Poulin (1969) R.
du B. 466, for a discussion ofthis decision.
579 [1957] C.S. 53
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consideration is an element of contract, which falls within the provincial legislative
domain and changes in terminology in the Act from consideration valable, to cause and a
titre onereux580) is a question of statutory interpretation of bilingual legislation.581 In
cases such as this, where legislation employs terminology known only to one legal
system, the court seeks to ascertain what parliament's intent had been when it used a
particular technical term, or term of art, and then extrapolating that intent to the other
legal system.582
As challenging as this task appears to be, and notwithstanding the difficulties this
type of exercise poses to the judiciary, section 9 cannot be used haphazardly to favour the
common law when two versions of the Act are in apparent conflict. We must always
focus on understanding the legislator's intent from the wording of the Act when dealing
with an express provision. This idea was expressed by Justice Brossard in Lavoie v.
Abbott.583 In discussing whether the instrument in question was in the form of a
promissory note defined in section 176 of the Act, he stated:
The rules of the common law of England cannot be made applicabll;l, under article 10 of the Bills
of Exchange Act, to the question of the form of the instrument as any application of said law
580 Indeed, the changes in terminology were likely the result of this judgement, and those similar to it.
Dorion, J. found that a contract without valuable consideration is a gratuitous contract, but that a moral
obligation can be valuable consideration where the contract is onerous (d titre onereux). Consideration in
the common law is much narrower than cause ou consideration in civil law, and a donation will havl;l cause
ou consideration (which means simply "a reason" for the transfer) but not necessarily consideration as
required by the Act. Nevertheless, on the facts of the particular case, Dorion, J. concluded that this bill, in
renewal of a previous one, had sufficient moral consideration to create a debt. See Re Ross, Hutchison v.
Royal Institution for the Advancement ofLearning, supra, note536, 107.
581 Earlier cases have tended to allow civil law cause where the Act required consideration. See Rouleau v.
Poulin, [1965] B.R. 292; Verreault v. Harvey, [1970] C.A. 753.
H2 •R. M. BEAUPRE, op. cit., note 548, p. 134.
583 Supra, note 75.
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contrary to the above findings, would, in the Court's opinion, be inconsistent with the express
provisions of the Act. 584
Even though the interpretation of section 9 is different from questions arising
from the other provisions of the Act, which is not to say that the interpretation of section
9 will have no bearing on how other provisions of the Act are understood. Indeed, in
examining legislation "[e]very component contributes to the meaning as a whole, and the
whole gives meaning to its partS.,,585 Thus, judges will often look to section 9 to help
them interpret other provisions of the Act.
For example, with respect to the question of "consideration" found now at section
52, Justice Bernier confrrmes that, "On a pretendu dans la presente cause que d'apres
l'article 10 de la loi, ces mots valuable consideration doivent s'interpreter dans Ie sens
qu'ils Ie sont sous Ie droit commun actuel en Angleterre, vu Ie texte meme de cet
article... [s. 10]"586 Likewise, Justice Pare points out that the provisions of the Bills of
Exchange Act should be interpreted in the spirit of the common law, as required by
section 10 [now article 9].587 He states:
Les commentateurs de la Loi sur les lettres de change ont restreint, il est vrai, la portee de cet
article 10 a ce qui est de I'essence meme des lettres de change, laissant au droit provincial de
determiner Ie fond du droit sur lequel s'appuient les effets de commerce. Mais il faut dire aussi
que Ie droit de la province ne doit recevoir d'application que si la Loi sur les lettres de change ne
contient pas de dispositions particulieres sur un sujet particulier. Or, l'article 179 contient
precisement une disposition indiquant comment deux souscripteurs sont lies a I'egard du
584 Id., p. 603.
585 Dubois v. The Queen, [1985] 2 R.C.S. 350, 365, as cited in P.-A. COTE, op. cit., note 520, p. 308.
586 Re Ross, Hutchison v. Royal Institution for the Advancement ofLearning, supra, note 536, p. 116.
587 SeeEntreprises Loyola Schmidt v. Cholette, supra, note 529, p. 560.
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detenteur. II s'agit ici non pas d'appliquer une autre loi defaut de dispositions pertinentes dans la
Loi sur les lettres de change mais d'interpreter les termes de la disposition elle-meme qui contient
l'article 179. Ie crois ici qu'on doit appliquer l'article 10 dans de telles circonstances.588
What occurred in those cases was not the application of common law pursuant to
section 10, but rather, section 10 was used as a tool to help interpret other sections of the
Act, specifically to help resolve some of the difficulties created by bilingual legislation.
We must also point out that most of the jurisprudence has demonstrated a tendency not to
turn to section 9 to resolve difficulties with other provisions of the Act. Rather, the courts
simply applied the civil law of Quebec in its suppletive role. For example, Newcombe
stated:
I would have thought that the question...would naturally fall to be determined by the law of
Quebec, the province in which the parties resided and made the agreement and where it was meant
to be performed ... It is true that the rules of the common law of England, including the law
merchant, apply to bills of exchange and promissory notes, because the parliament of Canada has,
by the Bills of Exchange Act, so declared in the exercise of its exclusive legislative authority over
that subject; but the Dominion legislation does not and was not intended to affect a subscriber's
liability to affect his subscription ....589
To summarize, despite the difficulties raised in the Act, the question of section 9
is distinct. The issues of capacity, consideration, and joint and several liability are really
questions about interpreting bilingual legislation. Section 9 is often invoked to help
588 [d.
589 Re Ross, Hutchison v. Royallnstitutionfor the Advancement ofLearning, [1931] 4 D.L.R. 689, 699;
[1932] S.C.R. 57
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interpret the other provisions, but its interpretation remains an independent concern. The
two linguistic versions of section 9 do not create the same problem, as it is generally
agreed that it expresses a single legal norm. The questions that remain, therefore, are as
follows: What exactly is the norm being expressed? What is its scope and limitations?
We will explore these questions in the following sections.
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APPLYING SECTION 9 (10) OF THE BEA
(l) The BA is an instrument governed by Federal laws.
(2) Interpreting section 9 (now 10) of the BEA, according to the civil and common
law traditions.
(3) Unless otherwise provided by law, when a statute contains both civil law and
common law terminology, then the meaning to be adopted shall be that of either
the Province of Quebec or that of the common law provinces if applicable.
(4) The civil law meaning, emerging from the French version applies to Quebec and
the common law meaning found in the English version, would applies to the rest
of Canada.
(5) Particularly, section 9 of"The Bills of Exchange Act", provides that the "common
law of England" shall apply. The courts have decided that this refers to both the
civil and common law systems.
(6)In matters of issue, negotiation and discharge, common law applies. However, in
issues affecting contracts and property, then in Quebec, the CCQ will also apply.
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4.2 Approaches to the Interpretation of Section 9
In an attempt to understand its proper meaning and scope, we will now examine
section 9 from the perspective of different interpretive approaches. First we will look at
grammatical and textual arguments, followed by interpretive/ contextual and historical
approaches. We will then turn to a constitutional analysis of section 9. Bear in mind that
our intention is not to display a comprehensive review of statutory interpretation, but
rather examine section 9 in light of these interpretive approaches. Thus, we will not
explore such questions as what is "interpretation" and what should it be? We will
conclude that there is no rule of interpretation that can be applied to determine the scope
of section 9 with any degree of certainty, and therefore whether the common law or civil
law apply to a matter relating to bills of exchange or promissory notes when the Act is
silent.
Our discussion on this issue relies heavily on articles and cases from the United
States, because there is a more extensive history of dealing with matters of interpretation
there than in Canada. Although there are "glimmers of an enlivened discussion about
statutory interpretation,,59o in Canada, American academics and jurists' interest in the
subject blossomed earlier and led to a wealth of literature generated on the topic. With
some exceptions, Canadian jurists have yet to show such interest.
The basic rules of interpretation emerged from "foundationalist" theories of
statutory interpretation. In the last 50 to 60 years, legal scholars have preferred theories
590 Stephen F. ROSS, "Statutory Interpretation in the Courtroom, the Classroom, and Canadian Legal
Literature", (2000) 31 Ottawa L. Rev. 39, 41
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that offer a unitary foundation for statutory interpretation. The three main theories posited
today are, textualism (which focuses on the literal command of the text), intentionalism
(the actual or presumed intent of the legislature enacting the statute), and purposivism
(the actual or presumed purpose of the statute).591 They have been described in these
words:
Textualism relies primarily on the judge's perception of the plain meaning of the statute's words, plus other
grammatical and dictionary aids to interpretation and a "benign fiction" that the legislature intends that the
entire corpus juris be read in a coherent manner. Textualisrn generally eschews the use of techniques that
explore the legislative and political context in which the statute was enacted. Intentionalism is an approach
that uses: the judge's understanding of the text; grammatical and other aids to linguistic interpretation;
legislative history; and, the political context in which the legislation was enacted--a11 with an aim to
effectuating the intent of the enacting legislature. Purposivism uses all of these techniques and a healthy dose
ofjudicial judgment as to the public purposes that underlay the need for the legislation, in order to best carry
592
out the statute's goals.
These theories are labelled foundationalist "because each seeks an objective ground
(foundation) that will reliably guide the interpretation of all statutes in all situations.,,593
The theories seek to create comprehensive, coherent, and normatively attractive
techniques for interpreting statutes. Let us examine each briefly, in turn.
591 See William N. ESKRIDGE, Jr. and Philip P. FRICKEY, «Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning», (1990) 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321, 324.
592 ROSS, loc.cit note 590.
593 W. N. ESKRIDGE, Jr. and P. P. FRICKEY, loco cit., note 591, p. 321, 324-325.
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Textualism
As suggested in its name, textualism requires the interpreter to focus on the text,
or the words, of the statute. It has been suggested that there are two types of textualism.
The stricter version, associated with Oliver Wendell Holmes, states, "[w]e do not inquire
what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.,,594 A second version of
this approach draws on statutory language not in place of, but rather as the best guide to,
legislative intent or purpose.595 In other words, the legislature has presumptively said
what it means. Therefore, the only way to discover what legislator "intends" is to look at
the words it has enacted into law, nowhere else. 596
In the last 20 years, textualism has been most closely associated with Justice
Antonin Scalia of the United States Supreme Court.597 Although his approach is actually
a return to the Supreme Court's traditional approach before World War II. 598 To
emphasize some of the differences, some academics have styled Scalia's approach the
594 Oliver Wendell HOLMES, The Theory ofLegalInterpretation, (1899) 12 Harv. L. Rev.. 417,419
(1899).
For a recent variation, see Frank H. EASTERBROOK, The Role o.fOriginalIntent in Statutory
Construction, (1988) 11 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy, 59, 65 (we should replace the meaningless concept of
legislative intent and "look at the statutory structure and hear the words as they would sound in the mind of
a skilled, objectively reasonable user of words").
595 See United States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U.S. 534,543 (1940), followed in Huffman v.
Western Nuclear Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2087,2092 (1988).
596 Harold SOUTHERLAND, Theory and Reality in Statutory Interpretation, (2002) 15 St. Thomas L. Rev.
1, 12.
597 Antonio SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of Interpretation 3, 3-37 (Amy Gutmann, ed.
1997).
598 William N. ESKRIDGE Jr., «Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?», (1998) 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1509,1521
("This general principle is not original with Scalia; the British House of Lords and Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes followed the same idea in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.")
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"new textualism."s99 Nevertheless, these differences do not obscure the fundamental
notion underlying the textualist approach. In the words of Professor Eskridge:
Doctrinally, the new textualism's most distinctive feature is its insistence that judges should almost
never consult, and never rely on, the legislative history of a statute. The rejection of legislative
history and insistence that judges follow plain meanings even when unreasonable contribute to the
overall theme of the Tanner Lectures: common law approaches, emphasizing purpose, policy, and
history, are not appropriate for statutory interpretation in the modem administrative state.
Consistent with this theme, Scalia has developed a rigorously text-based methodology that
contrasts strikingly with the common law approach in Holy Trinity Church. Like Holmes, the new
textualist starts with the meaning an ordinary reader would draw from the statutory language but
delves more deeply than Holmes usually did into what other textual sources might teach us. Thus,
the Scalian interpreter also considers which interpretation is most consistent with the statute as a
whole; whether similar language has been used elsewhere in the U.S. Code and, if so, how it has
been interpreted; and regular rules of grammar, syntax, and word use. When textual analysis is
done thoroughly, it can actually persuade a hostile audience, a feat hard to accomplish under other
approaches to statutory interpretation [citations omitted).60o
In short, by emphasizing the statutory words chosen by the legislature, rather than
(what seems to be) more abstract and judicially malleable interpretive sources, textualism
appeals to the values of legislative supremacy and judicial restraint. On the other hand,
textualism has been subject to an abundance of criticism.601 Textualism, and the rules of
599 See William N. ESKRIDGE Jr., «The New Textualism», (1990) 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621,623-624;
William N. ESKRIDGE Jr., Philip P. FRICKEY, Elizabeth GARRETT, Legislation and Statutory
Interpretation, New York: Foundation Press, 2000; see also Frank EASTERBROOK, «Legal Interpretation
and the Power of the Judiciary», (1984) 7 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 87.
600 W. N. ESKRIDGE Jr., loco cit., note 598, p. 1509, 1512
601 Justice Scalia's position has attracted much of the attention. See W. ESKRIDGE, loco cit., note 599, p.
1509, 1512; Cass R. SUNSTEIN, «Justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism», (1997) 107 Yale L.J. 529,
Richard J. PIERCE, Jr., «The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and
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intetpretation that stem from it, such as the plain meaning rule, are based on a number of
questionable assumptions. Firstly, there are problems inherent to language itself. Words,
text and language generally are indeterminate, they do not have a "plain meaning"; the
act of imbuing words with meaning - that is, intetpretation - is largely subjective, which
can lead to uncertainty and confusion.602 Moreover, there are many different fOTIns of
"meaning" (e.g., literal meaning, technical meaning, common sense meaning, etc.) each
of which is understood and employed differently by different judges. 603
Furthermore, textualists cannot escape the fact that the meaning of words is
heavily influenced by context. The United States Supreme Court reminds us to always
remember that, "Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal
existence; and not only does the meaning of each intetpenetrate the other, but all in their
aggregate take their pUtport from the setting in which they were used.... ,,604 As another
author suggested, all communication is indeterminate. No word can adequately portray
the depth of our reality; no word can truly encapsulate the fullness and vibrancy of
human existence.605 If this is the case, textualism rests on shaky foundations.
Incoherence in the Administrative State, », (1995) 95 Colum L. Rev. 749; William POPKIN, «An
"Internal" Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, », (1992) 76 Minn. L. Rev. 1133.
For a Canadian perspective, see Ruth E. Sullivan, «Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of
Canada», (1998-1999) 30 Ottawa L. Rev. 175.
602 See W. N. ESKRIDGE, Jr. and P. P. FRICKEY, loco cit., note 599, p. 321,341 and Ruth E. Sullivan,
«Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of Canada», (1998-1999) 30 Ottawa L. Rev. 175, 187.
603 Ruth E. Sullivan, «Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of Canada», (1998-1999) 30 Ottawa L.
Rev. 175, 193.
604 Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Department of Revenue, (1988) 488 U.S. 19; 109 S. Ct. 278, 281, quoting Learned
Hand in National Labor Relations Board v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941).
605 Anthony D'AMATO "Counterintuitive Consequences of 'Plain Meaning''' (1991) 33 Arizona Law Rev.
529; 530-531
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Intentionalism
Different from textualism, intentionalism includes a wide variety of intent-based
theories, but they all generally involve some form of imaginative reconstruction, in which
the interpreter seeks to determine what the legislator meant. 606 Intentionalism posits that
legislative intent is primary in interpreting the statute in question. From this perspective,
the statute is only a piece of evidence leading the court back to the legislature's intent.
Thus, those who support intentionalist theories of interpretation believe statutes should be
interpreted to reflect legislative intent, as it is this intent that makes statutes
authoritative.607
This view was expressed by McLachlin 10 a dissenting opinion 10 R. v.
McIntosh. 608
The point of departure for interpretation is not the "plain meaning" of the words, but
the intention of the legislature. The classic statement of the "plain meaning" rule, in
the Sussex Peerage Case (1844),11 C. & F. 85, 8 E.R. 1034 (H.L.), at p. 1057, makes
this clear: "the only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is, that they should
606 This is referred to as "archaelogical" intentionalist analysis. "Hypothetical" intentionalist analysis
Hypothetical intentionalism, on the other hand, asks not what the legislature's answer was but rather what it
would have been had the legislature considered the specific problem before the court. See Martin H.
REDISH & Theodore T. CHUNG, «Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process: Mourning the Death
of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation», (1994) 68 Tul. L. Rev. 803, 813.
607 Adrian VERMEULE, «Interpretive Choice», (2000) 75 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 74, 84. For an overview of
intentionalism, see Adrian Vermeule, «Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The
Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church», (1998) 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1833, 1834-35.
608 [1995] I S.C.R. 686 at 712-713
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be construed according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act". To
quote Driedger, supra, at p. 3: "The purpose of the legislation must be taken into
account, even where the meaning appears to be clear, and so must the consequences."
As Lamer C.l. put it in R. v. Z. (D.A.), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 1025, at p. 1042: "the express
words used by Parliament must be interpreted not only in their ordinary sense but also
in the context of the scheme and purpose of the legislation." The plain meaning of the
words, if such exists, is a secondary interpretative principle aimed at discerning the
intention of the legislator. If the words admit of only one meaning, they may indeed
"best declare the intention of the lawgiver" as suggested in the Sussex Peerage Case
at p. 1057, but even here it is the intention, and not the "plain meaning," which is
conclusive. But if, as in the case of s. 34(2), the words permit of doubt as to the
intention ofParliament, other matters must be looked to determine that intention.
Thus, according to this theory, the text itself is not the repository of legislative
intent, but rather a means of accessing that intent. Thus, it makes sense to look beyond
the statute to that which makes the legislation authoritative - the legislator's intent. Like
textualism, intentionalism is subject to its fair share of criticism. The classic discussion
put forth by Max Radin, very clearly states that legislative intention is "undiscoverable in
fact, [and] irrelevant if it were discovered.,,609 Basically, his view is that legislative
history provides notoriously malleable evidence of legislative intent.
Furthermore, courts often seek the intent of the legislature, but it is not clear how
one ought to go about fmding that intent. Indeed, it is not even clear if one can properly
speak of the intent of the legislature, as any legislature is compromised of many
individuals, often with different perspectives, desires and intentions. As another author
609 Statutory Interpretation (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863, 872.
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stated more recently, "[i]ntent is elusive for a natural person, fictive for a collective
body.'.6l0 Neither does an examination of legislative history help us very much. Before
one can turn to legislative history as a guide:
... [t]he interpreter must ftrst answer, even if only implicitly, a series of empirical questions: Does
legislative history in fact supply evidence about some suitably specifted notion of legislative intent
(for example, the understanding of the median legislator) in a broad range of cases? Even if it
does, will judges of limited competence do better at identifying legislative intent with legislative
history or without it? The answers to these questions will determine whether to adopt rules or
standards governing the use of legislative history and what the content of the rules or standards
should be.611
But perhaps the greatest difficulty with intentionalism is that imaginative
reconstruction seems to be far more imaginative than reconstructive.612 It deals in
hypotheticals and speculation, which casts doubt on its correctness or reliability. Authors
have pointed out that in some cases; courts have adopted "strained or implausible
interpretations" in attempting to interpret the statute in conformity with their
understanding of the legislator's intent.613 Critics have maintained that the courts are
overstepping their bounds by modifying the text this way in what is effectively judicial
610 Frank H. EASTERBROOK, «Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation», (1994) 17 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 61, 68
611 Adrian VERMEULE, «Interpretive Choice», (2000) 75 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 74,84. "The widespread
expectation that judges will consult legislative histories leads to [their] distortion ... and makes them
unreliable indicators ofcongressional intent." See Note: Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult
Legislative History Today (1995) 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1005, 1012. Professor Vermuele explains that the
heterogeneity of legislative history is also problematic in that it increases the possibility of error in several
ways. See Adrian VERMEULE, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold
Story ofHoly Trinity Church, (1998) 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1833, 1873jJ.
612 Paul MICHELL, «Just do It! Eskridge's Critical Pragmatic Theory of Statutory Interpretation», (1996)
41 McGill L. J. 713, 723
613 See Ruth E. Sullivan, «Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of Canada», (1998-1999) 30
Ottawa L. Rev. 175,184.
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amendment of the law. "C'est au legislateur et non aux tribunaux que revient la tache de
determiner ce qui constituera une restriction souhaitable a la realisation du but de la loi.
Autrement Ie domaine de celle-ci risquerait de ne connaitre aucune limite et d'outrepasser
l'intention de son auteur d'origine.,,614
614 Jeanne SIMARD, L'interpretation legislative au Canada: la tMorie 11 l'epreuve de la pratique (200 I) 35
R.J.T. 549, 592
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Purposivism
Compared to the other theories, purposivism, or modified intentionalism as it is
occasionally referred to, aims to discover the purpose of a statute or legislative
enactment. It then seeks an interpretation of the text that most harmonious with this
purpose.615 It is important to note, however, that purpose is distinct from intent although
the difference between intent (as meaning) and purpose is easily obscured. As James
Landis pointed out, "[p]urpose and meaning commonly react upon each other. Their
exact differentiation would require an extended philosophical essay.... ,,616 Indeed, in
Canadian case law, there is no systematic distinction between intentionalism and
purposivism.617
Purposivism maintains the "democratic pedigree" element of intentionalism,
without the "rigidity and definitional problems of intentionalism.,,618 In the view of Hart
and Sacks, law is a purposive activity and the role of the court is to find that purpose.619
Karl Llewellyn would have agreed. He wrote that "if a statute is to make sense, it must be
read in the light of some assumed purpose. A statute merely declaring a rule, with no
615 P. MICHELL, lac. cit., note 612, p. 713, 723-724
616 James LANDIS, «A Note on "Statutory Interpretation"», (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 886, 888. For a
discussion of the difference between intent and purpose, see Gerald C. MacCALLUM, «Legislative Intent»,
(1966) 75 Yale L.J. 754, 757jf.
617 Ruth E. Sullivan, «Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of Canada», (1998-1999) 30 Ottawa L.
Rev. 175, footnote 2.
618 See W. N. ESKRIDGE, Jr. and P. P. FRICKEY, lac. cit., note 599, p. 321, 332 and P. MICHELL, lac.
cit., note 612, p. 713, 724.
619 Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and
Application ofLaw, Tentative ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1958) at 1411.
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purpose or objective, is nonsense.,,620 In a similar vein, Professor J.A. Corry noted that by
interpreting statutes in light of their objectives, courts are acting consistently with the
proper role of an unelected judiciary in a democratic society.621 By focusing on the
purpose, we can interpret the legislation in a clear and coherent manner.
The purposivist approach is not immune from criticism either and is subject to
many of the same difficulties as intentionalism. Purposivism rests on questionable
assumptions about the nature of the legal process, for example, the notion that the
legislature produces purposive statutes. Modem political theory on the legislative process
suggests that rational legislators responding to rational interest groups will not, in fact,
produce purposive statutes.622 Moreover, legislative purpose is assumed, especially in
cases where the issue at hand was not contemplated by the legislature. Like legislative
intent, it is an easily malleable concept, unconstrained by statutory language.623 It is
extremely difficult, if not impossible to determine a single purpose, let alone the purpose.
Purposivism enables the court to ascribe a purpose to the statute which may not
have been intended at the time, and thus effectively modify the law. The possibility of a
shifting purpose runs contrary to the idea that the law ought to be transparent and
predictable.624 There is a concern that a purposive approach allows courts to move too far
beyond the words of the legislation. Consequently, "[I]f courts are permitted to look
behind the words of a statutory text and search for legislative intention or purpose, laws
may be enacted through strategic 'winks and nudges' by members of the legislature as
620 Karl N.. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about How
Statutes Are To Be Construed, (1950) 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 402jJ.
621 See lA. CORRY, «Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes», (1936) I U. T.L.J. 286,289.
622 W. N. ESKRIDGE, Ir. and P. P. FRICKEY, lac. cit., note 599, p. 321,333.
623 P. MICHELL, lac. cit., note 612, p. 713, 724.
624 See W. N. ESKRIDGE, Ir. and P. P. FRICKEY, lac. cit., note 599, p. 321, 337.
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opposed to properly enacted written statutes. This subverts predictability and
accountability and undermines the rule oflaw.,,625
We will now examine how these foundational theories, as contained in various
rules of interpretation, can be applied to an analysis of section 9 and help us understand
the case law that has developed around this provision of the Bills ofExchange Act.
625 P. MICHELL, loco cit., note 612, p. 713, 725.
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4.2.1 Grammatical Method or Textual Arguments
Even though in Canada the principal articulation of the theory has been in the
fotnl of the plain meaning rule, textualism exists in many fotnls. 626 The "plain meaning
rule" is referred to as the "literal rule." Interpreting statutes under this approach means
that we must understand them "as they are" and word for word. It emphasizes a very
textual approach to the legislation. As we mentioned, from this perspective, the text of a
law is of utmost importance; it will be the most decisive factor to understanding a law.
When the text is clear, the written words are given priority to the exclusion of other
factors. 627 Although the literal approach appears to be quite straightforward, it has been
expressed in a number of ways that do not always mean the same thing. Consider the
following statement from Sweeney v. Lovell:
Considering that the statute is clear, we cannot go...beyond the letter of law on the pretext of
discovering its spirit; general rules of interpretation are only applied when the technical or
ordinary meaning of the words or provisions is obscure, and we cannot rely upon the spirit of
statute to contradict the formal text. ...628
626 Ruth E. Sullivan, «Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of Canada», (1998-1999) 30 Ottawa L.
Rev. 175,182
627 A..See P.-A. COTE, op. Cit., note 520, p. 282.
628 Sweeny v. Lovell, (1901), 19 Que. S.C. 558, 561.
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Pierre-Andre Cote explains that there are three different features of the rule in that
statement of Lemieux. First, if the language of the statute is clear, it will not be necessary
to seek its interpretation. Second, a clear text should not be interpreted, and third,
legislative intent should be found within the text itself.629 In any case, pursuant to the
literal approach, the text of the Bills of Exchange Act must be interpreted literally.
Consider then, the wording of section 9:
The rules of the common law of England, including the law merchant, save in so far as they are
inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act, apply to bills, notes and cheques.
This provision seems quite clear. Bills of exchange, and consequently BAs, are to
be governed by the common law. Only where the common law is inconsistent with the
Act does it not apply. Interestingly, the Act seems to make applicable the whole of
common law with respect to bills and notes. Accordingly, a Quebec civil law court would
have to apply the common law argued by civil lawyers. Undoubtedly, this would prove to
be a rather awkward situation, since it is highly unlikely that the jurists in Quebec would
be very familiar with the rules of the common law system.
Despite the problems it might present, in Banque Canadienne Nationale and
Berube v. Gingras,630 Justice Pigeon stated in an obiter dictum that perhaps the common
law of conversion might apply in Quebec if one considered section 10 (now section 9) of
the Bills ofExchange Act, despite the contrary view, unanimously held by the rest of the
court. He said:
629 See P.-A. COTE, op. cit., note 520, p. 282. All three manifestations of the Literal Rule are controversial.
630 [1977] 2 R.C.S. 554
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Although it is in no way necessary in the case at bar, in view of the basis on which it was brought
and decided, I see no reason to refrain from saying that I am not completely sure it was correct to
state in Norwich Union that the common law rules on conversion could not be applied in Quebec.
In fact, not a word was said of s. 10 of the Bills of Exchange Act, and no reference to it is to be
found in the factums, although appellant's whole argument was based on English cases.631
Justice Pigeon, from his subtle rebuke to counsel, was open to a straightforward,
literal interpretation of section 10 (now section 9) that would apply the common law to
all matters of bills and notes. Had section 10 been pleaded, it might have effectively
precluded the application of civil law in place of existing common law rules. In his
treatise on bills of exchange and promissory notes, Russell stated:
The Bills of Exchange Act is the law for the Province of Quebec as it is for the rest of the
Dominion. Where it is silent, recourse is to be had to the rules of the common law of England,
including the law merchant. It is difficult to see that any place whatever is left for any rules of law
peculiar to the Province ofQuebec ....632
Justice Pigeon goes on to cite the decision in Noble v. Forgrave as evidence of his
proposition. In Noble v. F01'grave, 633 the Supreme Court of Quebec maintained that the
enactment ofthis section had modified the former law of Quebec by introducing into that
province the law of England. Justice Lemieux stated, "C'est-a-dire que les regles du droit
631 Id., p. 564
632 B. RUSSELL, op. cit., note 356, p.22.
633 (1899) 17 C.S. 234.
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commun en Angleterre s'appliqueront entierement aux billets, excepte dans les cas ou
e1les seront incompatibles avec les edictions de notre acte des lettres de change634...."
Additionally, Justice Flynnin in Larochelle v. Bluteau,635 stated, "Le droit anglais,
qui s'applique en matiere de lettres de change et billets promissoires, pour les cas non
prevus par notre loi, permet cette preuve testimoniale, dans un cas de letter de change, ou
billet.,,636 He does not mention section 10 (now section 9) of the Bills ofExchange Act
explicitly, but it seems that he considered the section in making this statement. Justice
Bernier, in his dissenting opinion, seems to take a literal approach to section 10, simply
stating that it introduces common law to Quebec. Several years later, as part of the
majority opinion in Re: Ross, Hutchison v. Royal Institution for the Advancement of
Learning, 637 Justice Bernier maintained the view that the effect of section 10 was to
apply common law, insofar as it did not conflict with the Act.
In Bank ofMontreal v. Amireault,638 Justice Barclay concluded his judgment by
affirming that he did not rely on cases from Quebec, because English law was applicable.
He was of the opinion that "the doctrine of estoppel, at least so far as negotiable
instruments are concerned, is in force in this Province, in view of section 10 of the Bills
ofExchange Act. ,,639 He seems to adopt a literal approach to the section, which explains
why his judgement contains no consideration of provisions of the civil code. Likewise,
the court in Blais v. Mathieu640 also seems to have adopted the literal approach to section
10 (now section 9). The court was clear that common law alone applied to bills and notes;
634 Supra 236
635 (1923), 34 R.L. (N.S.) 328 (RR.)
636 Id., p. 338
637 Re Ross, Hutchison v. Royal Institution for the Advancement ofLeaming, supra, note 536, 107.
638 (1938) 65 B.R. 1
639 Id., p. 15-16
640 (1918) 56 C.S. 3 (C. rev.).
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there was no room for the application of the civil code and the code of civil procedure.
On the facts of the case however, the laws of evidence represented an exception to this
general rule because of the specific legislative provision of another federal Act, namely,
the Canada Evidence Act.641
Since the French and English versions of the Act are equally authoritative,642 it
raises the possibility that the two texts establish two different legal rules. In any case, it is
doubtful that authors such as Russell, writing in the early twentieth century, contemplated
the implications of a French version of the text. The reality of two authoritative texts
highlights some of the limitations to the literal rule, which it shares with the grammatical
or textual approach, generally. For example, there is the problem of the "open texture" of
language, which suggests that most words do not have a clearly delineated content,
creating doubt as to what the word(s) in the statute are referring to. 643 This problem flows
from a basic flaw in the foundational theory oftextualism upon which the literal approach
is based. Although normatively appealing, "Textualism ignores the inexactitude of
language generally and American English in particular as a medium of precise and
effective communication; in this it puts on language a burden it simply cannot bear.,,644
641 Section 40 of the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. (1985), c. C-5 is the current provision. It provides:
In all proceedings over which Parliament has legislative authority, the laws of evidence in force in
the province in which those proceedings are taken, including the laws of proof of service of any
warrant, summons, subpoena or other document, subject to this Act and other Acts of Parliament,
apply to those proceedings.
This represents an exception to the general rule stated in s. 9 that Common law ought to apply to all matters
relating to Bills and notes.
642 Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, supra, note 454, s. 18(1)
643 A'.See P.-A. COTE, op. Cit., note 520, p. 279-280.
644 H. SOUTHERLAND, op. cit., note 596, p. I, 12
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As Professor Southerland explains:
Text alone, isolated from its larger context - its purpose, object, the circumstances that called it
into being - can never make meaning wholly clear. Text alone can never make meaning wholly
clear because the words that compose it are themselves never whoIly clear. No matter how
common or ordinary a word, its usage inevitably reflects the unique subjectivity of the writer; the
reader's understanding of the word is likewise freighted with a unique subjectivity. The meaning
of text is in the eye of the beholder, and each eye is different. Text can never do better than
approximate meaning, and this inherent imprecision should tell us that textualism, like any other
method of statutory interpretation, can be manipulated in the service of result-oriented decision
making. Language changes with changing conditions in society, and even a text that seems clear
enough today is likely to seem less so tomorrow. No text can anticipate every eventuality, foresee
every twist and tum in a road stretching into an uncertain future. 645
Given the uncertainty surrounding language, we may question whether the
"common law" referred to in section 9 refers to the common law as a legal system, or the
common law as jus commune. Proponents of the latter view might argue that section 9
imports the civil law (in its primary manifestation, the Quebec Civil Code) as the
common law of Quebec.646 This position must be dismissed, as the French version of the
Act clearly refers to "Les regles de la common law d'Angleterre... " not the "droit
• M7 .
commun d'Angleterre." In Re Evaporateur PortneufInc.; Angers v. Malouin, the court
found that "[b]y putting the English in parentheses, the legislator had shown a clear
645 [d., p. 46-47
646 This notion of the civiIlaw as the common law of Quebec can be found in the decision of Beetz, J. in
Laurentide Motels Ltd. v. Beauport (City), [1989] I R.C.S. 705, 720 and 724.
647 [1962] B.R. 218
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intention that the English version should receive special weight.,,648 Thus, it is clear, the
common law, not the droit commun of Quebec, must be applied.
Furthermore, despite the jurisprudential support, there are other difficulties with
the literal approach. Taking a literal approach to interpreting the Act requires recognition
that the Act refers to the common law of England. It does not appear that any of the
jurisprudence or doctrine deals with this issue.649 As Canadian common law diverges
from the English common law, this may become an interesting point. A literal
interpretation would have Canadian courts applying judgments of the House of Lords
instead of the Supreme Court of Canada, with respect to bills of exchange and promissory
notes. Would the expression "common law of England" exclude statutory law, such as
statutes of limitation? It has been suggested that the "common law" alluded to in section
9 likely refers to equity, but not statute law,650 although it is not definitive, as there has
been no judicial pronouncement on this particular issue.
Taking a literal approach to interpreting the Act required in this case would lead
to an absurd result. In truth, the courts have had little difficulty in manipulating the plain
and obvious meaning to escape the consequences of such results. For example, in Boma
Manufacturing Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce,65! the court considered
section 165(3) of the Bills ofExchange Act, which states:
648 R. M. BEAUPRE, op. cit., note 548, p. 135.
649 See B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1218.
650 ld, p. 1216.
651 [1996] 3 S.C.R. 727,
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165. (3) Where a cheque is delivered to a bank for deposit to the credit of a person and the bank
credits him wit~ the amount of the cheque, the bank acquires all the rights and powers of a holder
in due course of the cheque.652
Justice Iacobucci made the following comments:
The respondent submits that, within the plain meaning of s. 165(3), it has acquired the rights of a
holder in due course, since the cheques in question were indeed "delivered to a bank for deposit to
the credit of a person", and since the CIBC credited the person "with the amount of the cheque."
At first blush, this interpretation seems to be attractive. However, the consequence of this
approach would be far-reaching and overly broad. If the respondent's interpretation were adopted,
a bank would never need to require an endorsement .... A bank would always be immune from
the consequences of having accepted unendorsed cheques into third party accounts. This result
cannot be supported.653
The court went on to interpret the word "person" to mean "a person who is
entitled to the cheque" a definition which is clearly not derived from the plain meaning of
the word. Thus, taking a literal approach to section will be of little assistance here where
the result of doing so may lead to "absurd" consequences. 654
652 REA, s. 165(3).
653 [1996] 3 S.C.R. 727, 764
654 See Ruth E. Sullivan, «Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of Canada», (1998-1999) 30
Ottawa L. Rev. 175,199-200, where this case is discussed.
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4.2.2 Interpretive/Contextual
The "contextual" approach is concerned with context. In using the word "context"
here, we include the entire statute of which some disputed word or phrase is a part of.
What we mean by "out of context" is taking the entire statute itself out of context: the
context of its origin, its reason for being, the evil or mischief it was meant to combat, all
as reflected in the history of the times, committee reports, successive drafts, hearings,
debate, or any other material that seems credible and reliable in understanding the
purpose the statute was intended to serve. In considering context, we will not only
examine the historical context of the legislation, but today's context as well (i.e. the
current environment in which the words of the enactment take their meaning).
The contextual approach is part of the systematic or logical method of
interpretation. It assumes that the legislator is rational and that any output by this
legislator is coherent and logical. Naturally, interpretations that are congruent with
legislative coherence and rationality are preferred over those that would lead to
incoherence and inconsistency.655 We must be prepared to move beyond the words of the
text itself to get at the true legislative intent. In City of Victoria v. Bishop of Vancouver
Island, Lord Atkinson referred to context as an important factor in interpreting statutes:
655 ".See P.-A. COTE, op. CIt., note 520, p. 307.
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In the construction of statutes their words must be interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense,
unless there is something in the context, or in the object of the statute in which they occur, or in
the circumstances with reference to which they are issued, to show that they were used in a special
sense different from their ordinary grammatical sense.656
In Lusher v. Lacroix,657 in limiting the scope of section 9 to l'essence meme of
bills and notes, Justice Martineau, remarked:
Pour arriver it declarer qu' en vertu de ce texte toutes les questions pouvant se rattacher it un titre
quelconque aux lettres de change et billets promissoires, on doit avoir recours it la loi commune
anglaise, il faut supposer que Ie parlement federal tout en desirant resoudre toutes les difficultes
qui soulevent generalement ces contrats, a prefere s'en remettre simplement it la loi anglaise pour
les regler plutot que Ie faire lui-meme...L'opinion que la loi commune anglaise s'applique
seulement dans les limites de I'acte federal me parait plus rationnelle [emphasis added].658
According to Justice Martineau, a rational legislature would not have intended
section 10 (now section 9) to apply English common law to every aspect of bills and
notes. In La Banque d'Hochelaga v. Leger,659 the court pronounced that section 10:
ne veut pas dire qu'il faut avoir recours it la loi anglaise pour decider la question de responsabilite
du defendeur comme endorsseur, quelque soit it ce sujet les lois de cette province, mais que Ie
droit anglais doit s'appliquer seulement it tout ce qui est de I'essence meme des lettres de change
et billets et des cheques....660
656 [1921] 2 A.C. 384, 387
657 (1914), 23 R.L. (N.S.) 212 (C.S.)
658 Id., p. 214-215.
659 (1918) 25 R.L. (N.S.) 158 (C. rev.)
660 Id., p. 160-161
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In a similar spirit, Crawford suggests that "[i]t appears necessary to limit the
operation of s. 10 to the law of bills, notes and cheques in the strict sense so that the
section may not have the effect of making the common law of England applicable to all
transactions or phases of transactions in which bills, notes or cheques are involved.,,661 In
Reisler v. Kulcsar,662 Justice Rivard adopted Perrault's position (cited, infra) to establish
that the civil code would govern the appellant's obligation. He stated:
In the absence of a formal provision, it is more logical and more legally acceptable to conclude
that Parliament wished its statute of 1890 to be amplified by the common law only where matters
of form, characteristics and particulars relating to these three types of instruments are concerned
leaving the common law of each Province to continue to govern other matters not covered by the
Federal statute (emphasis added).663
In a Supreme Court of Canada decision, Justice Newcombe declared, "It is true
that the rules of the common law of England, including the law merchant, apply to bills
of exchange and promissory notes because the Parliament of Canada, has, by the Bills of
Exchange Act, so declared in the existence of its exclusive legislative authority over that
subject; but the Dominion legislation does not and was not intended to affect a
subscriber's liability to implement his subscription, and as I understood the argument, no
contention to the contrary was submitted.,,664
661 B. eRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1217.
662 [1965] B.R. 334, 57 D.L.R. (2d) 730 (hereinafter cited to D.L.R.)
663 Id" 737. Rivard, J. translated the quote he excerpted from, A. PERRAULT, op. cit, note 155, p.173-174.
664 Re Ross, Hutchison v. Royal Institution for the Advancement ofLearning, supra, note 536, 699.
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This jurisprudence has demonstrated that judges have refused a literal reading of
section 9 in favour of what they believe to have been the true legislative intent. The
majority of doctrinal writers have done the same. The Honourable Justice MacLaren, in
describing section 10, stated:
This section would not introduce into the province of Quebec any part of the common law of
England to interfere with the civil law of that province in cognate matters within provincial
jurisdiction that may arise in connection with bills, notes or cheques; nor would it interfere with
the law of any province as to such matters.665
Similarly, Dean Falconbridge explains the scope of section 10 (now section 9) in
a more detailed manner:
The result would appear to be that, notwithstanding s. 10 of the Bills of Exchange Act which
purports to make the common law of England applicable to bills, notes and cheques, in cases not
expressly provided for by the statute itself, effect is given to this provision in Canada only within
the limits of what may be called the law of bills and notes in the strict sense, including of course
the form, issue, negotiation and discharge of bills or notes, but not including all the consequences
of, or all the rights and liabilities resulting from, the contracts entered into by parties to bills or
notes. Beyond these limits there is a field of law in which the rights and liabilities of parties to a
bill or note transaction may be governed by the law of a particular province in accordance with the
ordinary rules of the conflict of laws.666
665 John James MACLAREN, MacLaren 's bills. notes and cheques, 6th ed., Frederick READ, ed., Toronto,
Carswell, 1940, p.36. The key words in that statement is would not introduce. as opposed to could not. It is
thus an interpretive approach, not a constitutional argument.
666 John Delatre FALCONBRIDGE, Banking and Bills ofExchange, 7th ed., Toronto, Canada Law Book,
1969, p.435; B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1220.
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This passage (as it was found in previous editions of his Falconbridge's treatise)
has been cited with approval in Jean v. Banque Canadienne Nationale. 667 In deciding that
case, Justice Archambault maintained:
L'article lOde la loi des lettres de change, qui dit que les regles de la loi commune d'Angleterre
s'appliquent aux lettres de change, aux billet a ordre et aux cheques, ne veut pas dire qu'it faut
avoir recours a la loi anglaise pour decider toutes les questions de negociabitite, de liberation, de
novation, de compensation, de mandat. ..quelles que soient a ce sujet les loi provinciales, mais doit
s'entendre dans ce sens que la loi commune anglaise doit s'appliquer dans les limites de la loi
federale, c'est-a-dire, a tout ce qui est dans ('essence des lettres de change, des billets a ordre et
des cheques.668
Likewise, Justice Barclay, in Banque Canadienne Nationale v. Turcotte,669 in
discussing section 10, maintained that "[i]t has been said, and I think rightly said, that the
effect of this section is to introduce the common law of England into the different
Provinces only when the question is, properly speaking, one of bills of exchange, cheques
or promissory notes, but only within the limits of the law of bills and notes in a strict
sense, and that the common law of England is not to be applied to all problems connected
with bills of exchange or notes.,,670 Perrault expresses a slightly different view than Dean
Falconbridge. He stated:
En ('absence d'une disposition formelle, it est plus logique et plus juridique de conclure que Ie
parlement federal ne voulut completer sa loi de 1890 par la Common Law que relativement a la
667 (1930), 69 C.S. 66
668 !d., p. 69
669 [1942] B.R. 383
670 !d., p. 401-402
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fonne, aux caracteristiques et particularites de ces trois ecrits, laissant Ie droit commun de chaque
province continuer de regir les autres aspects non couverts par cette loi fed erale.671
According to Justice Barclay's treatise, the common law of England applies solely
when the issue concerns, "forme, les caracteristiques ou les particularites des letters de
change et billets,,672 which is to say, "les aspects qui donnent aces titres un caractere
particulier dans l'economie du droit.,,673 Falconbridge believes Perrault to mean that:
the question whether a document is a bill, cheque or note, or something else, is detennined by the
law of England, in the absence or incompleteness of provisions of the statute, but as regards the
juridical basis on which an instrument of credit rests and the definition of the rights and
obligations which the instrument connotes, including matters of capacity, consideration and
prescription, recourse must be had to provinciallaw.674
According to Falconbridge, Perrault's definition of what is included in the law of
bills and notes in a "strict sense" is narrow, and his tendencies are to apply provincial law
in cases of even the slightest uncertainty.675 Thus it can be said that Falconbridge and
Perrault agree in principle in a broad sense, but do not espouse the same position.
The difference can be illustrated by examining their positions on the defence of
non est factum, as they disagree over its effect in Quebec.676 In this case, Falconbridge
views non est factum as a real defence, part of bills and notes in a strict sense, subject
671 A. PERRAULT, op. cit., note 155, p. 174.
672 Id., p. 171.
673 ld., p. 180.
674 John Delatre FALCONBRIDGE, «The Bills of Exchange Act in Quebec», (1942) 20 Can. Bar Rev.
723,729. See also, A. PERRAULT, op. cit., note 155, p. 174-175.
675 J. D. FALCONBRIDGE, loc. cit., note 666, 729-730.
676 See B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1525.
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therefore to the common law of England as provided for in section 9 of the Act. Perrault,
however, maintains that non est factum is basically an error as to the nature of the
contract (a relative nullity in Quebec) and consequently no more than a defect of title
pursuant to the Act.677
Drawing the line between what is a matter of a bill or note in a strict sense or wide
sense is not always easy.678 In any case, we must keep in mind the following:
[I]n construing... statutes, and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the
words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or
inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of
the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther. 679
These words uttered by Lord Wensleydale in Grey v. Pearson became the
"Golden Rule" of interpretation. The "Golden Rule" essentially permits judges to depart
from the ordinary meaning of a word to preserve the coherence of the provision or law
and prevent absurdity. What emerges is that the incoherence of the provision forces an
alternative understanding of the words or expression employed. It is difficult to argue that
the wording of section 9 is in some way repugnant or inconsistent with the rest of the
Bills ofExchange Act, or indeed suggests anything other than the true legislative intent. 680
As LeDain suggests, "there is nothing on the face of section 10 to justify any restriction
or qualification.... ,,681
677 For a full discussion, see a.E. LEDAIN, lac. cit., note 507, 120-125.
678 See B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1220; a.E. LEDAIN, lac. cit., note 507, p. 120.
679 Grey v. Pearson, (1857) 6 H.L.C. 61,106; 10 E.R. 1216, 1234.
680 •• .P.-A. COTE, op. Cll., note 520, p. 308.
681 a.E. LEDAIN, lac. cit., note 507, p.118
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4.2.3 Historical Approach
Professor Pierre-Andre Cote, in describing the historical approach to
interpretation, explains, "[i]n order to interpret a legislative enactment, it is permissible
and even advisable to consider the historical context in which the law was adopted.,,682
This approach shares certain similarities with the "archaeological" approach, in which it
is said the role of judges is to unearth and enforce the original intent or expectations of
the legislature that created the statute.683 The historical approach was accepted by the
Supreme Court of Canada. Nesbitt stated:
The general rule which is applicable to the construction of all other documents is equally
applicable to statutes and the interpreter should so far put himself in the position of those whose
words he is interpreting as to be able to see what those words related to. He may call to his aid all
those external or historical facts which are necessary for this purpose and which led to the
enactment and for those he may consult contemporary or other authentic words and writings.684
Considering the historical context of the evolution of commercial law in Canada,
and its effect on provincial law, some judges have deemed it necessary that we refer
exclusively to the common law when interpreting the Bills ofExchange Act, especially in
682 A' •P.-A. COTE, op. Cit., note 520, p. 414.
683 See William ESKRIDGE, «Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for
Statutory Interpretation», 74 Va. L. Rev. 275, 275. Professor Eskridge attributes the archeological
metaphor to Professor T. Alexander Aleinikoff.
684 Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. James Bay Railway, (1905) 36 R.C.S. 42, 89-90.
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light of section 9. As Justice Demers stated in Cote v. Brunelle,685 "La jurisprudence en
Angleterre n'est done pas douteuse et notre loi etant basee sur la loi anglaise, nous
devons suivre la jurisprudence anglaise.,,686 There is clearly a common law tenor to the
Bills ofExchange Act, being as it was, of English inspiration.687 It was paradigmatic of
legislation described by Brierley and Macdonald, when they stated, " .. .legislation
enacted in the simple exercise of federal jurisdiction was often grounded in Common law
theoretical assumptions, drafted in a manner of a Common law statute, and subsequently
interpreted in accordance with those assumptions.,,688 There have been judges and authors
that have felt that due to its historical development, the legislative intent of section 9 (or
section 10, as it was) was to apply common law to matters pertaining to bills of exchange,
in part to harmonize this area of law across the country and, consequently, that common
law should apply. 689
An expression of this can be discerned in Guy v. Pare, 690 wherein Justice
Davidson rendered an important decision, albeit in dissent. He stated:
The rules of the common law of England, including the Law Merchant, save in so far as they are
inconsistent with the express provisions of the said Act, as hereby amended, shall apply, and shall
be taken and held to have applied from the date on which the said Act came into force, to bills of
exchange, promissory notes and cheques [54-55 Vic., chap 17, s. 8]. This I believe, to be simply a
re-expression of the intent of 12 Viet., the Consolidated Statutes of Quebec, and in a more
emphatic sense of the Civil Code. It was the intention of the legislators to have a common system
685 (1916) 51 C.S. 35.
686 Id., p. 37
687 J. LECLAIR, lac. cit., note 32, p. 703.
688 John E.C. BRIERLY and Roderick Alexander MACDONALD, Quebec Civil Law: An Introduction to
Quebec Private Law, Toronto, Emond Montgomery, 1993, p. 646. See also R. JUKIER and R.A.
MACDONALD, lac. cit., note 206, p. 396.
689 J.D. FALCONBRIDGE, op. cit., note 537, p. 425.
690 (1892) I C.S. 443 (C. rev.)
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run throughout these provinces in relation to negotiable instruments which were being incessantly
interchanged between them.691
What Justice Davidson did is fairly "common practice." We may " ... refer to the
text that an enactment has replaced, repealed or amended, or to the statute that served as
its inspiration, and in this way study what might be called its legal pedigree. This
approach is legitimate to the extent that the prior legislation is part of the context of
enactment, and therefore makes its true meaning more accessible.,,692
If this "unity of legislative purpose" is the animating spirit of the Act, then it is
clear that section 10 (now section 9) would import common law to all matters concerning
bills and notes in Quebec. The examination of previous enactments is consistent with the
historical approach, which can help demonstrate legislative intention.693 We find this idea
expressed in Entreprises Loyola Schmidt Ltee. v. Choletti94 as well. Justice Pare was
unambiguous in discussing the difficulties raised by two linguistic versions of the Act
with respect to section 179. He rationalized that the English (common law) version of the
Act should take precedence, because, "D'autre part, sans meme qu'il soit necessaire de se
servir de cet article 10, l'historique de la Loi sur les lettres de change indique de toute
evidence, par les sources dont elle s'inspire, les bases pertinentes a la definition de ses
termes.,,695 If the other provisions of the Act are permeated with the legislation's common
law history, it is clear that section 10 (now section 9) can mean nothing else than
common law was intended to apply to all matters of bills and notes.
691 [d., p. 451. 54-55 Vic., chap. 17, s. 8, was the precursor of.s. 10, and the current s. 9 of the Bills of
Exchange Act.
692 P.-A. COTE, op. cit., note 520, p. 419.
693 See the decision of Pigeon, J. in Gravel v. City ofSt-Leonard, [1978] I R.C.S. 660, 667.
694 Entreprises Loyola Schmidt v. Cholette, supra, note 529.
695 [d., p. 560-561.
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In brief, the historical approach exposes its "purposivist" foundation, in that it
reveals that the purpose of legislation was to synchronize the law of all the provinces
with respect to bills and notes, and thus common law should be applied in all situations.
Jean Leclair suggests a different argument based on section 97(2) of the English Bills of
Exchange Act (1882), the English statute that served as the model for the Canadian Bills
of Exchange Act. In fact, as we have mentioned, the Canadian version is virtually a
replica of its English predecessor. Leclair's approach is in line with the historical
approach which permits us to look "to the statute that served as its inspiration" to
determine its true meaning. The provision reads:
97(2) The rules of the common law of England, including the law merchant, save in so far as they
are inconsistent with the specific provisions of this Act, shall continue to apply to bills of
exchange, promissory notes and cheques.
Leclair fmds it curious that the English Bills ofExchange Act (1882) would have
stated that the common law "shall continue to apply" to matters of bills and notes.
Indeed, England is a unitary state with Common law as the jus commune. Legislation is
generally viewed as an exception to the common law, and thus it is evident common law
would have continued to apply even without the express mention in section 97(2). Leclair
suggests, therefore, that the English Bills ofExchange Act (1882) did not seek to codify
the entire common law susceptible of applying to bills and notes, but only the branch of
law that constitutes bills of exchange.
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He thus explains:
L'expression «shall continue to apply» faisait, de toute evidence, reference a ce droit anterieur a la
codification. Quant aux tennes «save in so far as they are inconsistent with the express provisions
of this Act,» i1s temoignent de la nature toute speciale de la common law visee par Ie legislateur.
Puisque la loi en question codifie uniquement cette portion particuliere de la common law
constituee par Ie droit des effets de commerce, ce ne peut ~tre, selon nous, qu'a ces regles que font
reference les mots precites. En analysant la jurisprudence, nous verrons que Ie paragraphe 97(2)
autorise Ie renvoi aux regles de common law relatives au droit des effets de commerce au sens
strict.. .. Selon nous, iI devrait en aller de m~me de I'article 9 de la Loi sur les lettres de change.696
Leclair suggests that looking to section 97(2) of the English Bills ofExchange Act
(1882) helps us understand that section 9 was never intended to apply to anything other
than bills and notes in a strict sense. On the other hand, although Canadian parliament
adopted a virtual replica of the British Act, it may have had a different legislative intent in
enacting the legislation. This proposition gains greater weight when we consider the fact
that section 10 (now section 9) was omitted from the Canadian Bills ofExchange Act of
1890 and restored by the amending statute in 1891.697 Furthermore, legislation by
reference, such as section 9, is problematic because "[s]uch provisions may be partially
incompatible with those of the statute containing the reference. They may require
adaptation in order to apply appropriately to the new context. If the legislator does not
provide for modifications as circumstances dictate, the courts may refuse to undertake
such changes and, therefore, deny implementation of the incorporated enactments.,,698
696 J. LECLAIR, lac. cit., note 32, p. 745.
697 See J.D. FALCONBRIDGE, op. cit., note 537, p. 427.
698 ,. •P.-A. COTE, op. cit., note 520, p. 75-76
254
Leclair's suggestion is interesting but if the intent of the English Bills of
Exchange Act (1882) was to preserve only the portion of common law relating to
negotiable instruments, it would have made more sense for section 97(2) to read: "In all
matters relating to bills of exchange, promissory notes and cheques not provided for in
this Act, recourse must be had to the rules of the common law of England, including the
law merchant." In fact, this would be similar to article 2340 of the Civil Code of Lower
Canada respecting bills of exchange, which is als9 a codification that provides for any
lacunae that might occur. In fact, the wording of the provision is curious because it is
effectively saying that common law will govern bills, notes and cheques; it will not apply
only if there is an express provision in the Act that it is inconsistent with. Thus, on this
reading, one may well conclude that section 9 aims to preserve the law of bills and notes
in a wide sense. Moreover, recall that Justice Locke pointed out that "The Act, while
intended as a code, did not exhaustively deal with all of the rights given to persons
desiring to contract in this manner or to the holders of these instruments under that
branch of the common law referred to as the law merchant. These rights were reserved by
s. 97(2) and are reserved to the holders of such instruments by s. 10.,,699
699 Duplain v. Cameron, [1961] R.C.S. 693 at 707, 30 D.L.R. (2nd) 348, Locke, J. dissenting.
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4.2.4 Constitutional Approach
The constitutional approach is not really an independent method of interpretation,
but rather a part of the systematic and logical method. Whereas the contextual approach
sought to determine parliament's true intention (what parliament wished to do by
enacting section 9), the constitutional approach seeks to determine what parliament can
do, that is, the true scope of its constitutional power to legislate on bills and notes. It is
these constitutional constraints imposed by the division of power among legislative
bodies, federal and provincial, that shape the interpretation given to section 9, rather than
parliament's intention.
However, unlike other forms of external evidence of legislative intent,
constitutional considerations are sufficient to justify a departure from the plain meaning
even for some textualists. Justice Lamer affirmed a "plain meaning" approach to statutory
interpretation, but went on to say that:
The presumption that a statute's literal meaning, as construed in the context of the statute as a
whole, best reflects legislative intention is valid in ordinary circumstances. However, the
presumption is not irrebuttable. In cases where special circumstances exist, these circumstances
can lead a court to conclude that a statutory provision's apparent literal meaning does not, in fact,
provide an accurate reflection of the legislature's intentions, and that an alternative understanding
of the words in the statute would be more appropriate, provided that the words of the statute
reasonably bear such an alternative interpretation. One situation where such special circumstances
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can occur is in cases where a statutory provision would be unconstitutional if it were to be
interpreted literally. In such cases, the presumption that the legislature intended that effect to be
given to the plain meaning of its enactments can be countered by the competing presumption that
the legislature ordinarily does not intend to violate the constitution. If the words in the statutory
provision at issue reasonably bear an interpretation other than a literal reading, this second
presumption will justify rejecting the literal interpretation in favour of the non-literal reading,
when the former (but not the latter) interpretation would render the legislation unconstitutional.700
According to G. V. V. Nicholls, the proper interpretation of section 10 (now
section 9) is, in the final analysis, a constitutional question. He stated:
In Canada, in Quebec, section 10 of the Bills of Exchange Act cannot be taken too literally. It
cannot accurately be said that the rules of the common law of England always "apply" to all
situations in which bills of exchange are involved, except to the extent that they are inconsistent
with the express provisions of the Act. To begin with, the section in that broad sense is almost
certainly ultra vires the Dominion. It is true that by section 91-18 of the British North America
Act the Dominion has exclusive authority to legislate on bills of exchange and promissory notes.
And it is also true that the Dominion might by legislation that was ancillary to, or necessarily
incidental to its right to legislate on bills of exchange and promissory notes interfere with the right
granted to the provinces by section 92-13 of the British North America Act to make laws in
relation to property and civil rights in the provinces. But to grant the Dominion that power is far
from saying that it has the right to provide that the rules of the common law of England shall apply
in Quebec, for instance, to all situations in which a bill of exchange is involved, however
remotely.701
700 Per Lamer, C.J. in Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd. [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031, 1050-1051
701 G. V.V. NICHOLLS, lac. cit., note 266, p. 396, 397-398.
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In a subsequent article, Nicholls explained:
The possible conflict between the exclusive authority of the Dominion granted by section 91 (18)
of the British North America Act, to legislate on bills of exchange and promissory notes, and the
right of the provinces under section 92( 13) to make laws in relation to property and civil rights in
the provinces, has led the jurisprudence to a distinction. It is said that the effect of section lOis to
introduce the common law of England into the different provinces only where the question is
properly speaking one of bills of exchange, cheques or promissory notes, only within the law of
bills and notes in a strict sense.702
At first glance, Nicholls could be said to be advancing an interpretive approach,
similar to Falconbridge's own position, and this appears to be Perrault's view of what
Nicholls has done. 703 Falconbridge, however, is keen to point out that in fact Nicholls
does not subscribe to this distinction as set out in the jurisprudence, but rather is
summarizing it.704 In support, he quotes the passage in Nicholls' article that follows the
above-mentioned statement. Nicholls continued, "It is suggested that this distinction,
correct perhaps so far as it goes, is not particularly helpful and may actually be
misleading.,,705 Thus, Nicholls could not be said to adopt the position attributed to him.
Nevertheless, although it is not Nicholls own position, it is not without support. A
number of writers have adopted the distinction proposed by Falconbridge, namely, that
the common law of England, by virtue of section 9, applies only to matters of bills and
702 George V.V. NICHOLLS, «The Bills of Exchange Act and Novation in the Province of Quebec»,
(1938) 16 Can. Bar Rev. 602,603
703 See A. PERRAULT, op. cit., note 155, p. 177.
704 J. D. FALCONBRIDGE, loco cit., note 537, p. 728.
705 G.V.V. NICHOLLS, loco cit., note 702, p. 603
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notes in a strict sense. However, these writers consider the impact of the Constitution Act,
1867 in limiting the scope of section 9.
Professor Geva, for example, maintains that the expression "matters coming
within bills and notes" is broad enough to cover the entire law of bills and notes, in its
wide as well as strict sense. On the other hand, because the dual nature of bills and notes
means that it may be subject to the general law of property and obligations, he finds that
provincial law could apply, but is defeated by federal paramountcy. That is, provincial
law respecting bills and notes in a wide sense, is clearly valid, being intra vires the
powers of the provinces by virtue of section 92(13). However, provincial laws are
rendered inoperative on the basis of federal paramountcy, by virtue of section 10 (now
section 9), which creates a conflicting federallaw. 706 However, because Geva adheres to
Falconbridge's position that section 9 is limited to bills and notes in a strict sense, the
common law is only paramount over provincial law in matters of bills and notes in a strict
sense.707
Authors in Quebec have espoused a similar view. With respect to the idea that
section 9 (section 10, as it was then) is limited to bills and notes in a strict sense,
Maximillien Caron states:
Si une telle interpretation doit prevaloir, c'est qu'elle est plus ou moins inseparable du probleme
d'ordre constitutionnel. On doit presumer, en effet, que Ie Parlement federal, en adoptant l'article
10, a voulu se limiter aux seules questions qui se rattachent essentiellement au droit des lettres de
change.708
706 See Benjamin GEVA, «Preservation of Consumer Defences: Statutes and Jurisdiction», (1982) 32
U. T.L.J 176,200 and B. GEVA, op. cit., note 153, p. 256.
707 See J. D. FALCONBRIDGE, op. cit., note 537, p. 456-467.
708 See also M. CARON, op. cit., note 155, p. 15
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This perspective can be discerned in the judgement of Mercier in Boyer v.
Sambeau. 709 He stated:
...quand on considere que la question qui se souleve en cette affaire se presente dans une cause
qui releve d'une loi edictee par Ie parlement federal, comportant des dispositions speciales quant a
tout ce qui peut concemer, la solution en est moins facile, en egard au conflit existant, «au point de
vue de la loi de la preuve», entre une loi provinciale generale et une loi federale speciale se
rapportant a un sujet sur lequel, en vertu de I'acte de l'Amerique britannique de Nord de 1867 et
ses amendments, Ie parlement federal a une jurisdiction exclusive de celie des legislatures
provinciales .... Considerant que I'art. 10, ch. 119 S. rev. [1906], constituant la <<Ioi des lettres de
change, cheques et billets a ordre»...elimine consequement I'application de notre droit civil en
pareille matiere, pour y substituer I'application dil droit commun d'Angleterre et du droit
commercial anglais, et ce sans distinguer, aussi bien au point de vue des lois de la preuve qu'a tout
autre point de vue.710
Falconbridge's view has been subject to a different interpretation by Gertrude
Wasserman. She claimed the distinction drawn by Falconbridge between bills and notes
in a strict sense and wide sense is one based on the difference between substance and
procedure. According to her:
Section 10 makes no reference to procedure. In the matter of civil (as distinguished from criminal)
law, procedure is assigned exclusively to the provinces under head 14 of section 92 of the British
North America Act. It follows logically that section 10 of the Bills ofExchange Act has reference
709 (1919) 57 C.S. 79
710 Id., p. 81-82
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only to the form and negotiability of a commercial instrument, such as a cheque or promissory
note. This is in substance the view of Fa!conbridge."711
Putting aside the question of whether this view can truly be imputed to
Falconbridge, Wasserman's proposal is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly,
determining what is a procedural matter and what is substantive is not an easy task. There
are problems inherent in distinguishing procedure from substance. It has been suggested
that the line between "substance" and "procedure" does not exist in a vacuum, but rather
must be drawn to better carry out the underlying purpose of making the distinction.712
The "substance-procedure" dichotomy is a function of the purpose of the context in
which the characterization is made. Thus, any given rule or law may be "procedural" in
one context yet "substantive" in another. 713 On this issue, the Supreme Court of
Canada714 has cited Walter Wheeler Cook, who commented, "[i]f we admit that the
'substantive' shades off by imperceptible degrees into the 'procedural', and that the 'line'
between them does not 'exist', to be discovered merely by logic and analysis, but is
rather to be drawn so as best to carry out our purpose.... ,,715
Moreover, it is not clear if what Wasserman had in mind as "procedural" would
be characterized as such today. In T%fton v. Jensen; Lucas (Litigation Guardian oj) v.
Gagnon,716 the Supreme Court of Canada decided that limitation periods ought to be
characterized as substantive law, despite the fact that the common law has always
7ll Gertrude WASSERMAN, «The Bills of Exchange Act: its application in the Province of Quebec»,
(1967) 27 R. du B. 653, 661.
712 See Walter Wheeler COOK, « "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws», (1933) 42 Yale
L.J. 333. , 343, 352, 356
713 See Sun Oil v. Wortman, (1988) 486 U.S. 717 at 727
714 Tolofton v. Jensen; Lucas (Litigation Guardian oj) v. Gagnon [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022, 1068.
715 The excerpt was from Cook's book, The Logical and Legal Bases ofthe Conflict ofLaws, (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1942), p. 166
716 [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022
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considered limitation periods as procedural rules. There is no reason to believe that this
type of re-characterization is limited to limitation periods, or to matters of private
internationallaw.717
In any case, the above-mentioned approaches were questioned by Gerald LeDain,
in an article written before he joined the Supreme Court of Canada:
Technically, the question is one of statutory interpretation, but in searching for that will-o-the-
wisp "the intention of the legislature" and making what is in the final analysis a decision of policy,
one is naturally influenced by the current distinctions of constitutional law. Did Parliament in
enacting section 10 intend to cover only those matters not covered by express provision in the Act
which fall within its exclusive legislative jurisdiction or did it intend as well to occupy the
occupiable field? As far as this reviewer is aware, the courts have not formulated any rule of
interpretation to deal with this problem. There is presumably no reason in principle why the
occupiable field should not be occupied in wholesale fashion - and there is nothing on the face of
section 10 to justify any restriction or qualification - but as a matter of policy.718
LeDain understood that the Constitution alone cannot resolve the issue of the
scope of section 10 (now section 9). The constitutional division of powers would permit
the federal government to legislate in the occupiable field; if section 9 is to bear a
restricted application, it is not compelled by the constitution. Nothing in the Bills of
Exchange Act or the constitution purports to limit the applicability of section 9 to matters
717 With respect to determining issues of legislative competence, with matters of bills and notes for
example, there is the possibility of the re-characterization of what was traditionally conceived of as
substantive and procedural. Recall, that the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the purpose of the
substance/procedure dichotomy in the context of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, was to delimit spheres of
state legislative competence. See Sun Oil v. Wortman, (1988) 486 U.S. 717 at 727.
718 a.E. LEDAIN, loco cit., note 507, 118.
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of bills and notes in a strict sense. Bohemier and Richard agree with LeDain. According
to them:
.. .la veritable question n'est pas d'ordre constitutionnel mais qu'elle en est plutot une
d'interpretation. On ne peut, nous semble-t-il, douter reellement du pouvoir du parlement federal
de legiferer sur I'etendue des obligations des personnes qui participent a la creation et a la
circulation des effets de commerce. Cela parait peu discutable.719
In other words, from a constitutional perspective, as long as the dominant feature
(the "pith and substance" of the federal legislation in question), falls within the
enumerated heads ofpower in section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the fact that it has
an incidental effect on the legislative sphere of provincial governments is irrelevant for
constitutional purposes. Thus, for example in Bank of Toronto v. Lambe (1887),720 the
Privy Council upheld a provincial law imposing tax on banks, as validly enacted
legislation under section 92(2) even though it affected banking, which falls within federal
jurisdiction under section 91(15).721 Apparently, the government can create whatever
rules it wishes to "apply to bills, notes and cheques" even though it will affect the
provincial domain of "property and civil rights" in section 92(13). As Professor Hogg
points out, "[i]t is important to recognize that this "pith and substance" doctrine enables
one level of government to enact laws with substantial impact on matters outside its
jurisdiction" [emphasis added]. 722 Indeed, Geva admits that it is unlikely the Constitution
719 • .A. BOHEMIER and L.-H. RICHARD, loc. Cit., note 538, 160.
720 (1887) 12 App. Cas. 575
721 See Peter HOGG, Constitutional Law o/Canada, Toronto, Carswell, 1997, n' 15.5(a), p. 360.
722 Id.
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Act of 1867 (BNA Act) purported to deprive the Parliament of Canada of the power to
legislate in relation to the property and the obligatory elements of the instrument."m
The sole constitutional limitation is that the law must be enacted within
competence of the enacting legislature. Thus, Nicholls is correct in asserting that granting
the federal government the power to legislate in matters of bills and notes does not mean
"it has the right to provide that the rules of the common law of England shall apply in
Quebec, for instance, to all situations in which a bill of exchange is involved, however
remotely.,,724 Indeed, if the legislation is characterized as being in relation to something
outside the federal government's legislative domain, it will be found as ultra vires.
However, the law of bills and notes in a wide sense is not necessarily "remote."
There is nothing to suggest that what is part of bills and notes in a wide sense (such as
prescription or procedure) cannot fall within federal legislative competence over bills of
exchange and promissory notes. It appears that this is what LeDain means when he refers
to the legislator "occupying the occupiable field.'ms The strict/wide dichotomy
corresponds to the dual nature of bills and notes (strict corresponding to the negotiable
instrument aspect, wide referring to the contractual and property aspects), not what is
essential in its operation. That which is part of bills and notes in a wide sense is no less an
"integral element" of bills of exchange and promissory notes than those in a strict l>ense,
it simply relates to a different aspect of the bill or note.
In summary, laws relating to bills and notes that are too remote and will not fall
within the power of section 91(18) granted to the federal Parliament 91(18), that is, they
723 B. GEVA, loco cit., note 706, p. 198
724 G.V.V. NICHOLLS, loco cit., note 260, p. 397-398
72S G.E. LEDAIN, loco cit., note 507, p. 118.
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will fall outside the occupiable field. As a result, such legislation will be unconstitutional.
However, it is not unconstitutional simply because it infringes on the provinces'
legislative domain. Thus, a provision regarding liability of the parties, prescription,
procedure, and evidence, would appear to be intra vires parliament. The question
becomes, therefore, how do we know what falls within the occupiable field? Nicholls
stated:
... [n]o a priori rule can be given for the proper interpretation of section 10 of the Bills of
Exchange Act. All that can be done is to examine the civil law in its possible applications to bills
of exchange, cheques and promissory notes, to weigh the propriety of applying the civil law or the
common law in each instance, and to evolve from that examination a series of particularized rules-
of-thumb to cover the most common situations that might arise.726
LeDain called this the "safest statement" ever made about section 10.727 Like
Nicholls, LeDain eschews a universal test. At the end of the day, when a question arises
regarding whether an aspect of bills and notes is governed by the common law by virtue
of section 10, we must undertake a constitutional analysis to characterize the law in
question. "What are the criteria of importance that will control or at least guide this
crucial choice? .. .in the hardest cases the choice is not compelled by either the nature of
the statute or the prior judicial decisions. The choice is inevitably one of policy.',72S It
would seem that Professor LeDain best described the constitutional approach to bills and
notes as essentially one of policy:
726 G.V.V. NICHOLLS, lac. cit., note 702, p. 603.
727 G.E. LEDAIN, lac. cit., note 507, p. 120.
72S P. HOGG, op. cit., note 721, n° 15.5(g), p. 372.
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...there is nothing on the face of section 10 to justify any restriction or qualification - but as matter
ofpolicy, in view of the obvious impropriety of introducing a whole body of English common law
in this way into a provincial legal system, particularly the civil law system of Quebec, without a
careful consideration of the detailed implications, it is probably reasonable to hold as most of the
cases and commentators have in effect done, that this cannot be presumed to have been the
intention of Parliament. This interpretation is not open variance with the language of section 10; it
merely gives it a restricted application. Parliament may have in fact thought that it was providing a
uniform system of law to cover every aspect of bills· and notes but there are practical limits to the
extent to which this can be carried out in a bi-Iegal country. So long as we frankly acknowledge
that this is ultimately a decision of policy and do not try to dress it up in a pseudo-legal
proposition, we avoid argument at cross-purposes. [emphasis added]729
According to Hogg, the policy choice must be guided by the principle of
federalism. 73o Simeon has suggested community, efficiency and democracy as the criteria
of choice in a federal system731 but although they are the subject of much disagreement
and controversy. In a later article, LeDain discussed some important criteria:
It is sufficient here to stress the continuing importance in Canada, under any foreseeable
circumstances of constitutional or political accommodation, of comparative legal method at the
judicial as well as the legislative level, in the interests of a workable jurisprudence adapted to
economic realities in the field of commercial law. The necessity of achieving a working
relationship and indeed as large a measure of uniformity of result as possible, between the civil
law and common law in the commercial field is not a problem peculiar to Canada.... In this larger
729 G.E. LEDAIN, loco cit., note 507, p. 118-19
730 P. HOGG, op. cit., note 721, n° 15.5(g), p. 372
731 See Richard E.B. SIMEON, «Criteria of Choice in Federal Systems», (1983) 8 Queen's L.1. 131.
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context, Quebec has an important stake in the maintenance and development of a legal system that
is as commercially serviceable as any other.732
Hogg suggests that "[t]his distinction must be drawn in the light of the operational
realities of legislative regulation in a particular field, and these are most likely to be
perceived by judges familiar, through daily experience, with the effects of legislation and
the practical issues which arise in the various areas of law."m This distinction must be
based on what would be a "sound result" in the particular field of federal law, having
regard to the commercial expediency of as much uniformity of result as possible.734
Because the constitution permits that the federal competence in matters of bills of
exchange may extend to rules, which ordinarily fall within the provincial legislative
domain (such as the rules on prescription, capacity, etc.), we are left evaluating the
propriety of giving an extended scope to section 9, issue by issue. In brief, the
constitution offers no indication as to how far the federal government intends its
legislation to extend into and to affect the provincial government's sphere of legislative
power. The Constitution cannot tell us which aspects of a bill or note are governed by
federal legislation (i.e., the BEA) and which aspects remain in the provincial domain (i.e.,
the common law of Canada and the Quebec Civil Code). This is left for jurists to
determine on the basis of policy considerations.
Professor Leclair has most recently made a statement on the constitutional issue.
He seeks to re-establish a firm constitutional basis for interpreting section 9. He wants to
show that the approach taken by many eminent jurists and judges is "juste et raisonnable"
732 Gerald Eric LEDAIN, «Concerning the Proposed Constitutional and Civil Law Specialization at the
Supreme Court Level», (1967) 2 R.J.T. 107,115
733 [d., p.11 0
734Id.
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from a constitutional perspective,735 and reassert "un fondement constitutionnel a
l'interpretation restrictive donnee jusqu'ici par les tribunaux a l'article 9 de la Loi sur les
lettl'es de change.,,736 After examining the current state of the law, the various problems
that exist, and the interpretive approaches adopted until now, Leclair turns his attention
the constitutional matter. He aims to demonstrate that the provincial law regarding
prescription of negotiable instruments is constitutional. In his words, "[t]outefois, nous
verrons maintenant que rien n'empeche l'application des delais de prescription
provinciaux d'application generale, et ce, parce que la prescription ne fait pas partie du
«droit des lettres de change au sens striCt.,,737
It is unclear why Leclair devotes considerable emphasis to demonstrating
provincial law could apply to bills of exchange and promissory notes, It seems to be
uncontested. He attributes to LeDain the view that provincial law on prescription of
negotiable instruments is unconstitutional because it falls within exclusive federal
jurisdiction under section 91(18).738 However, it is unclear upon what basis he makes this
assertion. After all, LeDain clearly states:
It appears reasonable to take the view that the exclusive federal jurisdiction over bills and notes
covers the law of bills and notes in a strict sense.. .If any matters affecting bills and notes fall to be
regulated by provincial law it is clearly not in virtue of section 10, which in its terms, far from
mentioning provincial law, makes a sweeping reference to the English common law, but because
735 See J. LECLAIR, loco cit., note 32, p. 710.
736 Id, p. 711.
737 /d, p. 724.
738 Id, p.7ll and 737.
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provincial law on these matters is valid in virtue of section 92 of the BNA Act [emphasis
added].739
These provincial provisions may be rendered inoperative, on the basis of federal
paramountcy, but that is hardly saying they are unconstitutional. In any case, according to
Leclair, the problem as to the scope of section 9 depends on the constitutional limits on
the power of one legislature to encroach on the domain of the other legislature, by
exercising its accessory power (which permits an incidental effect on the legislative
sphere of the other legislature).740 After all, LeDain believes this ability to intrude on the
legislative sphere helps defme the occupiable field.
This issue is based on the case of General Motors ofCanada Ltd. v. City National
Leasing741 where the question of encroachment was a central issue. The court set out that
once a provision is shown prima facie to intrude on provincial powers, the question
becomes to what extent does it intrude? The degree of intrusion is necessary to determine
its possible justification.742 In determining whether a provision can be justified
constitutionally by reason of its connection to valid legislation, Justice Dickson stated
that we must first determine what test of "fit" is appropriate. By this he meant "how well
the provision is integrated into the scheme and how important it is for the efficacy of the
legislation.,,743 Justice Dickson, listed a number of tests cited in the jurisprudence,744 but
concluded that the test of encroachment varies with the serious of the encroachment.
Thus for example, "[fjor minor encroachments, the rational connection test is appropriate.
739 a.E. LEDAIN, loe. cit., note 507, p. 118
740 See J. LECLAIR, loe. cit., note 32, p. 737.
741 [1989] 1 R.C.S. 641, 58 D.L.R. (4th) 255 [hereinafter cited to S.C.R.]
742 See General Motors o/Canada Ltd. V. City National Leasing, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641,667.
743 !d., p. 668
744 Id., p. 670-671
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For major encroachments, a stricter test (such as 'truly necessary' or 'essential') is
. ,,745
appropnate.
In assessing the seriousness of the encroachment, Justice Dickson lists three
criteria that should be considered in this case, namely; (1) the provision in question was
remedial, which by its nature is less intrusive, (2) the provision provided for a limited
scope of action; its application limited to the Act and (3) the federal government was not
precluded from creating rights of action where warranted. 746 He found that the provision
in question intruded in a limited manner, and thus a strict test, such as "truly necessary"
or "integral," was not appropriate. 747
On the basis of the principles established by this case, Leclair examines the scope
of section 9. He questions whether an intrusion as important as the one effected in section
9 is constitutionally valid. Firstly, he acknowledges that the power of parliament to
intrude on the provincial domain is great. It seems to him that section 9 could support a
generous interpretation, but that it lacks the clarity and precision required to justify a
large intrusion into the provincial domain.748 However, Leclair concludes that the
arguments he makes are not conclusive as to whether the restricted meaning given to
section 9 is the correct one. This, he determined, depends on the motives a person
ascribes to parliament. According to him, "[c]es motifs nous amenent a penser que
l'adoption de cette disposition de renvoi ne represente pas l'exercice par Ie Parlement
745 P. HOGG, op. cit., note 721, n° 15.9(c), p. 392.
746 See General Motors ofCanada Ltd. v. City National Leasing, supra, note 711, p. 672-673.
747 Id., p. 683.
748 See lac. cit., note 32, p. 742.
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federal d'un pouvoir accessoire qui avait pour objet de regir la presque totalite des
facettes contractuelles d'un effet de commerce.,,749
Despite the constitutional arguments and the supporting line of reasoning, Leclair
effectively suggests it comes down to a matter of interpreting legislative intent. It seems
that where Leclair and LeDain differ is on the following point. For LeDain, the focus is
purely one of statutory interpretation. In his view, the constitution neither aids nor
hinders the quest to determine legislative intent. Leclair on the other hand, focuses on the
fact that section 9 entails an encroachment into the provincial legislative sphere.
Accordingly, policy alone would not justify occupying the occupiable field; rather, we
must utilize the criteria set out in the jurisprudence to determine the extent of the
encroachment. As this inquiry essentially involves interpreting the constitution, the
interpretation of the scope of section 9 takes on a constitutional dimension.
It should be pointed out that despite the validity of Leclair's argument, there are
issues of concern which should be noted. Firstly, the General Motors decision, upon
which Leclair bases his reasoning, has been the subject of a serious critique. In the words
of Professor Hogg:
The General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing judgement is a valiant attempt to
give coherence to the inconsistent approaches of the Court. With respect, however, it is not
satisfactory. Ifa provision is a rational, fitnctional part ofafederal legislative scheme, why should
it be regarded as 'encroaching' or 'intruding' on provincial powers? Indeed, it may be doubted
whether the provincial Legislatures would have been competent to enact the civil remedy
provision that was under attack, since its purpose was to improve the enforcement of a federal law.
The idea ofencroachment or intrusion, however appealing in common sense, does not stand up to
749 J. LECLAIR, loco cit., note 32, p. 743.
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analysis. If I am wrong on this, there still remain serious difficulties. How is the encroachment or
intrusion, once found to be measured? And, once measured, how is the unique test for validity to
be formulated for that particular encroachment or intrusion? In my view, the General Motors
approach makes the answer to a simple question too complicated, too discretionary, and therefore
too unpredictable [emphasis added).750
Caution must be exercised in classifying provisions as encroaching on the
provincial legislative domain. In other words, with respect to BAs, a provision that does
not deal exclusively with bills and notes in a strict sense (that is, it deals with bills and
notes in a wide sense) should not necessarily be said to be encroaching or intruding into
provincial legislative sphere, because it may be a "rational, functional part of a federal
legislative scheme." Secondly, accepting Hogg's alternative argument, we must contest
the seriousness of the intrusion on the provincial legislative sphere.
Leclair asks:
Un empietement aussi important pourrait-i1 etre considere comme etant constitutionnel? De prime
abord, on peut affirmer qu'un debordement legislatif de cette nature serait manifestement grave, ce
qui entraine des lors l'impossibilite de recourir Ii la theorie de l'aspect. En effet, l'introduction
massive du droit commun prive anglais en matiere de capacite de contracter, de consentement, de
responsabilite des parties Ii un effet de commerce et de cause pouvant en fonder la licMe
constituerait tres certainement une atteinte majeure aux pouvoirs des provinces en matiere de
propriete et droits civils. 751
750 P. HOGG, op. cit., note 721, n° 15.9(c), p. 393.
7511. LECLAIR, lac. cit., note 32, p. 740.
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At ftrst glance, section 9 appears to be a major encroachment on provincial
powers, as Leclair suggests. However, upon closer analysis, it is not clear that this is the
case. The question of intrusion is a qualitative question, not a quantitative one. By this we
mean that a given piece of legislation may have a number of provisions that "encroach"
to some extent, but the totality of these slight intrusions do not constitute a "massive
intrusion" into the provincial legislative domain.
Given this, consider ftrstly that issues of capacity to contract and consideration
are not properly speaking section 9 issues, as mentioned above, because they are dealt
with in other provisions of the Act. Secondly, insofar as prescription, procedure and
evidence are concerned, it is clear that the intrusion into the provincial sphere, if any, is
limited to prescription, procedure and evidence of bills and notes. Indeed, in assessing the
seriousness of encroachment in General Motors, Dickson determined that the limited
scope of action was an important factor. 752 He noted that the section in question did not
create a general action for damages, and was therefore a limited encroachment intra vires
parliament. Likewise, it is obvious that parliament did not intend to legislate on
prescription, procedure and evidence generally, but only as they relate to bills, notes and
cheques. Granted, section 31.1 of the Combines Investigation Act at issue in the General
Motors case was clearly circumscribed to the Act itself, whereas section 9 is very broad.
However, although section 9 is drafted in sweeping terms, it is not very speciftc. It does
not clearly intrude on any given aspect of exclusive provincial jurisdiction. It does not
purport to alter the law of a matter falling within provincial legislative competence.
Furthermore, we must remember the presumption of constitutionality. In the words of
Hogg:
752 See General Motors ofCanada Ltd. v. City National Leasing, supra, note 711, 672-673.
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[t]he "reading down" doctrine requires that whenever possible, a statute is to be interpreted as
being within the power of the enacting legislative body. What this means in practice is that general
language in a statute which is literally apt to extend beyond the power of the enacting Parliament
or Legislature will be construed more narrowly so as to keep it within the permissible scope of
power.753
Indeed, in Duplain v. Cameron,754 Cartwright stated, "[T]he rule is well settled
that, if the words used permit, the statute must be construed in accordance with the
presumption which imputes to the legislature the intention of limiting the operation of its
enactments to matters within its allotted sphere.,,755 Thus, section 9 must be read in a
manner that will not violate the constitution. However, we must bear in mind that reading
down is only done to maintain the constitutionality of a piece of legislation. A provision
need not be read down to limit it to what is in the exclusive jurisdiction of the enacting
legislature.
In summary, if there is an intrusion or encroachment on exclusive provincial
jurisdiction by virtue of section 9, it is a limited one that should not raise any
constitutional difficulties. The presumption of constitutionality requires us to read section
9 so as to keep it within constitutional limits.
753 P. HOGG, op. cit., note 721, n° 15.7, p. 376.
754 Supra, note 668
755 Id., p. 709. Cited in, J. LECLAIR, loco cit., note 32, p. 741.
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CHAPTER 5. Resolving the Law Applicable to Bankers'
Acceptances
In our analysis, we have seen various approaches to interpreting section 9 of the
Bills ofExchange Act. In most situations, statutes are clear enough to apply according to
their terms. Usually, the plain meaning of a statute will provide the same result as would
the consultation of that statute's purpose. However, thorny statutory provisions often
require a more subtl.e analysis, engaging a number of interpretive approaches. Section 9,
one of the most controversial provisions, may not be answerable by anyone of these
approaches alone, since it is equally amenable to several interpretations. However,
problems such as those posed by section 9 are inevitable whether by " ... inadvertence
(because the legislature did not contemplate the concrete situation now before the court
or tribunal) or by design (because the legislature deliberately left open an interpretive
question in order to forestall controversy or to ensure that passage of a statute would not
be stalled by disagreements over interpretation),,756 Still, this is little consolation or help
to a judge who must interpret a statute arising from actual litigation.
The fact that there is no single definitive, authoritative rule of interpretation for
section 9 is clearly a problem. Judges are faced with a diverse array of approaches to
statutory interpretation, which, in many cases, are contradictory. In the words of one
author, the question is, "[h]ow should judges choose doctrines of statutory interpretation?
756 P. MICHELL, loc. cit., note 612, p. 713 at 720
275
Judges explicitly or implicitly choose interpretive doctrines - canons of construction,
rules governing the admissibility and weight of extrinsic sources, and rules about the
force of statutory precedent.,,757
Similarly, with respect to the other provisions of the Act, we are confronted with
two authoritative texts, (the English and French versions) and no clear rule on how
discrepancy or conflict between the two ought to be resolved. At most, interpretive
approaches tell us that both common law and civil law meanings can be applied, but they
do not provide a legal rule that determines when either should be applied. The
constitutional approach, though somewhat more useful, leaves us with the same problem.
The issue of interpretive choice is that judges "will often be unable to choose interpretive
doctrines without making empirical and predictive claims (whether explicit or implicit)
about the consequences of the choice.,,758 Interpretive choice is really at the heart of
interpreting the meaning and scope of section 9. Professor Vermeule explains the
significance of the interpretative choice it in the following way:
The importance of interpretive choice is that the choice of an interpretive aim (such as capturing
legislative intent) tells the interpreter surprisingly little about the proper contours of interpretive
doctrine. Which of the plausible candidate doctrines would best promote the specified interpretive
aim will often prove to be a difficult question: The selection of one candidate will depend upon
empirical and. predictive premises about the sources used in statutory interpretation, the
competence and capacities of the judges and other officials who must implement interpretive
doctrine, and the behaviour and anticipated reactions oflegislatures and agencies. 7S9
757 Adrian VERMEULE, «Interpretive Choice», (2000) 75 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 74, 74.
758 Id, Rev. 74, 76.
759 Id, Rev. 83-84
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In other words, if a judge views the legislature's will as the authoritative source of
law, his or her approach to interpretation will differ significantly from the judge who
views the text itself as the only legitimate source of law. The theory of interpretation
relied upon will by a Judge will naturally impact which considerations are chosen. It
follows that justifying a judicial decision requires a judge to have adopted a line of
reasoning that demonstrates congruence between statutory interpretation and its practice.
In the outcome of a given case, the absence of clear guidelines on how to
approach the task of statutory interpretation leads to great ambiguity. Moreover, it is not
clear that interpretive guidelines will resolve difficulties created by the most contentious
of provisions. A recent attempt to sketch concrete and feasible methods of interpretive
choice recognized that the various techniques and strategies drawn from decision theory,
political science, philosophy, and rhetoric, can fruitfully be applied to the judicial choice
of statutory interpretation, "but these strategies are weakly determinate and thus provide
only imperfect guidance.,,76o
We are therefore left with the problem stated at the outset: Drawing the line of
application between common law and Quebec civil law is not necessarily obvious. There
is no strictly legal basis for applying provincial law to bills of exchange, aside from a
decision of policy, expediency or common sense. How much this lacuna matters is
debatable. Authors have suggested that, although many law professors posit abstract
"grand theories" containing a single foundational basis for statutory interpretation,
lawyers and most judges approach the project of interpreting statutes in an eclectic way.
They look at the text, legislative history, the context of the original enactment, the overall
760Id, Rev. 74, 78.
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legal landscape, lessons of common sense, and good policy.761 This is in line with
Eskridge's "practical reasoning" to interpretation. This approach has been described in
the following manner:
Briefly, this tradition, with its Aristotelian roots, emphasizes practical reasoning and wisdom,
experimentation, and approaching a problem from different angles in order to reach the best
solution. At the core of this approach is a healthy scepticism about all theoretical approaches and a
measure of uncertainty as to whether the answer chosen is the correct one. At the same time,
however, critical pragmatism is concerned to get the job done, not to equivocate or temporize.
Seen from this perspective, the essential problem of statutory interpretation is to apply a general,
abstract statutory provision to a concrete factual situation. Circumstances often arise which the
enacting legislators did not or could not have contemplated. Interpreters, on this account, must do
what works best, by reference to the 'web of beliefs' that surrounds a statute.762
This practical reasoning approach seems to share similarities with the 'pragmatic'
approach adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada. As Ruth Sullivan has pointed out:
Anyone who has read the recent case law of the Supreme Court of Canada dealing with statutory
interpretation must certainly agree that the pronouncements of the Court on this subject are
confusing and contradictory. However, the problem in my view is not methodological. In fact, the
interpretive practice of the Court is sound and is often exemplary; and overall this practice is
consistent. While it is true that in particular cases judges emphasize sometimes textual meaning,
sometimes intended meaning or purpose, and sometimes compelling policy concerns, in doing so
their approach is consistently pragmatic. Using a pragmatic approach, each judge takes advantage
761 See Stephen F. ROSS, «Statutory Interpretation in the Courtroom, the Classroom, and Canadian Legal
Literature», (2000) 31 Ottawa L. Rev. 39,41 citing W. N. ESKRIDGE, Jr. and P. P. FRICKEY, loco cit.,
note 593, p. 321.
762 P. MICHELL, loco cit., note 612, p. 713 at 731.
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of the full range of interpretive resources available to interpreters and deploys those resources
appropriately given the particulars of the case.76J
The pragmatic (or practical reasoning) approach is usually rejected in favour of
one of the other approaches because it is viewed as granting judges too much discretion
in arriving at an interpretation. Arguably, this is not the case, as judges already have that
discretion by virtue of their position in the trial process. This approach merely
acknowledges this reality and tries to bring to light the true reasoning in any given
decision.764 We must recognize that this process of choosing among competing methods
of interpretation is inescapable; judges are required to choose between alternative
implementing doctrines. 765
Given this stark realization about the statutory interpretation generally, and the
difficulty with section 9, what is (or ought to be) the applicable law for a BAs in Quebec,
and on what basis do we apply it? Concerning the difficulties raised by the provisions of
the Act, it would appear that the matter has now been conclusively resolved with the
entry into force of the Federal Law - Civil Law Harmonization Act, No.1.766 Section 8 of
the Harmonization Act amended the Interpretation Act. Section 8.2 of the Intelpretation
Act now reads:
763 Ruth E. Sullivan, «Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of Canada», (1998-1999) 30 Ottawa L.
Rev. 175,178
764 [d, p. 175,227.
765 Adrian VERMEULE, «Interpretive Choice», (2000) 75 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 83, 90.
766 2001, c. 4. It is interesting to note that a similar problem, that is, disparities between legal systems exists
at the international level as well. New rules set forth in the United Nations Convention on International
Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes are an attempt at reaching compromise between different
legislation, emanating from different legal systems, regarding commercial paper. For an analysis of the
acceptability of this compromise for practitioners in each system, see Martin PINAULT, «La reconciliation
des irreconciliables: la Convention des Nations Unies sur les lettres de change internationales et les billets a
ordre internationaux», (1997) 38 C. de D. 503. The harmonization that occurs in a bijural, bilingual country
is quite different because it recognizes both civil and common law rules, rather than trying to create a single
legal norm. This can be explained largely by the principle of federalism.
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RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
Property and Civil Rights
8.1 Both the common law and the civil law are equally authoritative and recognized sources of the
law of property and civil rights in Canada and, unless otherwise provided by law, ifin interpreting
an enactment it is necessary to refer to a province's rules, principles or concepts forming part of
the law of property and civil rights, reference must be made to the rules, principles and concepts in
force in the province at the time the enactment is being applied.
8.2 Unless otherwise provided by law, when an enactment contains both civil law and common
law terminology, or terminology that has a different meaning in the civil law and the common law,
the civil law terminology or meaning is to be adopted in the Province of Quebec and the common
law terminology or meaning is to be adopted in the other provinces.767
Section 8.1 would presumably resolve the problem raised by section 46(1)
regarding liability being based on the capacity to contract. Section 46 gives no indication
of the law by which it should be determined; however, since the capacity to contract is
generally governed by the provinces, section 46(1) has been viewed for the most part as a
reference to provincial law.768 Thus, according to section 8.1, capacity would be
determined by the Civil Code in Quebec and by the common law in other provinces.
Thus, "[t]he latter part of cl. 8.1 therefore makes express what has heretofore been an
implicit constitutional principle, namely, that provincial common law and civil law
767 R.S.C. (1985), c. 1-21, ss. 8.1,8.2
768 See for example, Ricard v. Banque Nationale, (1893) 3 B.R. 161; Dagneau v. Decarie, (1906) 8 R.P.
Que. 141 (C.S.); Morin v. Dion. [1957] C.S. 53; Consumers Acceptance Corporation, v. Gendron (1961),
[1962] C.S. 203; Roy v. Canadian Imperial Bank ofCommerce, [1971] C.A. 321.
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underlie and offer interstitial support for many of the private law elements of federal
enactments."769
However, there have been opinions that have maintained section 46(1) is not a
reference to provincial law, and that capacity should be determined according to the
common law by virtue of section 10 (now section 9).770 In that case, section 8.2 would
resolve the difficulty. Because the phrase "capacity to contract" entails different things in
the civil law than in the common law771 when cases concerning capacity to contract arise
in Quebec, capacity must be understood in the sense of the Quebec Civil Code.
Furthermore, section 8.2 would seem to handle the difficulties raised by
competing versions of the Bills ofExchange Act. Thus, section 179 which uses the term
"jointly/ conjointement" with different meanings in the civil law and common law would
no longer be problematic. The civil law meaning, emerging from the French version,
would apply in Quebec and the common law meaning, found in the English version,
would apply in the rest of Canada. In other words, the liability of joint makers of a note
would correspond to the province in which the note was made. The same would be true
of consideration. The use of the terms cause and atitre onereux - which are civilian in
nature - found in the French version of section 52 would lead us to apply the civilian
notion of consideration (Le., cause ou consideration) in Quebec, while the common law
understanding of consideration as valuable consideration would be the rule in the rest of
the provinces.
769 H.L. MOLOT, lac. cit.; note 497 14-15. See also, Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, supra,
note441,s.18.
770 For a discussion of the issue of capacity and the different approaches, see B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note
34, p. 1334.ff.
771 See B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1342 and 1347.
281
The Harmonization Act has thus provided a clear lUle for resolving the problems
associated with bilingual legislation, much like section 8 of the Official Languages Act,
prior to its modification.772 The purpose of the Harmonization Act is "to ensure that each
language version takes into account the common and civil law...Harmonization aims to
ensure that the existing provisions of federal laws are brought into line with existing civil
law."m Indeed, the full name of the Act is A First Act to harmonize federal law with the
civil law of the Province of Quebec and to amend certain Acts in order to ensure that
each language version takes into account the common law and the civil law. Section 8,
which amended the Intelpretation Act, went a long way to reducing the issues created by
legislation that does not adequately take account of both Civil and Common law legal
traditions. This was an important step to resolving the myriad of difficulties that arise
from the Bills ofExchange Act and its interpretation.
As L'Heureux, Fortin and Lacoursiere pointed out:
[p]ar ailleurs, Ie droit bancaire canadien, en raison des ses origines, se rattache en grande partie a
la common law. Si on ne peut ignorer cette realite, on doit egalement tenir compte du fait que Ie
contrat bancaire conclu au Quebec doit etre interprete selon les principes du droit civil. Cette
approche sera dorenavant peremptoire dans I'interpretation de toute loi federale depuis les
modifications introduites aux articles 8.1 et 8.2 de la Loi d'interpretation. C'est une autre
caracteristique que nous voulons souligner.774
772 R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-2. The Act contained a provision that created a rule of construction for bilingual
legislation, but it had been amended, and the rule of construction established in section 8 was repealed. See
supra, note _ (currently fn 475).
773 Luc GAGNE, «Bill C-50: Federal Law - Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. I» online:
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/36/I/parlbus/chambus/houselbills/summaries/c50-e.htm>
774 •N. L'HEUREUX, E. FORTIN and M. LACOURSIERE op. cit., note 54, p. 1-2
James Crossely VAINES, Personal Property, 5th ed., London, Butterworths, 1973, p. 161.
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Although the Harmonization Act is an important step in reconciling federal law
with provincial law, specifically the civil law of Quebec, it still leaves us in doubt with
respect to the interpretation of section 9. Section 9 is a highly unusual provision, quite
idiosyncratic, which creates a problem not easily resolved by the Harmonization Act.
Recall that the preamble to the Federal Law ~ Civil Law Harmonization Act, No.1,
provides that, "the provincial law, in relation to property and civil rights, is the law that
completes federal legislation when applied in a province, unless otherwise provided by
law." Section 9, however, may represent one instance where provincial law should not
apply, because the BEA provides explicitly that the common law of England shall apply,
and both section 8.1 and 8.2 apply only if it is not "otherwise provided by law."
Previously, we mentioned that Parliament "may explicitly decide the meaning
they wish to give to the terms deployed in their statutes. For example, the Parliament of
Canada might provide that the meaning of a tenn in one of its enactments is to be found
by reference to a specific definition within that statute itself, or even by reference to the
law of another jurisdiction such as England or France.,,775 Thus, insofar as section 9 may
represent an explicit derogation from the application of provincial law, the
Harmonization Act would be of little assistance in resolving the difficulties of
interpreting the provision in question.
Consequently, can the rules of interpretation created by the Hannonization Act
help us in resolving the problem of section 9'1 It seems that it all depends on one's
reading of section 9. One possibility contemplates that the "common law of England"
referred to in section 9 means quite simply the common law, as a system, not a restricted
body of law specific to a particular jurisdiction. According to this view, the expression
775 R. A. MACDONALD and F.R. SCOTT, loco cit., note 496, p. 49.
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"the common law of England" is not a term of art, but merely a way of refening to the
common law by a more fonnal designation. Granted, this would be contrary to a literal
interpretation (focused on the wording) of the Act, which refers to the "common law of
England." However, we must remember that,
When having recourse to pre-Act cases, the Canadian courts have not construed strictly the
reference to the common law "of England." They have, without comment or discrimination,
looked for guidance to earlier decisions in their own province, as well as from other provinces and
other countries, as a supplement to existing English jurisprudence, in the absence thereof and,
when justified by special circumstances, in preference therefore.776
Therefore, given that section 9 includes the common law of the provinces, and is not
limited to the law of England, section 8.1 of the InteTpretation Act could then be
understood in the following manner: "if in interpreting an enactment [that is, in
interpreting section 9] it is necessary to refer to a province's rules, principles or concepts
fonning part of the law of property and civil rights" That is, we must look to provincial
law of prescription, procedure, etc. to give meaning to the provision. Then "reference
must be made to the rules, principles and concepts in force in the province at the time the
enactment is being applied." We must look to the law of the province, i.e., the Civil Code
of Quebec when the problem arises in Quebec, and the common law in the rest of
Canada.
Note also that the French version of section 8.1 provides "en vue d'assurer
l'application d'un texte ... " which offers quite different meaning than "interpretation" and
776 B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1218.
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sheds some light on what is intended.777 In other words, we can understand it this way: In
trying to ensure the application of section 9, we must tum to provincial law, that is the
law of the provinces on matters of prescription, procedure, etc.; and we must tum to the
provincial law in force at the time, namely the Quebec Civil Code, and the common law
in the other provinces.
Although prima facie this appears to resolve the problem, a closer examination of
the rule of interpretation reveals that this is not the case. The applicability of the latter
part of section 8.1 turns on whether "in interpreting an enactment it is necessary to refer
to a province's rules, principles or concepts forming part of the law of property and civil
rights." Section 8.1 requires that it be neceSSalY to refer to provincial rules, principles or
concepts. This means "[i]f a federal enactment, expressly or impliedly, relies on a
provincial rule, concept or principle that relates to 'property and civil rights', it may not
be possible to fully understand and apply the federal enactment without recourse to that
provincial rule, concept or principle. Reference to the latter is therefore 'necessary' m
order to accurately interpret and apply the federal enactment.,,778
But this is not the case with section 9. There is nothing in the words of section 9
that indicate a reference to provincial law; nor is such a reading constitutionally required.
Parliament's power to legislate on matters of bills and notes would certainly allow it
determine the law governing matters of bills and notes, even if it had an incidental effect
on the provincial sphere. There is certainly no necessity to refer to provincial law, when
section 9 can easily be read as legislation by reference, with reference to the law of
particular jurisdiction, namely, England.
777 H.L. MOLOT, loco cit., note 497, 14
778Id.
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It seems therefore, that ultimately, the scope of section 9 must be determined on
the basis of policy. The policy choice of most authors and judges seems to be that, for
matters dealing with bills and notes in a strict sense, common law will apply. Civil law
will apply where the matter is "contractual" or "proprietary," that is, bills and notes in a
wide or broad sense. We believe this is the correct approach and should be adopted.
Although the distinction between bills and notes in a wide sense and bills and notes in a
strict sense is not found within the Act itself, and moreover, some jurists maintain that it
is incompatible with the language of that section,779 we neveliheless agree with Barak
that, " ... the distinction has proved a political and legal means of limiting the incidence of
sec. 10 and restricting its application to an absolute minimum.,,78o
Although we recognize that nothing compels this approach to section 9, we
nevertheless believe that a restricted application of the wording of section 9 is justified on
grounds of policy. Though we agree with LeDain that a restricted interpretation of section
9 is ultimately based on policy, we disagree on which policy should inform the
interpretation. As we mentioned above, LeDain leans towards uniformity as it recognizes
the "economic realities in the field of commerciallaw.,,781
Firstly, this aspiration to uniformity expressed by LeDain is often questioned.
Professors Macdonald and Scott maintain that toleration of diversity in legislative policy
is in fact a principal justification for federalism. 782 We thus concur with Perrault who
779 A. BARAK, lac. cit., note 85,73. Barak was referring to Falconbridge. Falconbridge states,
"Notwithstanding s. lO ... effect is given to this provision in Canada only with the limits of what may be
called the law of bills and notes in a strict sense" [emphasis added]. See J.D. FALCONBRIDGE, op. cit.,
note 537, p. 435.
780 A. BARAK, lac. cit., note 85, p. 73.
781 G. E. LEDAIN, lac. cit., note 507, p. 115
782 See R. A. MACDONALD and F.R. SCOTT, lac. cit., note 496, p. 42. Their primary concern is the
divergence oflegislative policy, but rather that policy divergence need be expressed in non-congruent
legislative language.
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maintains that, "il est exagere de pretendre qu'en matiere de lettres de change, cheques et
billets Ie parlement federal voulut uniformiser Ie droit canadien concernant toutes les
consequences juridiques decoulant de la redaction et de la mise en circulation de I'un ou
I' autre de ces ecrits."783
We maintain that the criteria which guide us in the policy choice of characterizing
statutes should be the same as those that guide us in interpreting section 9. The policy
choice that lies at the heart of this issue must be guided by the concept of federalism. In
other words, we must ask ourselves what aspects of bills and notes should be legislated
upon at the federal level and which aspects at the provincial level. The former should be
deemed to fall within the scope of section 9, and the latter should be governed by
provincial law. In making this policy decision, "[t]he only 'political' values which may
be accepted as legitimate ... are those that have a constitutional dimension to them, that is,
values that may reasonably be asserted to be enduring considerations in the allocation of
power between the two levels of government.,,784 Note that this does not mean that this
decision is required by the constitution, but rather that the constitutional division of
powers becomes the framework through which we analyze, and ultimately make a policy
decision, as to the interpretation of section 9.
The policy fits well with the double nature of the bill or note. We saw that the BA
is an obligation (contract) contained in a tangible piece of paper (property), as well as a
negotiable instrument. 785 The identification of the right to possess a bill or note and the
right to sue thereon corresponds to the double nature of a BA as a negotiable instrument
783 A. PERRAULT, op. cit., note 155, p. 173.
784 See generally, P. HOGG, op. cit., note 721, n° 15.5(9), p. 372. See also, William R. LEDERMAN,
Continuing Canadian Constitutional Dilemmas, Toronto, Butterworths, 1981, p. 241.
785 See A. BARAK, loco cit., note 85,67.
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on the one hand, and as a chose in action and a chattel on the other (or an intangible
obligation and moveable property in civilian terminology). This double, or rather triple
nature of a negotiable instrument has long been recognized. From a constitutional
perspective, the contractual and proprietary aspects of the bill fall within provinCial
legislative competence, whereas the negotiable instrument aspects fall within federal
legislative competence. The strict! wide dichotomy fits well with the constitutional
division of powers. The policy of restricting the interpretation of section 9 can thus be
justified by preserving the various aspects of bills and notes within their proper
constitutional spheres.
It is important to recall what we have mentioned earlier, namely, that the
constitutional division of powers would permit the federal government to legislate on
matters of bills and notes in a wide sense; if section 9 is to bear a restricted application, it
is not compelled by the Constitution. What we are suggesting here is simply that using
the constitutional division of powers as a framework, we can inteTpret section 9 to apply
only to bills and notes in a strict sense. Determining that the scope of section 9 is limited
to bills and notes in a strict sense however is only part of the solution. We must pay heed
to the concern expressed by Nicholls. He stated:
It is suggested that this distinction, correct perhaps so far as it goes is not particularly helpful and
may even actually be misleading. It is not helpful because it always gives rise to the further
question as to what is a problem of bills, cheque and notes in a strict sense ... and it may be
misleading because, for instance, as was shown in the case of prescription, a question that on any
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grounds is one of bills, cheques and notes in a strict sense may still fall to be decided by the civil
law of Quebec. 786
Generally speaking, when we refer to the law of bills and notes in a strict sense,
we are referring to the set of laws which includes the form, issue, negotiation, and
discharge of bills and notes. The law dealing with the property and obligatory elements of
the instrument is the law of bills and notes in the wide sense. 787 This categorization is
deceptively simple. It does not capture the difficulty of characterizing particular matters
as part of the law of bills and notes in a strict sense or wide sense.
Not every issue is problematic. Still, some are confounding. For example,
"[a]lthough it is not always easy to determine what comes within the law of bills and notes in a
strict sense, if anything would appear at first sight to fall into this category, apart from such
obvious matters as the form and negotiation of the instrument, it is the classification of defences
and the determination of where a particular defence stands in the classification, for this goes to the
very essence of negotiability. It is what makes the rights of the holder in due course what they are,
as distinct, for example, from those of the ordinary civil law assignee.,,788
Recall that the disagreement between Falconbridge and Perrault over the effect of
the defence of non estfactum in Quebec was premised on a question of whether it formed
part of the law of bills and notes in a strict sense.
The difficulty with the distinction is enduring, leading Nicholls to eschew a
universal test as we mentioned above, and examine, "the propriety of applying the civil
786 G.V.V. NICHOLLS, lac. cit., note 260,603
787 See B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1220. See also, B. GEVA, op. cit., note 153, p.256; N.
L'HEUREUX, E. FORTIN and M. LACOURSIERE op. cit., note 57, p. 421.
788 G.E. LEDAIN, lac. cit., note 507,120.
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law or the common law in each instance, and to evolve from that examination a series of
particularized rules-of-thumb to cover the most common situations that might arise.,,789
LeDain agreed. He found that, "[i]t is wiser not to attempt to formulate in positive terms a
general statement of what is governed byprovinciallaw.,,79o
789 G.V.V.NICHOLLS, loco cit., note 260, 603.
790 G.E. LEDAIN, loco cit., note 507,119-120
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5.1 Step-by-step Approach to Resolving the Law in Bankers'
Acceptance Transactions
In Chapters 1 to 4, we have set out the various issues arising in determining the
law applicable to BAs. In this section, we will layout a proposed method to answering
questions that may occur in dealing with bankers' acceptances. This approach will then
be illustrated by its application to a fictional case.
It is important that when looking at any problem arising in a BA transaction, the
following approach to arriving at the proper law should be adopted:
1. At the first stage of resolving a BA issue, it is important to keep in mind that with
respect to matters specifically in the Act, if the statute is unambiguous, it is the
sole guide to the applicable law.
1.1 In determining the law, we must also be careful not to refer to pre-Act case
law. The rules emerging from these cases are law only to the extent they are
"accurate and logical deductions from the general propositions of the statute.,,791
Such jurisprudence should be used with caution, and in a limited fashion. For
example, in cases where, "a provision be of doubtful import... Or, again, if in a
code of the law of negotiable instruments words be found which have previously
791 J.D. FALCONBRIDGE, op. cit., note 537, p. 427.
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acquired a technical meaning, or been used in a sense other than their ordinary
one... " These examples, however, are not exhaustive. 792
2. Once steps 1 and 1.1 have been completed and it has been found that the
provision in question is ambiguous, it must be interpreted. The interpretation of
the Act should follow the statutory rules and basic principles of interpretation. For
example, in reading the Bills ofExchange Act, one is unsure if the statement, "No
clerk, teller or agent of any bank... ,,793 refers to all employees of a bank (that is,
managers and directors as well). One would have to tum to the rules of statutory
interpretation (e.g., the Intelpretation Act, or cannons of construction such as
noscitur a sociis, esjudem generis, or expressio unius).
2.1 Section 8 of the Intelpretation Act should be used to interpret the enactment
if, in interpreting the Act, reference is necessary to rules, principles, or concepts
forming part of the law of property and civil rights of a province, or the provision
contains terminology that contains both civil law and common law terminology,
or terminology that has a different meaning in the civil law and the common
law. 794 According to section 8 of the Intelpretation Act, when an enactment
contains terminology that has a different meaning in the civil law and the
common law, the civil law terminology or meaning is to be adopted in the
Province of Quebec and the common law terminology or meaning is to be
adopted in the other provinces. Thus, when the Act refers to makers being
792 Bank ofEngland v. Vagliano Brothers, supra, note 490, 144-145.
793 B.E.A." s. 12
794 See R.S. 1985 c. 1-21, ss. 8.1 ,8.2
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"jointly/conjointement" liable on a note, they will each be liable only for their
proportionate share of the note in Quebec (pursuant to the civil code of Quebec
meaning of "joint,,/95 but will be liable for the entire amount in the remaining
common law provinces796 (unless the common law meaning of "joint" has been
modified or altered in those provinces).
If, however the matter is not dealt with in the Act, then:
3. The issue being dealt with must be confirmed as one of bills and notes, in either a
strict sense (Le., concerning the form, issue, negotiation, and discharge of bills
and notes) or wide sense (i.e., dealing with the property and obligatory elements
of the instrument). That is, the BA usually operates as part of a wider transaction
(as part of a larger financing scheme or credit facility) which involves many
parties and different interactions. Not all these are properly matters concerning
bills and notes (even in its broadest sense). For example, the credit agreement is a
part of the overall transaction between the bank and customer in setting up BA
financing, but it cannot be said to fall within the occupiable field, that is, it does
not form either part of the law of bills and notes in a strict or wide sense. It is too
remote to be governed by the Bills ofExchange Act, and will thus be governed by
the appropriate provincial law, as are all other contracts.
795 C.C.Q., art. 1518.
796 A. BOHEMlER and L.-H. RICHARD, loco cit., note 538,155-156; B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p.
1833.
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4. As well, the issue affecting the BA must not be regulated by other federal
legislation. The issue (e.g., evidence) must be examined along with other federal
statutes to see if they regulate the issue. For example, evidentiary issues regarding
bills and notes must be governed by provincial law (even though they could be
said to constitute part of the law of bills and notes in a strict sense) due to section
40 of the Canada Evidence Act, which provides:
In all proceedings over which Parliament has legislative authority, the laws of evidence in
force in the province in which those proceedings are taken, including the laws of proof of
service of any warrant, summons, subpoena or other document, subject to this Act and
other Acts of Parliament, apply to those proceedings. 797
Evidence has been the only issue that the courts have dealt with to date in respect
to bills and notes that has been subject to other federal legislation. However, with
new legislation, or modifications to existing legislation, there may be other issues
concerning the BA that will come to be governed by federal law, aside from the
Bills ofExchange Act (or indeed, the Depository Bills and Notes Act).
5. Section 9 shall apply if neither of the above conditions is met. Accordingly, one
must determine if the issue is properly one of bills and notes in a strict sense,
including the form, issue, negotiation, and discharge of bills and notes, or wide
sense, dealing with the propelty and obligatory elements of the instrument is the
law of bills and notes. The latter shall be governed by provincial law in its
797 Supra, note 610, s. 40. See also, Blais v. Mathieu, supra, note 609; Boyer v. Sambeau, supra, note 678.
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suppletive role as the jus commune; the former shall be governed by the common
law. The stricti wide analysis should be done with the federalism and
constitutional principles in mind, that is, the division of powers and the notion of
what would best enacted at the federal and provincial levels, respectively.
The application of the common law in most provinces raises no difficulty. However,
when an issue that is part of bills and notes in a strict sense requires the common law to
be applied in Quebec, which "common law" is to be applied? We know, for example,
courts have looked to various jurisdictions in applying the common law. Nevertheless, as
perplexing as this question seems at first glance, it is hardly as problematic as it may
seem. Firstly, as we have mentioned earlier, it is accepted that the common law includes
equity, but not statute law. Accordingly, the concepts and institutions of common law -
unaltered by statute - are virtually identical in every common law jurisdiction. It is highly
unlikely that applying the common law of one jurisdiction will be any different than
applying the law of another. In those rare instances where the expression of the common
law differs, we suggest that the expression of the common law articulated by the Supreme
Court of Canada should be the one applied. If the Supreme Court has not addressed the
particular issue, we suggest that reference be made to the common law of England.
Reference to the common law of a particular province, over any other, would require a
justification, and thus should be avoided. We must remember, however, that
discrepancies in the common law, unaltered by statute, are likely to be minimal, and even
less likely to be significant in those very small number of issues that form part of the law
of bills and notes in a strict sense and that are dealt with in the Act itself.
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To see this approach applied, we return to the example of BASE International
discussed in our introduction. Consider the following information about BASE
International:
A Montreal-based operation, BASE International, is a registered partnership of Mr. Louis O'Dell and his
son Eugene. Eugene is 17 years old. BASE needs money in order to purchase the resources it needs to
complete the order for its customer in Spain, and so it chooses to finance the purchase by way of
bankers' acceptance.
Louis O'Dell negotiates a credit agreement for BASE International with the representatives of Bank
ABC of Montreal. In turn, Bank ABC sends a copy of the credit agreement and completed drafts for the
other partner, Eugene, to sign as well. The bank representatives never met Eugene, nor were they aware
that he was a minor.
The documents and drafts were signed by both partners on January 16, 1995, and returned to the bank on
the same day. The face value of the BA was one million dollars ($1,000,000) with a maturity set at 90
days. On January 20, 1995 Louis O'Dell traveled to Sri Lanka to conclude the purchase of the necessary
goods. The following day, Louis O'Dell disappeared. The transaction was never completed.
Without the goods from India, Eugene could not generate sufficient funds to honour the terms of the
credit agreement. At maturity, the BA is presented for payment by a holder in due course, and the bank
duly paid the acceptance, as it was required to do. The bank initiates an action against Eugene O'Dell, as
drawer of the bill, for the recovery of the $1,000,000.
In this matter, the questions of law are: Is Eugene liable to the bank and if so, for how
much? The first question involves two separate questions, namely, is Eugene liable pursuant to
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the underlying credit agreement he signed, and secondly, is Eugene liable on the draft as a
drawer of the BA?
Using the steps set out above, we see that the underlying credit agreement is not dealt
with in the Act. Moreover, it seems clear that such an agreement is distinct and independent
from the operation of the bankers' acceptance. Accordingly, it does not constitute part of the
law of bills and notes, even in its widest sense, and falls to be governed by provincial law.
Since the credit agreement was signed in Montreal, we must turn to the Civil Code of Quebec
to determine the matter. We might look first to the section dealing with the capacity of persons
to determine the capacity of Eugene, who is a minor.798 For example, the bank might argue that
Eugene may not bring an action in nullity or reduction of his obligations because the damage
he suffered is the result of a fortuitous and unforeseen event.799 In any case, if capacity is
established, we might examine the provisions dealing with qualities and defects in consent. For
example, lesion may be argued. 8oo The codal provisions concerning obligations will determine
whether Eugene incurred any liability on the underlying agreement.
Concerning Eugene's ability to incur liability on the draft, the rule is expressed in
a provision of the BEA, namely, section 46(1), which provides, "capacity to incur
liability as a party to a bill is coextensive with capacity to contract." As we know, this
provision creates uncertainty because it gives no indication of the law by which it should
be determined. However, because section 46(1) is understood as a reference to provincial
law, it engages the rule of interpretation found at .section 8.1 of the Intelpretation Act,
and accordingly capacity must be determined by the Civil Code of Quebec, as the
798 C.C.Q. art. 155 jJ.
799 Id., art. 164.
800 C.c.Q., art. 1399 and 1406
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question arose in Montreal. The inquiry into capacity will thus be the same for the
underlying agreement as it is for the BA.
Nevertheless, once we have determined that Eugene can incur liability pursuant to the
Act, we must determine if, and on what basis, such liability would arise. It is clear that, as a
drawer, Eugene engaged his liability to any holder or any endorser who is compelled to pay the
BA if it is dishonoured. In this case, the BA was not dishonoured, nor is Bank X a holder or
endorser. It seems that the liability of a drawer to the acceptor is not stated clearly in the Act.
Consequently, because the relationship between drawer and acceptor appears to be part of the
law of bills and notes in a strict sense (and there does not appear to be any legislation dealing
with the matter), we may invoke section 9, and apply the common law of England. Remember
that Bank X is also an accommodation party on the bill, and that as an accommodation party it
holds a common law right to indemnification from the party accommodated (in this case,
Eugene O'Dell). This common law right of indemnification extends to bankers' acceptances
made in Quebec by virtue of section 9 of the Act 801 because the Act is silent on the matter, and
the relationship between drawer and acceptor forms part of the law of bills and notes in a strict
sense.
Eugene's capacity to enter into the underlying agreement and the BA will be
determined by Quebec civil law, although the basis of liability will differ in both instances.
With respect to the underlying agreement, Eugene's liability will be determined by Quebec
civil law, whereas common law will govern his liability pursuant to the BA. However, this
does not resolve the matter conclusively. Recall that both Louis and Eugene O'Dell signed the
underlying agreement and the draft. This raises the question of whether their liability was joint
or joint and several. The amount for which Eugene is liable is at stake.
801 See B. eRAWFORD, op. cit., note 87, p. 878; E. RAZIN, loco cit., note 10, 221-222
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There is no provision equivalent to section 179 regarding joint and several
liability of drawers of a bill. Indeed, the Act does not discuss multiple drawers; although
in discussing the conditions for the validity of notice of dishonour, the Act refers to
drawers in the plural,so2 and it has been suggested that two or more persons may act as
drawers on a bill. s03 The silence of the Act (and other federal legislation) makes this
question a section 9 issue. It is clear that the structure of liability of parties is part of the
law of bills and notes in a strict sense, but what about their modalities?
We must therefore decide if this matter is part of the law of bills and notes in a
strict sense or wide sense. The law of bills and notes in a strict sense does not include,
"all the consequences of, or all the rights or liabilities resulting from, the contracts
entered into by parties to bills and notes."S04 Moreover, recall that the constitutional
division of powers should aid us in making this determination. Since the modalities of
obligations fall within the provincial legislative sphere, and it would not impact the form,
issue, negotiation or discharge of the BA, it seems appropriate to allow provincial law to
govern whether the liability of drawers is joint, several or joint and several, or in civilian
terminology, whether the obligation is joint, solidary, divisible or indivisible. We
recognize that the "right to sue, force payment, or to recover on funds owing on a bill or
note is of the very essence of bills of exchange This is one of the essential characteristics
of a bill or promissory note."S05 However, whether the liability is joint or several does not
impact the right of Bank X to sue or enforce payment, and at most will incidentally affect
802 H.E.A., s. 96(d)
803 See B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1249. Moreover, it has been suggested that their liability is
probably joint, though it is not clear on what basis this is asserted.
804 See B. CRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1220. See also, A. PERRAULT, op. cit., note 155, p. 1088-89.
80S Attorney General ofAlberta and Winstanley v. Atlas Lumber Co., supra, note 438, 101
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its right to recover (where for example, one of the drawers cannot be found and the other
is only liable for his or her share of the debt).
Consequently, in Quebec, the amount Eugene would be held liable for would depend on
the provisions of the civil law of Quebec. For example, the nature of the partnership, between
Louis and Eugene O'Dell as general, limited or undeclared would determine whether Eugene
would be jointly or solidarily liable, that is, whether he would be liable for the sum of
$1,000,000, or $500,000. Likewise, had BASE International operated in Ontario, and entered
into a BA in that province, Eugene's liability would depend on the nature of his partnership
and the corresponding liability structure set out in the Partnerships Act of Ontario.806
806 R.S.O. 1990, c. P-5.
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RESOLVING THE PROBLEM OF THE LAW APPLICABLE TO A "BA"
(l) Is a law in the Bill of Exchange Act clear?
If yes, then it must be applied fully.
If not, then we must determine the applicable law to complete the
ambiguity.
Remember, when resolving this type of problem:
- Careful usage ofpre-act case law,
- Reference is made to the rules of statutory interpretation,
- Section 8 of the Interpretation Act is applied when an enactment
contains terminology, having different meaning in the civil law and the
common law, the civil law meaning or the common law. In such cases,
the civil law meaning should apply depending if we are in Quebec or in
another province.
(2) Does the Bill of Exchange Act not deal with a particular problem?
If it does not deal with a particular problem, then:
(a) Does it involve the "credit agreement between the bank and its
customer?" if yes, then provincial laws pertaining to contracts should
apply.
(b) Is the issue one of the BA's form, issue, negotiation, discharge (strict
sense). If yes, then the Federal Bills of Exchange act as well as the
Depository Bills & Notes Act apply
(c) Is the issue one whose jurisdiction is Quebec?
(d) Is the issue one ofproperty or obligatory elements of the BA (wide
sense?)
If yes are there any federal laws affecting the said issue?
If yes, reference must be made to them and to the common law of
each province.
If not, then the matter is governed by provincial laws and in Quebec,
that means the Civil Code of Quebec.
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Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to determine the law applicable to BAs, particularly
which aspects of BAs are to be governed by provincial law. In resolving these questions,
we have analyzed doctrinal opinions and relevant jurisprudence, as well as proposing a
technique to resolve the various issues that may arise in determining the law applicable to
BAs. The discussion of the history, development and evolution of a bill from a form of
payment into the BA, which may be part of highly sophisticated transactions, helps us
understand that new challenges may arise in relation to the BA as commercial practices
change over time.
To recapitulate, the Bills ofExchange Act is federal legislation, enacted under the
power granted to Parliament pursuant to section 91(18) of the Constitution Act, 1867. The
BA instrument, however, is part of a wider transaction involving a number of parties in
different relationships, as demonstrated in Chapter 3. Several of these relationships are
governed by the Act, and some are not. Moreover, there is confusion in the Act itself due
to section 9, which has lead to conflicting jurisprudence. Judges and jurists alike have
attempted to understand what was meant when the legislator stated, "[t]he rules of the
common law of England, including the law merchant, save in so far as they are
inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act, apply to bills, notes and cheques.,,807
Many judges of the courts in Quebec have either limited the application of section 9 or
ignored it altogether in applying civil law to matters arising on bills of exchange and
promissory notes.
807 R.S. 1985, c. C-5, s. 9.
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Is section 9 to be interpreted literally, requiring us to apply English common law
to every issue that might arise in connection with bills and notes? Did parliament mean
this provision to apply equally to Quebec, whose private law is based on the civil law
system? These issues have plagued the jurisprudence for over a century. Our study
looked to other interpretive approaches, offering a variety of different solutions, to the
problem of section 9, but has found them wanting. In addition to the problem of section 9
and its interpretation, there are issues arising from the enactment of bilingual legislation
in a bijural country. These issues have slowly been recognized over the last few decades.
Fortunately, the Harmonization Act amended the Interpretation Act, in an attempt to
recognize and give effect to both language versions, in order to give expression to both
the common law and the civil law. This has resolved a few of the problems we face with
the Bills ofExchange Act. Unfortunately, it cannot, and was likely never intended to, help
assist us with the peculiar provision that is section 9.
Our analysis has led us to adopt the opinion advocated by the majority of jurists,
but with the recognition that our approach to section 9 is based on reasons of policy. We
have adopted the stricti wide dichotomy, realizing the challenges inherent in determining
where one ends and the other begins. We adopted this approach on the basis of our
analysis in Chapter 2, which demonstrated that the complex character and multifaceted
nature of the BA is premised on its dual nature (as a negotiable instrument on the one
hand, and as a specie of contract and property on the other), which corresponds the stricti
wide dichotomy.
We believe that the method we suggested is the most reasonable and pragmatic,
and would prove quite valuable in solving problems arising with BAs. But in the final
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analysis, our approach to section 9 is simply one among many. It is hard to imagine
impugning a decision in which a judge offered a careful and considered judgment based
on a different interpretive approach to section 9, or in fact arriving at a different
conclusion as to what constituted a matter of bills and notes in a strict or wide sense.
Section 9 is clearly problematic, yet despite numerous changes to the Act, section 9 has
endured. There have been sixteen (16) modifications, and five (5) revisions of the Bills of
Exchange Act, none of which effectively dealt with the issues we have seen in this paper.
Seven (7) have concerned holidays or modified the meaning of "juridical day"; two (2)
others corrected typographical errors.808 Many involved reformulations of the French
version, leaving the English version virtually unchanged.809
Therefore, in our opinion, there are two (2) possible solutions. Firstly, there is the
possibility that section 9 could be repealed. In this case, all matters not expressly dealt
with in the Act would fall to be governed by provincial law, as is the case with other
federal legislation. In these cases, Quebec Civil Law takes on a suppletive role in
applying a federal law in Quebec. However, repealing section 9 would introduce Quebec
Civil Law notions as the law of those aspects of form, issue, negotiation and discharge
that had not been mentioned in the Act. Effectively, this would mean that the law of bills
and notes, in its strict sense, that is, the law relating to the negotiable instrument aspect of
BAs, would be different across the country. While the policy we have expressed above
suggests that provincial law should govern proprietary and contractual aspects of bills
and notes, it is equally true that those core aspects of bills and notes (in a strict sense)
808 See B. eRAWFORD, op. cit., note 34, p. 1178.
809 See J.-M. BRISSON and A. MOREL, loco cit., note 539, 772.
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concerned with its negotiability, that is, with the bill as a negotiable instrument, should be
governed by uniform law - the law of negotiable instruments. Since such a law of
negotiable instruments can only be provided by parliament, given the constitutional
division of powers, we believe that matters of bills and notes in a strict sense should not
be left to be governed by provincial law in the silence of the Act.
Rather, it appears to us that modifying as opposed to repealing section 9 while
incorporating the stricti wide dichotomy is the preferable solution. Therefore, we suggest
that the provision reads as follows: "The rules of the common law of England, including
the law merchant, save in so far as they are inconsistent with the express provisions of
this Act, apply to bills, notes and cheques in a strict sense. For greater certainty, bills and
notes in a strict sense include the form, issue, negotiation and discharge of bills, notes and
cheques." The modification of section 9 should reflect the practice of the BA transaction.
Notably, that the amendment combines the qualities of a negotiable instrument governed
by federal law, as well as the aspects of property and contracts governed by provincial
law. The Law Reform Commission should consider drafting a legislation consisting of a
more elaborative and clear wording that guides us in understanding the strict and wide
interpretation of section 9. In Chapter 3, we elaborated on how the Depository Bills and
Notes Act, (DBNA) came into force on June 11, 1998, to bring clarification to the BEA
for matters pertaining to electronic negotiable instruments. Although the DBNA was seen
as a temporary measure, still until today, it is in force and has been very useful in dealing
with electronic acceptances. In the same way that the DBNA has joined the BEA as a
further law concerning the creation and transformation of the BA into a negotiable
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instrument. Similarly a new legislation on the strict/wide understanding of section 9 can
also join these ranks.
This short Act could be named the Bankers Acceptance Act (BAA), and explain
the dichotomy between the strict and wide sense of section 9. For example, the
Commission could group elements relating to the strict interpretation of the BA, such as
issue, negotiability and discharge into a single provision and define those elements in
further detail under federal law. In another provision which will be more challenging to
formulate then the first, the Commission could lay down the wide aspects of the BEA that
the courts and doctrinal authors have examined and have classified as wide in light of the
Quebec Civil Code and Common law. Particularly, capacity to contract (e.g., incapacity
by minors); liability of co-signers (joint and several) and of endorsers; means of defence
available against a holder in due course; cause or consideration; proof (e.g., the
admissibility of evidence given orally, or by a consort, onus of proof of good faith);
procedure and prescription". With such a law in place, jurists can interpret the matters
set above according to the applicable federal and provincial laws. Supposing that the
Commission would only choose to create the provision that explains the strict sense of
section 9, then that in itself would be an advancement and would further our
comprehension of the BA.
Another way of codifying the strict/wide dichotomy would be until the Legislator
decides on creating an Act, a group of bankers, lawyers and legal authors could compile a
set of rules and practices based on case study and research, which in turn would be
applied by Canadian banks as a code of conduct to all BA transactions. For example, the
Uniform Practices and Customs (UCP) rules concerning letters of credit was a law
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adopted not by a Legislator, but by merchants, traders and bankers and is viewed as the
lex mercatoria (Commercial Law) since it regulates issues involving letters of credit
transactions. Considering that a similar codification for the BA would not have the same
effect as an Act created by Parliament, we still support the idea of establishing rules
which would avoid confusion as to the application of provincial law regarding BA
transactions.
These types of changes would assist in clarifying the law, and strike the
appropriate balance between the application of federal and provincial law regarding
bankers' acceptances. This approach is best "adapted to economic realities in the field of
commercial law [and will assist in] achieving a working relationship, and indeed as large
a measure of uniformity of result as possible, between the civil law and common law in
th ·al fi ld ,,810e commercl e ....
810 G. E. LEDAIN, loco cit., note 507, 115.
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